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1. S ee Edw ar d J . Imw ink elrie d, A S ma ll Contribution to the Debate Over the
Prop osed  Legislation Abolishing th e Charact er Evidence Prohibition in S ex Offense
Prosecu tion s, 44 SY R AC U S E  L. RE V. 1125, 1129 (1993). For example, the F ederal  Rule s
of Evidence, the formulation of the ru les of evidence in  p lace  in  the substan t ia l
ma jor i ty of America n ju risd ictions , i d . at  112 7, p ro vid e t ha t “[e]v ide nce  of a  p e r son’s
cha rac te r o r  a  tr a i t  of  cha ract e r i s n o t  adm iss ible  for t he  pu rp ose of p rov ing  act ion
in  con for mit y t her ew it h  on  a  pa r t icu la r  occ asion , e xcep t  . .  . . ” F E D . R. E V I D. 404(a ).
2. S ee, e.g., Thom as J . Reed, Trial by Prop ensity: Adm ission of Other Criminal
Acts Evidenced in Fed eral Criminal T rials,  50 U. CIN . L. RE V. 713, 739 (1981) (“I t
for[bids] t he  admiss ion  of  other  c r imi na l a cts  of th e a ccu se d a t t ri al  bec au se  of th e
subst an t i a l da ng er  of un du e pr eju dice t o th e a ccus ed a ri sin g from  infe re nt ial  pr oof
of the a ccused’s disposition to commit th e crim e.”). In this regar d, the Feder al Rules
of Ev idence  r e st a t e  t he gener a l  ch a ra cter e vidence r ule in  th e context  in wh ich it is
of pa rt icul ar  conce rn : “Evide nce  of oth er cr im es, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove  th e ch ar act er  of a p er son  in or der  to s how  action  in conform ity t her ewit h.” FE D .
R. E VID. 404 (b).
3. See F E D . R. E VID. 413 and 414, which became effect ive on  Ju ly 9, 1995. Rule
415 of the  Federa l Rules of Evidence, wh ich per mit s th e int rodu ction of simila r
evid en ce in civil ca ses concerning sexual assa ult or child molestation, was ena cted
simu lta neou sly along with Rules 413 and 414 of the Feder al Rules of Evidence.
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The Cha ra cter E vidence Rule Revisited
Kenneth J . Melilli*
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 A long-s tand ing  funda men ta l t enet of the ru les of evide nce
in  Amer ican  ju r isdict ions h as b een  a  gen er a l prohibi t ion  of
cha ract e r evidence for th e pur pose of proving an  actor ’s  confor -
mi ty with  a  ch a r a ct er  t r a i t  on  a  pa r t icu la r  occas ion .1 Alth ough
th i s character  evide nce r u le i s n ot  res t r ict ed  to the
ci rcumstance in  wh ich  the pr osecut ion se eks  to in tr oduce n ega -
tive  cha ra cter  eviden ce concer nin g a crim ina l defend an t, it  is
the de si re t o pr otect  the cr im in a l defenda nt  from the im pa ct  of
such evidence th at  accoun ts for th e firm vitalit y of th e ru le.2
Recen tly,  th e Feder al Rules  of Evidence ha ve been am ended
so as t o pe rmit  the gover nmen t , in  pr ose cut ion s for sexu al as-
sau lt  or child  moles ta tion , to in t rodu ce ev iden ce of t he cr imina l
defendan t ’s prior offenses  of se xu a l a ss au lt  or  child  moles ta t ion ,
r e spect ively.3 Th es e n ew add it ion s t o the F ed er a l Ru les  of Ev i-
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4. S ee, e.g., R eport  of th e J ud icia l Con feren ce on t he A dm iss ion  of Ch ara cter
Ev idence in  Cert ain  S exu al M iscon du ct Ca ses , 159 F.R.D. 51, 53 (1995) [hereina fter
Ju dicial Con feren ce]; Myrna  S. Rae der , Am erica n B ar A ssoci at ion C rim in al J us tice
S ection  R eport  to t he H ous e of Del egat es, 22 FORD HAM  URB . L.J . 343  (199 5).
5. S ee infra  note s 150–163 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
6. S ee infra  note s 164–177 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
dence received subst an tial opposition prior t o their en actm ent ,4
a s well as a gr eat  deal of criticism sin ce tha t t ime.5 Not  the
least of these criticisms has been directed at t he new rules’
unfounded  pr em ise t ha t s ex offense ca ses  me rit  ent ire ly differ -
en t eviden t ia ry t r ea tmen t  t han do prosecut ions for oth er
crimes.6
But  while th ere m ight be n o just ifica t ion  for  a  crim e-specific
ad jus tment  to the ru les  govern ing th e adm issibility of cha ra cter
evidence, i t  does  not  fol low tha t  the solu t ion  i s a  re tu rn  to an
offense-neut ra l pr oscript ion aga ins t  the in t roduct ion  of
cha ract e r evide nce. I n  fact , as  will be dem onst ra ted  sh ort ly, it
does n ot  app ea r  tha t  any such  compr eh en sive a dh er en ce t o the
cha ract e r evidence rule ha s ever r eally existed. Never th eless,
by their  assa ult u pon th e char acter  evidence rule, th e new
federal  ru les ha ve provoked  a ba cklash in  defense of this sacred
cow of evide nce la w. A close  exa min a t ion  of the r a t ion a l es
adva nced for t he pr eserva t i on  of the ch ar act er e viden ce ru le
actually lead to the following conclusions.
F i rs t , the  characte r  ev idence ru le i s m ore r het or ic t han
subst an ce; th e pra ctice in Amer ican courts  belies any r eal
commi tment  t o excluding cha ract e r  evidence. An unin itiat ed
observer  of our adjudicatory system would be astounded to
learn  of the ch aracter  evide nce r u le,  for  cha ra cter  eviden ce is
adm itted  her e, ther e an d everywher e.
Secon d,  when stripped of hyperbole, the sta nd a rd
a rgumen t s for  t he  cha ract e r  ev idence  ru le  a re lar gely
speculat ive and u nper sua sive.
Third, th e only t ru ly cogen t  just ifications for the cha ra cter
evide nce ru le are t hose foun ded, to some degree or a noth er,
upon judicia l econ omy an d cour tr oom efficiency. These concern s
do not suppor t  a  b road exclusionar y rule, but  ra th er can  be
accomm odated  by pr esu mp tively lim itin g  relevan t cha ra cter
evide nce t o the for m of pr ior  convict ion s.
Four th , whe n ch ar act er e viden ce is ad mit t ed  under  the
cur ren t ru les , it  get s in  unde r  one or  more of a  va r ie t y of
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ M E L - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1547] CHARACTER EVIDENCE  REVISITED 1549
7. S ee Edw ar d J . Imw ink elrie d, The  Use  of  Ev iden c e of an  Accu sed ’s U nch arg ed
Mi scon du ct to P rov e Mens Rea : T h e  Doctr in es W hi ch T hr eat en t o En gu lf t he C ha ract er
Ev idence Proh ibit ion , 51 OHIO  ST . L.J . 575 , 58 0–8 1 (19 90).
8. In  som e ca ses, t he firs t st ep in t his pr ocess simp ly involves cred iting t he
t e s t imony of t he  cha ra cte r w itn ess . Th is occu rs  wh en  th e wit ne ss t est ifies  in t he  form
of opin ion  (th e p er son al  opin ion  of th e witnes s ,  based  upon  the witness ’s  persona l
kn owledge of the in dividua l in quest ion) or rep ut at ion (a consen sus  or collective
opin ion  about  th e individu al in q ues tion, a s re layed to  the ju ror s  by the  cha ract e r
wit ne ss ). Examples of character  evidence in t hes e forms w ould be t estim ony by a
cha rac te r witness  tha t  the re levan t  ind ividua l is a vi olent p ers on (opinion) or is
reput ed by members of tha t individual’s social circle t o be a  violen t p er son
(re pu ta ti on ).
In  other cas es, the first  step in t he pr ocess requ ires  an actu al inferen ce to be
made  by th e jur y. This occur s whe n t he cha ra cter w itn ess t estifies in  t h e  fo rm  o f one
or  more  specific insta nces of beha vior by th e rele van t in dividua l. For exa mp le,  if t h e
cha rac te r witness  were  to t es t ify tha t  the  re levan t  ind ividua l h ad physically beaten
his  spouse on  a pa rt icular  occasion or occasions, t he ju ry m ight  infer t he in dividua l’s
genera l pr open sit y tow ar d viole nce  ba sed  up on s uch  spe cific beh avi or.
Ess ent ially, th e a na lyt ical  dis tin ction  bet wee n ch ar act er  evid en ce in  th e for m of
complex theories and e xcep t ion s.  As a  conse qu en ce, s uch
evide nce is u su ally a ccomp an ied by jur y inst ru ctions inten ded
to assist  t he  ju ry in i t s appropr ia t e use . H owever , be cause  su ch
inst ruct ions ar e often b oth  hopeles sly confus ing and  con t r a ry to
common sense, t her e is no realist ic hope that  th ey will be
follow ed  by ju rors.
A simpler , m ore st ra igh t forward  approach  to the
ad mis sibilit y of cha ra cter  eviden ce would a lleviat e t he  above
problems. This ar ticle will exam ine t he d eficiencies in t he
cur ren t app roach , a nd w ill  recom men d s uch  a  sim plified
solu t ion .
II. TH E  TR A D I T I O N A L  ST AT E  O F  AF F A I R S
 The essent ia l character is t ic of ch aracte r  ev idence  is  tha t it
requ ires  two steps of logical in feren ce. Fir st , th e jur y mu st
draw a conclusion from the evidence about an individua l’s
genera l propensity t o behave in a certa in wa y, an d second , the
ju ry must  measur e the likelihood that th e same individual
beha ved in accordance  wi th th is  genera l p ropensity  on  the
par t icu la r occasion  in  qu es t ion .7 Thus,  the essent ial featu re of
cha ract e r evide nce is  tha t  it s r ele va nce depends  upon  a
conclu sion  abou t  an  in divid ua l’s ge ner a l propensi ty; if t he
evide nce ha s r elevan ce with ou t n ecess ar ily re qu irin g a
conclu sion  a bout gener al pr opensity, it is not cha ra cter
evidence and is n ot bar red by t he cha ra cter evidence ru le.8
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ M E L - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1550 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
opin ion  o r  r epu tation t estim ony an d char acter  eviden ce in th e form of specific
instan ces is t ha t,  in  th e la tt er  cir cum st an ce, t he  ju ry  mu st  ta ke  th e fi r s t  ste p fr om
beh avi or  to gene ra l pr opensity, while in the former situa tion, the witness (in the case
of opinion t estim ony) or even  pers ons n ever h ear d from dir ectly in  th e court room (in
the case of reput ation test imony) have taken  this  firs t s te p for  th e ju ry . In  bot h
scenarios, it is for t he ju ry t o dete rm ine if, and to what degr ee, the second step
(beh avi or  on t he  occas ion i n q ue st ion i n con form i t y w it h  the  individua l’s  genera l
propen sity) shou ld be  taken .
9. S ee supra  no t e 2  and accompany ing  t ex t .
10. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 404 (a)(1 ).
11. This  sequ ence is a ppar ent  from t he wor ding of Rule 404 (a)(1), which perm its
“[e]vide nce  of a pert inen t t ra it of char acter  offered  by an  accused , or by th e
pr osecu tion  to r ebu t t he s am e.” Id .
As noted  ea r li er ,9 th e pr ima ry concer ns  un der lying t he
cha ract e r evidence rule a r e  t h e consequ en ces of allowin g th e
ju ry to draw conclusions about the general propens ity of a
criminal  defendant. If t he in t rodu ct ion  of character  evide nce
against  the  accused  in  a  cr i m inal prosecution can be defended,
th en  th e us e of cha ra cter  eviden ce in a ll othe r s itu at ions is
appropr ia t e as  well. Conse que nt ly, th e ba lan ce of th is a rt icle
will focus  on  the  mos t  common  a nd m ost d an gerou s scen ar io:
the p rosecu t ion’s  in t roduct ion  of evidence  of t he  de fendan t ’s
cha ract e r .
P r ior  t o t he  r ecen t  addit ions of Rules  413 a nd 4 14 to the
Fed e r a l Rules  of Evid en ce, t her e a lr ea dy  exi st ed  a  va r iet y of
ci rcumstances in which  the  government  cou ld in t roduce
evide nce of t he  de fendan t ’s  cha ract e r . These ci r cums tances a re
embodied a t  five di ffer en t  point s in  the F ed er a l Ru les  of
Evide nce. E ach  of thes e will be a ddr esse d in  tu rn .
 A. Rules 404(a) and 405(a)
One of the  tw o exception s t o Rule 40 4(a)’s gen e r al
pr oscript ion aga ins t  t h e admission of character evidence is a
specific a llow ance for  evide nce of the  characte r  of the accused.10
There ar e, of cour se, t wo impor ta nt  res tr ictions u pon t his
exception to the cha ra cter evidence ru le.
The fi r st ,  and  mos t  impor t an t , of these limitat ions is that
the defendan t  mus t  go fi r st ; i.e.,  the government  may not
in t roduce cha ract e r evidence regarding the defendant  unless
and un t i l the defen da nt  in t rodu ces  character  evide nce a bou t
him self or  her se lf.11 Wit hout  qu es t ion , t he goa l of p rotect ing the
defendan t  from t he gover nm ent ’s n egat ive cha ra cter  eviden ce is
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12. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 405(a). The d istin ction bet ween  opinion  an d r epu ta tion
te s t imony a s  con t r as t ed with  t e s t imony as to specific instan ces of conduct is discussed
supra  at  not e 8. Th e choice made in Rule 405(a) might very well be regarded as an
odd one. It requ ires th e jury to tr ust  the ju dgment  of the witness  (or those who
gossip with  the  wi tnes s ) r a the r  t han  be ing  pre sen ted  wi th t h e  a ctu al  beh av ior  of th e
de fendan t . Th e pr efer en ce for op ini on a nd  re pu ta tion  evid en ce is  cont ra ry  to t he
conve nt iona l wis dom  as  to t he  re lat ive p rob at ive s up er ior ity  of eviden ce of specific
instan ces of condu ct. S ee, e.g.,  David P. Le ona rd, The Use of Character to Prove
Conduct: Rationalit y and  Catharsis in  the Law  of Evid ence ,  58 U. COLO . L. RE V. 1,
16 & n.94 (1986–87). Moreover, reputat ion evidence is thought  to be the least  reliable
and potentially the m ost dangerous form of character  eviden ce. S ee H.  Richa rd
Uvil le r , Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and In justice in the
Cou rtr oom , 130 U. P A. L. RE V. 845, 885 (1982 ). Never th eless , opting to exclude
cha rac te r evidence in the form of specific instan ces of conduct does avoid po t en t i ally
t ime-consuming cour t b at tl es  over  th e a ctu al  pr ior  cond uct  of the defendant. It  is,
ther efore, one of severa l specifics in th e law gover nin g char acter  eviden ce, suggest ing
tha t  su ch e vide nt iar y r ule s a re  dr iven  in s ub st an tia l pa rt  by con cer ns  for cou rt room
econ omy  an d efficiency.
fully advanced by pr oviding t he  defen da nt  wit h t he  only ke y to
t he locked door, behind wh ich lies evidence of th e defendan t’s
cha ract e r . Bu t  the p rice th at  th e defendan t m ust  pay t o keep
tha t  door locked is  t he fir st  de monst ra t ion  of the la w’s la ck of
tota l commi tmen t  t o th e char acter  evidence rule. In  r esponse to
a  false accusa tion , a defenda nt ’s na tu ra l response would be t o
sta te,  “I  would not  do such  a  th ing , and  the people who kn ow
me will tell you t ha t.” A defenda nt  who chooses t o call
witnes ses  to so t es t ify ess en t ia lly w aives t he p rotect ion  of th e
char acter  evidence rule.
There is, to be su re , not t he s light est  un fair nes s in  th is
a r r angemen t . If ther e indeed  exi st s n ega t ive  character  evide nce
be h in d the now unlocked doors, then perha ps the defendant ’s
own  cha ra cter  witn esse s a re n ot t o be believed, and  surely the
jur y is ent itle d t o more  th an  jus t h alf t he  st ory. Never th eless , if
cha ract e r evidence, and in  par ticular , negat ive cha ra cter
evidence, is so prejudicial, why allow it even un der t hes e
circumstan ces? It  wou ld  se em  tha t  eit her  su ch  charact er
evide nce has s ome r ea l va lu e or  the r u le is a  less t ha n gen uin e
att empt  to in hib it d efend an ts  from in tr oducin g posit ive
char acter  evidence concerning t hem selves.
The se cond l im it a t ion  on the in t rodu ct ion  of cha ract e r
evide nce regard ing  the defendan t  i s tha t  such  evidence must  be
presen ted in  the form of op in ion  or  repu ta t ion  t est imony  on ly
and not  as e vid en ce of spe cific inst ances  of conduct .12 While t his
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13. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 405 (a).
14. S ee 2 J ACK B. WEIN STE IN E T AL ., WEINSTE IN ’S  E VIDENCE  ¶  405[04], at 405–50
(199 6).
15. S ee E D W A R D W. CLEAR Y ET AL ., MCCORMICK ON  E VIDENCE  § 191, at 569 &
n.28 (3d e d. 1 984 ).
16. S ee 2 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  405[04], at 405–50 to 405–51.
migh t  ap pea r t o be only a m at ter  of form ra ther  than  substance ,
ther e is  one fu r ther  asp ect  of the r u le t ha t  de se rves  a t t en t ion .
On cross -examina t ion  of a  characte r  wi tness , quest ions  a re
perm itted  as t o speci fi c i ns t ances of t he  de fendan t ’s  conduct .13
Thus, for  example , the  characte r  wi tness  who test i fi es  tha t  the
defendan t  is, or is r eput ed to be, a pea ceful  person m ay be
cross-exam ined as  to sp ecific inst an ces of violent or  aggr ess ive
beh avior  of th e defendan t .  The theor y u nde r lying t he a llowance
of su ch  in qu ir ies  in to sp ecifi c in st ances  of condu ct  is  not  t ha t
such  questions a nd answ ers  a re  admi t t ed  to p rove the
defendan t ’s ch a r a ct e r , bu t  r a ther  a re  admi t t ed  to enable the
jur y t o de ter min e what  we igh t , if a ny, s hould  be  give n  to the
tes t imony of the character witness.14 If the positive char acter
witnes s does n ot k now or  ha s n ot h ea rd  of the  nega tive
beh avior  of the  de fendan t ,  then  the  characte r  wi tness  a rguab ly
does not  t ru ly know of t he d efenda nt ’s ch aracter  or  rep u ta t ion ;
if th e pos it ive  cha racter  wit nes s d oes  kn ow or  has h ea rd of t he
negative behavior of the defendant , th en  the p osi t ive  opin ion  or
r epu ta t ion  test imony of th e char acter  witnes s is pr esu ma bly of
lesser  or no value.15 Such inquiries on cross-examina t ion  a re
typ ically accompa nie d by a  limit ing in st ru ction d ire ctin g th e
ju ry to consider such questions and a nswers, n ot  as  nega tive
evide nce of th e defenda nt ’s ch aracter , bu t  ra ther  as e vid en ce
which , in the judgmen t of th e jur y, can on ly be us ed in
dete rmin ing wh at  we igh t , if a ny, t o ass ign  to th e  ch a ra cter
witnes s’s tes tim ony of the defenda nt ’s positive chara cter. 16
Here we ha ve th e first of several exam ples of th e law’s
theore t ica l observance of the char acter  evidence rule by the
de vice  of a likely ineffect ua l  ju ry  ins t ruct ion .  The  actua l
evide nce presented to the jury on cross-exa m ina tion —specific
inst an ces of ba d con du ct  i n t he  con text  of t e st imony  as to the
defendan t ’s good  character—ha s all th e ear ma rk s of char acter
evidence. The defendan t is sa id to be a pea ceful, nonviolent
person , and  it  comes  to l igh t  tha t  he  or  she has  physi ca lly
ass au lted  severa l individuals on sever a l prior occasions. That
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17. S ee 2 i d . ¶ 405[04], at 405–51.
18. S ee Abra ha m P . Ord over, Balancing the Presum ptions of Guilt and
In nocen ce: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J . 135  (198 9).
th i s i s a ffi rma t ive  evide nce of a  viole n t  pr ope nsi ty ca nnot
seriou sly be doub ted , an d, m ore t o th e point , it is im pr obable
tha t  the ju ry wi ll con fin e it s con side ra t ion  of th is evidence to its
nominal nonchar acter perimeters.17
In  fact , on e of t he t wo t h e or ies on which such cross-
examina t ion  is  pe rmit t ed —tha t  the valu e of th e char acter
witness’s t e st imony  is  d imin ished  because the  cha ract e r
witness is un aware of the negative behavior—depends
neces sa rily upon the actual existence of such  behav ior  on  the
pa r t of the defendan t .  I t  is un rem ar ka ble tha t a  char acter
wit nes s i s u nawa re of a n  event  th at  did not a ctua lly take p lace.
Therefore, when the chara cter witness who has testified as to
the defendan t ’s  nonviolent character admits on cross-
examina t ion  to ignorance  conce rn ing the  de fendan t ’s  p r ior
assaults,  there can be no dim inut ion of the character witness’s
tes t imony un less  the ju ry accept s t ha t  ther e r ea lly  were s uch
incidents  of p r ior  assau lt ive  behavior  on  the  pa r t  of the
defendan t . This  ren der s it  all  t he  more  improbable tha t  the
ap plicable  limiting ins tr uction will accomplish its  sta ted
pur pose. The jury, having concluded that t he defendant  has
engaged  in a ssa ult ive conduct , is now ins t ructed  not  to consider
th i s as affirm at ive evidence of th e defendan t’s char acter  even
as it  resolves the  very qu es t ion  of the d efenda nt ’s ch aracter  for
violence or peacefulness.
The unl ikelihood  tha t  the ju ry  wi ll  both  comprehend  and
obey the limit in g in st ruct ion  a t t en da nt  to th is  evide nce is  not
prem ised upon a  pejorative as sessm ent  of either  the
in tell igence or th e good faith  of jurors. Th e problem lies not
with  the jurors, but with t he instruction itself.  Lawyers are
prone to creat e th eor e t ica l d is t in ct ion s t ha t  a re e it her  illusor y
or  im pos sible  to app ly p ract ically, es pe cia lly  by ju rors w ho are
not  part icipants in the intellectua l hair-splitting activities that
spawn  such distinctions.18 Children  can  pr ete nd  th at  th e fam ily
dog is a lion for t he pu rposes of a par ty gam e, but t he lat e-
a r r iving child not involved in t he gam e can h ar dly be blamed
for  gazing at th e animal and pr onouncing, “It’s just a  dog.”
Alth ough  even  a  thorough  indoct r ina t ion  in  the  reasons
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19. S ee, e.g., Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1140–41, 1145–46.
20. After  resta ting th e gene r al pr oscr ipt ion  em bodi ed i n t he  cha ra cte r e vid en ce
rule,  th e rele van t sect ion of Rule 404(b) provides t ha t “[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts . . . may, however, be admissible for other  purposes,  such a s pr oof
of motive, opportunity, intent , preparat ion, plan, knowledge, ident ity,  or a bse nce  of
mis take or accide nt .” FE D . R. E VID. 404 (b).
under lying the limit in g in st ruct ion  migh t  not  advance t he goa l
of th e inst ru ction, the a b se n ce of any exp lan at ion virt ua lly
insu res failur e.
So why does th e law continu e to perm i t  wha t a ppear s to be
cha ract e r evidence to reach t he jur y, shielding th e defendan t
with  only a feeble ju ry cha rge r est rict ing consid era tion  to its
noncha ra cter  us e? Sur ely it is  not  an  unwar ran ted  fa i th  in  such
an  in st ruct ion ; the ca se  for  the ch aracter  evide nce pr ohibit ion is
lar gely prem ised  upon  the cla im ed  in effect ivenes s of
inst ruct ions confin in g ju ror  conside ra t ion  of s u ch  evide nce t o a
non-prejud icia l scop e.19 Per ha ps t he e xpla na tion  is t ha t, wh ile
the limiting instru ct ion  a llows u s t o wor sh ip  a t  the a lt a r  of th e
cha ract e r eviden ce ru le, in r ealit y we a re not truly persuaded of
the ru le’s worth . Perh aps  we ar e not t err ibly both er ed by t he
ad mis sion of wha t  has a l l th e appea ra nce of wha t t he cha ra cter
evide nce ru le  ca t egor i zes a s  prejudicial evidence becau se we
believe, or  a t  lea st  suspect ,  t ha t  such  evidence, even used
“impr oper ly,” is r ea lly quit e r eleva nt .
B. Ru le 404(b)
 The circumst an ces governed  by Rules 404(a ) and 405(a) a r e
by no mea ns t he on ly s it ua t ion  in  wh ich  this  phenomenon
occurs.  Wit hout  a  dou bt , t he m ost  sign ifica n t  a rea  of the la w of
evide nce in which t his occur s is th e well-ensconced rule,
embodied in the second sen ten ce of F ed er a l Ru le of E vid en ce
404(b), 20 a llow in g the int roduction of specific insta nces of bad
conduct , having a ll  t he  ind ica t ions  of cha ract er  e viden ce, for
wha t the  law deems  a noncha ra cter pu rpose. To illust ra te,
suppose tha t  the  de fendant  is on t ria l for a ba nk  robber y in
which  th e act or  crea ted  a d ivers ion by pla cing an  explosive in
the au toma t ic teller m achine a nd t hen , posing as an  employee
of an  ind epen den tly  cont racted  clea nin g ser vice , u se d a  va cuum
cleaner  to collect t he cash  from th e a b a n doned  st a t ion s of t he
distr acted  teller s . I n  t he like ly even t  tha t  the id en t it y of the
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21. S ee id .
22. S ee, e.g., H ud dle st on  v. U ni te d S ta te s, 4 85 U .S.  681 , 68 9–9 0 (19 88).
23. S ee CLEARY ET AL ., supra  not e 15 , § 190 , at  558; 2  WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra
no te 14, ¶ 404[08], at 404–44 to 404–45.
perpet r a tor  i s a  con tested  i ssue a t  t r i a l, th e govern men t wou ld
almost su rely  be  pe rmit t ed  to in t rodu ce evidence  tha t  the
par t icu la r defend a n t  ha d used  th e sam e modus operandi t o rob
other  banks  on  other  occasions.  This evidence would be allowed
desp it e the  fact  tha t  the  de fendan t  i s not  ch a rged with a ny but
the first-men tioned r obbery, and des pite t he  fact  tha t  the
evide nce itself has  all th e qua lities of th e supp osedly dreaded
cha ract e r evidence, i.e., specific acts (prior ba nk  r obberies)
ind icat ing a general propensity (defendant  robs banks) used  as
evide nce of behavior  on t h e occas ion in q ues tion  (robbed t his
bank).
The theory up on wh ich t he a dm issibilit y of su ch eviden ce is
a llowed is th at  it ha s a legitima te n onchar acter  relevan ce (in
the examp le above, to prove the r obber’s id en t ification  by th e
dist inct ive me thod  used) t ha t  is  dis t inct  from the  use  of such
evide nce to demonstr ate a general propensit y. However , th is
dist inct ion exi st s in  pr in cip le on ly.  On e ca n  ana lyt ica lly
sepa ra t e how the defendan t  robs banks from the  fact  tha t  the
defendan t  robs ban ks, but  in rea lity one cannot lea rn  how the
defendan t  robs banks without being informed t h a t  the
defendan t  robs banks. The evidence of the defendant ’s
cha ract e r is adm itted , and  it is only to the ext ent  th at  we a re
successfu l in  persu adin g the jur y to view i t  othe rwise  tha t  such
evidence could be deemed t o be nonchara cter evidence.
1. Th e 404(b) prerequisites
 To be sure, a dm is si on  of su ch  evide nce is  not  au tomat ic.
F i rs t , the  proponen t  must  give  not ice t o the a ccuse d u pon
reques t .21 Second, the tr ial court must  be satisfied that a
ra t iona l ju ry  cou ld find tha t  the  un cha rged  mis condu ct did
occur .22 Third, t he  t ri a l cou r t  must  be persuaded that  there is a
legitima te,  noncha ra cter pu rpose to su ch evidence.23 Four th ,
the trial court  must  balance the usefuln ess  of the evid en ce
against  th e pot en tia l pr ejud ice of the ju ry u sin g su ch  evidence
to det e rmin e  t he ge ner a l propensi ty, or  cha racter , of the
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24. S ee 2 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  404[08], at 404–45.
25. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1126.
26. In  fac t ,  e ve n  i n  a  crimin al case  in wh ich th e eviden ce is offered aga inst  th e
accused, th e gove rn me nt  ne ed on ly sa tis fy th e cou rt  th at  th e ju ry  coul d f in d  t h at  t he
pr ior  bad acts occurr ed by a preponderance of the eviden ce. S ee Hu dd lest on ,  485 U.S.
a t  689–90. Cons eque nt ly, even condu ct which  ha s been  th e sub ject of a prior  acquit ta l
( r ep resen t ing only the failure of the governm ent’s evidence to reach th e higher
th res hold of pr oof beyon d a  re as ona ble doubt) may be intr oduced in a subsequen t
pr osecu tion  un der  Rule 4 04(b). S ee Dow lin g v. U ni te d S ta te s, 4 93 U .S.  342  (199 0).
27. S ee Raed er, supra  not e 4, a t 3 48–4 9; cf. Edward J . Imw ink elrie d, S om e
Comments About Mr. David Karp’s Remarks on Propensity Evid ence , 70 CH I .-KE N T L.
RE V. 37, 39 (1994) (reporting that both sides of the deba te feel cour ts a re “un duly
solicitous” to t he  oth er  sid e).  
28. S ee 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHE R B. MU E L L E R, F EDERAL E VIDENCE
§ 136, a t 132  (1985); Glen We issen ber ger, Makin g Sense of Extrins ic A ct E vid ence:
Federal Ru le of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. RE V. 579 , 57 9-80  (198 5).
accused.24 In m ak ing th is final deter mina tion, th e court m ust
consider  that  such eviden ce is , seemin gly wit hout  exce pt ion ,
accompa nied  by a  l imi t ing  ins t ruct ion  jux tapos ing  the
per mis sible  nonchar acter use a nd th e forbidden  char acter
tr eat men t of the evidence.25
In practice, these requirements are  often sat isfied. The first
is solely pr ocedur al a nd  limits  only t hose w ho a re s imp ly
un prep ar ed for tr ial. Th e second r equ irem ent  is a  nom ina l
r e qu i rement tha t  ther e s im ply ex is t  su fficie n t  evide nce t o ra i se
a  jury ques tion as  to th e occurr ence of th e prior ba d a cts.2 6  The
th ird prer equisite  to a dm issib ility u nd er  Rule  404(b) migh t
have been a significan t lim ita tion  if the  per mis sible
noncha ra cter  us es of such  eviden ce ha d been  na rr owly
circumscribed. But  th is h as  not  been  th e cas e. The d ecision s
resolving Rule 404(b) issues h ave been qu ite liber al in
sus ta in ing th e  t h eor i es  of a dmissibility adva nced by
prosecu tors.27 In de ed , t he fr equen cy wi th  wh ich  the excep t ion s
to Rule 404(b)’s gener al ru le of exclus ion ar e su ccessfully
invoked h as pr ompt ed som e comme nt at ors t o sugges t t ha t it  is
the exclusion of such evidence tha t  is tr uly th e exception r at her
th an  th e ru le.28
The pra ctical impact of Rule 404(b) m ust  be  unde rst ood n ot
on ly in th e proportion of cases  in which t hese issu es a r e
resolved, but  also in th e qua n t it y  of such cases in which these
issues  ma ter ialize. Rule 404(b) accounts for  a  grea t er  number  of
publish ed jud icia l op in ions  than  any other  prov is ion  in  the
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29. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 7, at 577. Professor Imwinkelried has
cha rac te r ized “[t]he  ad mi ssi bilit y of un char ged mis conduct  eviden ce [as] the  single
most im po r tan t  is sue i n  con tem po rary cr im in a l e vi de nce  la w. ” Id . a t  576  (c it i ng to
Edward J . Imw ink elrie d, Un cha rged  Mi scon du ct: On e of th e Mos t M isu nd erst ood
Iss ues  in  Cri m in al E vid ence , CRIM . J U S T ., Su mm er  198 6, a t 6 , 7).
30. S ee Ord over, supra  note 18, at  142.
31. S ee Weisen ber ger, supra  note 28, at  579.
32. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1136.
33. S ee supra  note s 21–25 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
34. S ee 1A J O H N H EN RY WIGMORE , E V ID E N C E  IN  TRIAL S  AT CO M M O N  LAW  § 54.1,
a t  1151–52 (1983); Office of Legal Policy, Rep ort t o the A tt orney General on the
Ad m iss ion  of Criminal H istories at Trial,  22 U. MICH . J .L. RE F O R M  707, 719 (1989)
[hereinafter  Ad m iss ion  of Cr im in al H ist ories ]; Thomas J . Reed, A d m iss ion  of Ot her
Criminal  Act Eviden ce After Adoption of the Federal Rules of E v i d en c e, 53 U. CIN . L.
RE V. 113, 115, 158, 161 (198 4).
Federa l Rules of Evidence,29 and the in t rodu ct ion  of evide nce of
uncha rged crim ina l conduct  un der  Rule 4 04(b) ha s a ppa ren tly
increas ed subst an tially since 1975, when  the F ed er a l Ru les  of
Evidence were enacted.30 Th e volume of ca se s in  wh ich  cour t s
a re both a sked t o admit  evi de n ce  u n der  Ru le 4 04(b) a nd in  fact
g ran t such r equest s ha s led to th e popu la r  concept ion  tha t
crea tive  prosecu t ors  will u su ally be  su ccessful in  gene ra tin g a
theory for int rodu cing evidence of the d efenda nt ’s p r ior ,
un cha rge d m isbeh avior  before t he  jur y.31
That pa rt icular  piece of plebeian  wisdom  is u nd oubt edly
overstat ed, bu t  the fact  r emains  tha t,  in pra ct ice,  Ru le 4 04(b)’s
gate swings ope n  wid er  and m ore oft en  than  one m igh t  exp ect ,
given th e const an t a nd vociferous incant at ion of th e ch a ra cter
evide nce rule. Some have suggested tha t th e problem, if it  is a
p rob lem, can  be t ra ced t o th e non exclus ive lan guage of Rule
404(b)’s second sen ten ce. S pe cifica lly , t he r u le’s provis ion  tha t
evide nce otherwise inadm issible  unde r  the ch aracter  evide nce
ru le “may . .  . be admissible for other pu rposes, s u ch as  . . .”
followed by a list of noncharacter th eories of admissibility ,
m a kes clea r  tha t  th is  lis t  is  in ten de d t o be  illust ra t ive , a nd n ot
ex ha u s t ive.32 Ra ther  than  viewing t he Rule 4 04(b) li st  of
th eories of adm issibilit y as a  closed  un ive rse  of possib ilitie s, t he
preva il ing in terp re tat ion  of Rule  404(b) is  tha t , subject  to the
other r equirem ent s specified above,33 evide nce of p r ior
misconduct  is admissible un less it s r elevan ce depen ds s olely
upon the d efenda nt ’s gen er a l prope nsi ty t o comm it t he cha rged
crime.34
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35. S ee Reed, supra  note 2, at  713.
36. S ee Thom as J . Reed, T he D evelop m ent  of th e Propensity Rule in Federal
Criminal  Causes 1840–1975,  51 U. CIN . L. RE V. 299 , 30 2, 3 03,  322 , 32 5 (19 82).
37. S ee Reed, supra  note 2, at  717.
38. S ee Reed, supra  note 34, at  113.
39. S ee Reed, supra  note 2, at  713–14.
40. S ee J uliu s St one, The  Ru le  of  Exc lus ion  of S im ila r A ct E vid ence: A m erica ,
51 H ARV. L. RE V. 988 , 98 9–9 1 (19 38).
41. S ee J uliu s St one, T he R ul e of E xclu sion  of S im ila r A ct E vid ence: Eng land,
46 H ARV. L. RE V. 954  (193 3).
42. S ee Ston e, supra  not e 40, a t 991 ; Ston e, supra  note 41, at  954.
43. S ee id . at 960–65; 1A WIGMORE , supra  no t e 34,  a t  1213 (“In early English
This  inclusiona ry approach  s t ands  in  con t r a s t  t o t he
“t r ad it iona l,” exclusionary r ule th at  would only adm it wha t
would  oth erw ise be ch ar act er e viden ce if its logica l  r ele va nce
fell wit h in  a  lis t  of well-d efin ed  exce pt ion s. 35 It h as been  ar gued
tha t  the exclusionary for mula t ion  of th e cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le
is th e only approach t ha t is faith ful to the origins of the r u le,
bot h  in  the com mon la w of t he United Sta tes 36 an d, even
ea r li er , in  the com mon la w of E ngland.3 7  The a r r iva l  of the
in clu sionary approach  of Rule 404(b) in 1975 is supposed to
have r eve r sed the  then -pr eva iling exclu sionary a pp roach ,38
resul t ing in  an  object ion able  exp ansion  of other  crimes  evide nce
introduced against criminal defendant s.39 P resumably , then ,
the lar ge volum e of oth er cr imes  eviden ce th at  ma kes  its  way
in to Amer ican  cour t s  pursuan t  to Rule  404(b) and its  pr ogeny is
sim ply a r ecent m ista ke, rep resen ts n o failur e of th e char acter
evide nce rule in principle, and can be  corre cted  sim ply by a
re tu rn to th e tr adit ional, exclusionar y chara cter evidence ru le.
However, neit her  h is tory n or  rea son  a llow s t he li bera l u se  of
Rule  404(b) by pr osecut ors t o be expla ine d a wa y so ea sily.
2. Historical absence of an exclusionary rule
 F i rs t , any  cla im tha t  the  characte r  ev idence ru le developed
as a gen era l ru le of exclus ion is sim ply shor t  s igh ted . The
per vas ive belief th at  th e comm on law ordina rily disallowed
evide nce of simila r  cr im es  is  actu a lly r efu ted  by t he h is tor ica l
recor d. 40 The  cha ra cter  evide n ce  ru le  in  th i s coun t ry  has
actua l ly undergone sever al t ra ns forma tion s du rin g its  growth. 41
The ru le i n  the U nit ed  St a tes  wa s or igina lly  ba se d u pon  the
then-exi st ing pra ctice in E ngland.42 Neither the ear ly English
cases43 nor t he ea rly En glish text wr iters 44 specified an y genera l
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practice, [evidence of bad acts to show th e chara cter of the accused] was  r e so r t ed  to
withou t limit at ion.”). 
44. S ee Ston e, supra  note 41, at  958–60.
45. S ee T.R.S. Allan , S im ila r Fa ct E vid ence a nd  Disposition: Law, Discretion and
Admissibil ity, 48 MOD . L. RE V. 253 , 27 4 (19 85).
46. S ee Ja son M. Brauser , In tri ns ic or E xtr in sic?: Th e Con fu sin g Dis tin ction
Be tween  Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and  O t h er Crimes Ev idence Under R ule
404(b), 88 NW . U. L. RE V. 1582, 159 2 (1994); Ston e, supra  n o t e 4 1 , a t  965–66.
Ess ent ially, the r ule raised t he bar  for char acter ev idence by requir ing tha t it be
more tha n mer ely relevant; i.e., that, because of the danger  of prejudice, it be
especially  rele van t t o some p ar ticula r poin t. Id . at 983–84.
47. S ee Bra use r, supra  not e 46, a t 159 3; Ston e, supra  note 40, at  991–1000.
48. S ee Ston e, supra  note 41, at  966.
49. S ee Bra use r, supra  not e 46, a t 159 3; Ston e, supra  note 41, at  966.
ru le of exclusion of similar-act evidence. T he a dm issibil it y of
specific act s of cond uct  was  sim ply det erm ined  by th e ordin ar y
test  of relevan ce, an d a  gener al exclu siona ry r ule w ould,
th erefore, act u a l ly be u nfa it h ful t o the h is tor ica l r oots  of th e
law’s approach to evidence of similar bad a cts.45
By th e nin et een th  cent ur y, the ru le h ad d eve loped  to the
extent  tha t  it  es se n t ia lly  pr evi ewed  the cu r ren t  in clu s ion a ry
formula t ion  of Rule 404(b). Specifically, if th e eviden ce in
que st ion wa s r ele va nt  for  any purpos e ot her  than , or  in  add it ion
to, a s ugges tion  of a gene ra l pr open sit y to commit  th e crim es, it
was adm issible ; exclusion  of su ch  evide nce was t he excep t ion a l
r e su l t, warra nted on l y wh en  the evid en ce h ad n o rele va nce
other th an  to dem onst ra te a  gener al cr imin al p ropen sit y.4 6  It
was i n  t h is  form tha t  the r u le r ega rding ev iden ce of p r ior
crimes  made its way into the American courts. T h e e a rly
Amer ica n  cases followed the Brit ish inclusiona ry ru le,
admit t ing su ch  evide nce excep t  in  cir cu m s t ances in  which  it
would  sustain n o relevant conclusion except to estab li sh  a
genera l pr open sit y.47 The purposes for which  such  evidence was
adm it t ed unde r  th is  in clu sionary a pp roach  in clu de d,  among
other th ings, proof of knowledge, inten t, an d motive.48 This list
is manifes t ly t he h is tor ica l or igin  of the cu r ren t  ca ta logue of
in clu sionary pur poses for wh ich  evidence may be ad mit ted
unde r  Ru le 4 04(b).
In  th e lat ter  ha lf of t h e  nin et een th  cen tury, cou r t s in  bot h
England and  the Un it ed S ta t es sh ift ed to an  exclusiona ry
approach .49 Exclusion  of cha ract e r  evidence  to show genera l
p ropens ity became  the s t a t ed ru le, and th e categories of
ad mis sibilit y which ha d developed under  th e ear lier,
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50. S ee Ston e, supra  note 41, at  975–76.
51. S ee id . at 976.
52. S ee id .  Any other result would have been remar kable. Why would, or should ,
the la w s us ta in  in  pe rp et ui ty  th eor ies  of relevance th at  ha d a ri sen  in ca ses  up  to a
p a rt i cu la r mom en t i n t im e, b ut  per ma ne nt ly s hu t t he  door  to t he  ide nt ica l type of
deve lopmen t of theorie s of relevan ce in un pr ecedented circumstances in futur e cases?
53. S ee 22 CH A R LE S AL A N  WRIGHT & KE N N E T H  W. GRAH AM , J R ., F ED ERAL
P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE  § 523 9, a t 4 32 (1 978 ).
54. S ee 22 i d . § 5239, at  428. Even  Wigmore  describe d th e moder n comm on law
charac te r evidence rule in inclusionary term s:
The usual black-letter description of the character evidence rule found in
the l it e r a tu re a n d  in  codes  tod ay .  . . sim ply a sse rt s t ha t it  is im pr oper  for
a  tr ier  of fact  to d et er mi ne  wh at  a p er son  did on a pa rticular  occasion by
ask ing an d an swe ri ng  th e qu est ion of w he th er  th at  per son  ha s t he  sor t of
dis posi tion  tha t  wou ld incl ine  h im toward t he d oin g or  not -doin g of t ha t a ct.
Phr ased  in t his wa y, the  ru le seem s at  first s ight  to ha ve a wide  am bit.
Modern an al ysi s, h owev er , give s t he  cha ra cte r evidence r ule a  rela tively
restr icted mea nin g. I t  is ge ne ra lly s aid  th at  th e pr open sit y r ule  does  not
forbid an y u se of e vide nce  th at  re flect s ba dly on  th e ch ar act er  of a p er son ,
and ther e is no such pr ohibition even wh e n  i t  h a ppens tha t  t he  act s  of  the
per son  shown ar e not th ose that  are our  ultima te conce rn  in t he la wsuit  in
qu est ion  but ser ve on ly a s a  ba sis  for a sce rt ai ni ng  som e ot he r m at te r of fa ct
tha t  does ha ppen  to be of more im med iat e  co n ce r n. The rule against
cha rac ter  evid en ce, it  is t hou gh t,  pr ohi bit s t he  us e of ev ide nce  th at  re flect s
in clu sionary form ulat ion beca m e the sta ted exceptions.50
Desp ite  this reversal in formulation, it  is doub t fu l  tha t  it  had
any practical consequences.51 Ca tegor ies  for  wh ich  su ch
evide nce could be r elevan t  (other  than  to show genera l
pr open sit y) contin ued  to develop; t he on ly dis t inct ion  was tha t
these categories were added t o a  li st  of exceptions to wha t wa s
th eoret ically a  genera l ru le of exclusion , ins tea d of simply be ing
included am ong an illust ra tive l is t  demons t ra t ing  a  genera l
ru le of adm issib ility. N otwithst an ding a chan ge in how the
“ru le” was art iculated, the list of si tua t ion s in  wh ich  evide nce of
un char ged miscond u ct  was found to be relevant continued to
expand and develop.52
By the t im e of t he a dop t ion  of the F ed er a l Ru les  of
Evidence, most  court s wer e a rt icula tin g th e ch a racte r  ev idence
ru le using t he exclu sionary for mula t ion .53 Bu t , s eman t ic
d is t inct ions aside, t he r e-adopt ion of inclusiona ry la ngu age in
Rule  404(b), like the n inete e n t h  cen tury  switch  from the
in clu sionary to the exclusionar y approach, did not give r i se  t o
any sign ificant  cha nge  in t he  ad mis sibilit y of such e vidence.
Even  under  t he  pre ru le s common law formula t ion ,  the
exclusion a r y rule was  avoided easily and  often .54 Sh ift ing back
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on  th e char acter  of a pers on whe n a nd on ly wh en th at evidence is offered
in  order  to s how th at  th e per son a cted in  a cert ain  way on a  par ticula r
occas ion  becau se  he  ha d a  pr ope ns it y or  in clin at ion  to a ct t ha t w ay . If t he
evidence th at  re flect s ba dly on  th e ch ar act er  of a p er son  is offer ed for  any
o ther  purpose, it  does not offend the prohibition against th e us e of ch ara cter
evidence.
1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 54.1, at 1151-52.
t o th e inclu siona ry a ppr oach in  Rule  404(b) me re ly st a t es  the
ru le in a man ner more faithful to its hist or ica l origin s, a nd
perhaps  stat es it  i n  a  manner  more  in  conformi ty with  actua l
pra ctice.
Regardless of the t ru e his tor ical de riva tion  of the  ru le, th e
a t t r ibu t ion  of such  ext r aord ina ry s igni fi cance  to the  seman t ic
dist inct ion bet ween  th e inclu siona ry an d exclus iona ry
app roaches  also fails to withstan d reasoned analysis. One must
keep  in  mind  tha t , r egardles s of t he  form of the  ru le , the
dist inct ion p resent  in both  Ru le 4 04(b) a nd i t s p red ecess or
common law ru les be tween  in adm issible  “pr ope nsi ty” evid en ce
and ad mis sible “non cha ra cter ” eviden ce only ma kes  sen se if
tha t  distin ction is real. Ther e mu st be a n  a r t iculable,
compr ehe ns ible bounda ry between  th e two; oth erwise t he
p le thora  of motions, objections, judicial opinions a nd liter at ur e
on  th e su bject is t ru ly th e mode rn , legal equ iva len t  of the
emperor ’s new cloth es. If t he d ist inct ion bet ween  wha t is
ad mis sible  noncha ra cter eviden ce an d ina dmiss ible cha ra cter
evide nce is  rea son ably  clea r , t hen  wh at  pos sible  di ffer en ce ca n
it  make which is labeled the rule and w h ich is labeled the
exce pt ion ? Ea ch cas e sh ould come  out  corre ctly r ega rdless of
which  half of t he d ichotomy en joys the  st a tus  of “the  ru le .” A
glass  th at  is filled ha lf way and a  glass t ha t is filled complete ly
and th en em ptied  by ha lf both  con ta in  the  same quan t ity  a t  the
end of the process.
One possible  res pon se  to th is  poin t  is  tha t  the exclu sionary
form of th e r u le,  by r es t r ict in g t he t heor ies  of rele va nce t o a
specified, closed list  of possibilit ies, will r esu lt in  th e exclusion
of other  crimes evidence in ca ses w her e ad mis sibilit y would
have been p rem ised u pon a  th eory of releva nce n ot inclu ded in
the tr ad itiona l list e mbodie d in  th e second s ent ence of Rule
404(b).  The flaw in  th is  res pon se  is  em pi r ica l. An  exa min a t ion
of the  annota t ions  fol lowing Ru le 4 04(b) r eve a ls  tha t  de cis ion s
admit t ing evide nce u nde r  Ru le 4 04(b) do so,  a lm ost  invar iab ly,
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55. One nota ble exce p t io n  t o this observation is United S tates v. Procopio, 88
F.3d 21, 29–30  (1st Cir . 1996), cert . d eni ed , 117 S. Ct . 620 (1996), and  cert .  den ied ,
117 S. Ct. 1008 (1997). In Procopio,  seve ral defenda nt s we re  cha rg ed w ith  var ious
offenses, including conspira cy, arising out of the a rmed  robbery  of  an  a rmored  t ruck
in  1991. Th e govern men t wa s ab le to in tr oduce evid ence of gun s, ha ndcu ffs, a s t a t e
police u n i fo r m  a nd badge, and a police scanner seized in 1993 from an apa rtm ent
wh ich  was the r esidence of one defendant a nd th e tempora ry residence of another
de fendan t . Over the objection of these defendants that  this  was imper miss ible
cha rac te r eviden ce becaus e it  revea led  a p rop en sit y to com mi t r obbe ri es,  th e cou rt s
allowed th e ev ide nce  on t he  th eor y th at  it d em ons tr at ed a  “crim ina l as socia tion ”
between  th ese t wo defenda nt s. Specifically, th e th eory of admiss ib il it y  was  tha t  t he
ass ociation  of th ese  tw o defe nd an ts  in 1 993 w as  som e ev ide nce  of th eir  as socia tion
two years ea rlier. The d efendan ts ad mitt ed th eir ass ociation with each oth er in 1991
in  the m onths following the r obbery, but  th e cou rt s r ule d t ha t t he  1993  as socia tion
inferred  from  th e ph ysi cal  evid en ce h ad  sp ecia l r ele va nce  beca us e it, un l ike  the
admitt ed 1991  associa t ion , was  a  criminal a s soc ia t ion .
Had the case involved the sam e c h a rg es aga ins t  a  s ing le  defendan t  and the
physica l evidence of other  similar crimes been  found in t hat  defendant’s apart ment
two years after th e date of the charged offense, t he evid ence wou ld pre sum ably h ave
been excluded a s ina dmis sible cha ra cter e vidence. Th e only dist inction b etwe en t his
hypothe t ica l scen ar io an d t he  act ua l fact s of Procopio is t ha t t he  lat te r s itu at ion
involved mul t iple actors. E vidence su ggestin g th e gene ra l propen sity of a sin gle
ind iv idua l to commit  robberies may be char acter evidence wh i ch  is inadmissible under
the first  sen ten ce of Rule 404(b), bu t  a p p a ren t ly  the same  ev idence  sugges t ing  the
genera l propensity of two individuals t o commit  robberies together is n oncharacter
evid en ce ad mi ssi ble u nd er  th e se cond  sen te nce  of Rule 404 (b). What t he cour t la bels
as eviden ce of a crimin al a ssociation m ight  jus t a s we ll be  des ign at ed a s gr oup
cha rac te r evidence.
Argua bly, an oth er  excep tion  to t he  obse rv at ion  i n  t h e t ext i s t he  “doctr ine  of
chan ces,” d iscussed  a t  infra notes 63–65 and accompan y ing  t ex t . As wil l be  seen ,
however , all or vir tu ally all of th e “doctrine of chan ces” cases ha ve been , or could
ha ve bee n, p lace d wit hin  one  or m ore  of th e t ra dit iona l categor ies of adm issibility
catalogued in  Ru le 4 04(b ).
56. S ee 2 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  404[08], at 404–44.
57. S ee David  J . Kar p, Evidence of Propen sity and Probability in Sex Offense
Cas es an d O th er Ca ses , 70 CH I .-KE N T L. RE V. 15,  35 (1 994 ).
un der  one of th e specified th eories of relevance. It seems tha t
after  severa l cen tur ies  of exp er im en ta t ion , t he u nive rse  of
possible  “noncha ra cter” theor ies  of rele va nce h as b ecom e
su bst an tia lly closed , t he in clu sionary formula t ion  of the  ru le
not wit hs ta nd ing. 55
The rea l a nsw er  to the object ion  s t a ted a bove, an d in  tu rn
t h e explana t ion  for  t he  at t en t ion  devoted to wha t  ough t  t o be a
tr ivial  d is t inct ion  a s  t o for m , is th at  th e bounda ry between
what Rule 404(b) an d like ru les allow a nd  disa llow could  ha rd ly
be less clear. The dis t in ct ion requir ed by Rule 404(b) ha s been
cha ra cter ized a s so per plexin g56 and  vague5 7  th at  th ere is litt le
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58. S ee id .; Kar p, supra  note 57, at  34-35.
59. S ee 22 WRIGHT & GR A H A M  § 5239, supra  note  53, at  431. This  difficulty, in
t h e view of some comm ent at ors, h as led  some cour ts in  some cas es to a dmit  evid e n ce
tha t  prope rly sh ould h ave be en e xcluded . S ee, e.g.,  Im wink elrie d, supra  note 7, at  578;
see also Procopio, 88 F.3d at 29–30.
60. S ee, e.g., 1A WIGMORE , supra  not e 34, § 54.1, at 1152, 1155–56; Richard B.
Kuhns,  T he Prop ens ity  to M isu nd erst an d t he C ha ract er of S pecif ic A cts  Ev id ence , 66
IOWA L. RE V. 777 (1981); Lee E . Teit elbau m et  al., Evalua tin g th e Prej ud icia l E ffect
of Evidence: Can J udges Identify the Im pact of Improper Evidence on Ju ries?, 1983
WIS . L. RE V. 1147 (1983); Uville r, supra  note 12, at  882.
61. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 54.1, a t 115 2 n.1; Or dover, supra  no t e
18, at 147, 157.
62. F o r example , i n  Car son  v. P olley , 689 F .2d 562 (5t h Cir . 1982) , a  c iv il  r igh t s
act ion  aga inst law en force me nt  officia ls for  th e u se  of exce ss ive for ce in  th e con du ct
of an  ar re st , th e pl ain tiff a ppe ale d fr om a  jud gm en t e nt er ed on  a ju ry  ver dict  for t he
severa l defenda nt s. On a ppea l, t h e  co u r t  he ld t ha t it  wa s r eve rs ible  er ror  for t he
dis tr ict  cour t t o ha ve e xclu ded  a p er form an ce eva lua tion  re p or t  r ega rding one o f t he
defendants,  con ta in ing  a  comment  tha t  t he  de fe n d a n t  “n eeded t o ‘work on  contr olling
[his] te mp er  an d p er son al  feelings ,’ becau se he  ‘ten ds to get  int o argu men ts wit h
inmates,  l et s  h is t em pe r fl ar e up  too quick ly.’” Id . at  571. The  court  ru led th at  th is
r epor t  “t ended  to show [the  defendan t ’s ] i n t en t  to  do  ha r m  to [th e p la in ti ff ] when
booking him at t he jail, and, therefore, was admissible unde r th e ‘int en t’ excep tion
to the  genera l  ru le  aga in s t  ch a ra cter  eviden ce.” Id . at 572. Apparent ly, prior incidents
of angry en counters with  inmat es is not evidence of a ge ne ra l dis pos it ion  to s uch
encounters,  but is evidence of a specific intent t o h a r m  a n  individua l  t ha t  the
de fendan t had n ot yet met a t th e time of the incident s  fo r m in g  t he  bas is  fo r  t he
repor t .
In  United S tates v.  Had away , 681  F.2 d 21 4 (4t h C ir . 198 2), a  pr osecu tion  for
a iding and abetting the th eft of televisions from an interst ate sh i pm e n t , evid en ce of
the defenda nt ’s crim i n a l i n volvement in thr ee subsequent thefts of interstate
sh ipmen t s of, respectively, 1,000 cases of tuna fish, Goodyear t i res , and a  tra iler
cons is tency in th e decision s of cour ts  at te mp tin g to a pply t he
ru le.5 8  Cour ts  often  ha ve difficult y iden tifyin g an d a pplyin g th e
distin ction between t he a dmiss ible and t he ina dmiss ible.59
The confusion  is ea sy t o unders ta nd. The exa mple chosen
ea r li er , rega rding proof of iden t ifica t ion  by mean s  of a  un ique
m o d u s op er an d i , is  a ct u a lly one of the rela tively
compr ehe ns ible exa mples  of a llow able  Ru le 4 04(b) evid en ce. F or
m ost  oth er e xam ples, t he d ist inct ion re quir ed by Ru le 404(b) is
fa r  more  obscu re .60 The  dist inct ion is pa r t icu la r ly e lu sive,  if n ot
illusive, in cas es in  wh i ch  t he evide nce is  ad mit te d t o prove
some level of scien ter , such  as k nowle dge, a bs en ce of mis take or
acciden t and, in  pa r t i cu la r , in ten t .61 There are count less
examples  of the in t rodu ct ion  of evide nce of p r ior  ba d a ct s,
osten sibly admit t ed , not  to show a  propensit y t o engage  in  the
sp ecifi ed conduct ,  bu t  r athe r  t o demons t r a t e t he  in t en t  t o
en gage  in  the s pe cified con du ct ;62 this distinction is, at best,
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con ta in ing pipe t obacco an d wome n’s boots, wa s ad mit ted , not to sh ow a  genera l
p ropensi ty to  commit  such  c r imes , bu t  to show tha t  the  defendant  possessed the
requ is it e “in ten t , k nowle dg e,  mot iv e,  pl an , a nd p rep ara t ion” t o  a id  and  abe t  t he
comm iss ion  of the e ar lier, ch ar ged offense . Id . a t  219 . In  Uni ted  S ta t es  v . McCollum ,
732 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1984), a prosecution for attem pted  ba nk  rob ber y in  wh ich  th e
de fendan t claimed  to ha ve acte d un der h ypnosis, t he cour t r ule d  t h at e vid en ce of a
twelve-yea r-old a rmed r obbery would have been admissible, not to establish the
cha rac te r of the a ccused, bu t r at her  to pr ove the  defenda nt ’s int ent  to commit  th e
cha rged offense.
In  Uni ted  S ta tes  v. P ollock , 926 F.2d 1044, 1047–49, (11th Cir . 1991), a
pr osecu tion  for va ri ous  dr ug  offens es i nv olvin g a v er y la rg e qu an tit y of cocain e fou nd
secreted  in a  car dr iven by the d efen da n t , t he c ou r t , a ft er  ack nowle dg in g t ha t  “the
mar gin  between  [propen sity a nd in ten t] is n ot a b righ t lin e,” Id . a t  1048 , ru led tha t
the defendant ’s five-year-old conviction for conspira cy to import ma rijuan a was
adm issible  to prove conspiratorial intent. In United S tates v. Parziale, 947 F.2d 123
(5th  Cir. 19 91), a cas e in w hich  th e defen dan t wa s cha rged  with , inter alia , conspirin g
to import, an d att empting t o import, mar ijuana, evidence of the defen da nt ’s pr ior
attem pt  t o i m port ma rijuana  was adm issible on th e issue of the defendant’s intent,
an  issu e sufficient ly ra ised solely by t he de fenda nt ’s plea of n ot g u i lt y . In  United
S ta tes  v. B r ow n ,  34 F. 3d 5 69 (7 th  Cir . 199 4), a  dr ug  pr ose cut ion  in  wh ich  th e
de fendan t did  not  dis pu te  int en t b ut  ra th er  clai me d n ot t o ha ve been  invo lved  in  the
attem pted purcha se of cocaine from an  under cover police officer which was t he subject
of t h e cha rg ed offen ses , th e cou rt  su st ain ed t he  ad mi ssi on of t est im ony a s t o th e
de fendan t ’s involveme n t  in  four  pr ior s ale s or  pu rch as es of d ru gs, p ur por te dly for  th e
es t abl ishmen t of the defendan t’s intent .
In  Un ited  S ta tes  v. H ern an dez ,  84 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 1996), the defendant
depart ed from a n a irpla ne a nd r etr ieved a s uit case la ter  found t o contain  la r ge
quan tities  of cocaine an d heroin, leading to charges of possession with int ent t o
d is t r ib u t e both  su bst an ces . At t ri al , t he  gove rn me nt  wa s p er mi tt ed t o in tr odu ce
evid en ce th at , on a  pr ior occa sion , the defen da nt  wa s st oppe d en te ri ng  th e cou nt ry
in  a n  a u t om o bile con ta inin g a l ar ge qu an tit y of ma ri jua na . Th e a ppe lla te  cour t
affirmed the  defendant’s  conviction, ruling th at t he pr ior crime evidence was
admissible, no t  to  show the  defendan t ’s  gene ra l p ropensi ty to deal drugs, but  rat her
his  int ent  to do so. The cour t r eason ed th at  th e la r g e q u a n t it y of mar ijuana seized
on  th e pr ior occas ion a llowed t he i nfer ence  of an in ten t t o dist ribu te t ha t m ar ijua na ,
wh ich  in turn  allowed the inference that  the de f en d a n t was  st i ll  of  a mind to
d is t r ibu te wh en  he  wa s fou nd  wit h d iffer en t d ru gs on  a d iffer en t occa sion. See id.  a t
935. Of course, t he in itial in feren ce in th is chain  of reason ing wa s ava ilable dir ectly
from  the lar ge quant ity of cocaine an d heroin found in th e suitcase in  q u es t io n . Mor e
pers ua sive is th e court ’s adm ission of th e eviden ce on an  “absence of mist ak e ” t h e or y,
i.e., t o  r efut e  any c la im tha t  t he  defendan t  was  an  ignoran t  cour ie r . In  any even t , t he
dis tin ction  between “the defendant  is a drug dea ler because h e  h a s  do n e it befor e,”
and “the  defendan t  in t ended  to d is t r ibu te these d rugs  because  he  has done it befor e,”
rema ins paper  t h in .
extr eme ly su bt le.  Evid en ce of p r ior , s im ila r  cr im es  is  rout inely
adm itted  despite t he a lmost imp erceptible dist inction between ,
for  exam ple, t he  pr open sit y t o sell dr ugs  an d t he in ten t t o sell
drugs.
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63. S ee Edwar d J. Im win k e lr ied, T he D isp ut e Over  th e Doct rin e of Ch an ces,
CRIM . J U S T ., Fa ll 1992, at 16, 18.
64. S ee 2 J O H N H EN RY WIGMORE , EV I DE N C E  I N  TRIALS AT CO M M O N  LAW  § 302,
a t  241  (197 9).
3. The doct rine of  chances
 Perha ps the r ea l h in ter la nd of Rule 404(b) met ap hys ics is
the doct r ine of chances. Th e d oct r in e is  pr em ised  on the
improbabi li t y of mu ltiple coincidences.63 In  ma ny ca ses , t he
doct r ine i s u sed  to in t r od u ce evide nce r eleva nt  to pr ove
sci en te r ;64 su ch  evide nce would  ther efor e fall with in  one or
more of the  spe cified, per mis sible ca te gor i es of Rule 4 04(b),
such  as in ten t , k nowle dge, or  absence of mista ke or accident.
For  examp le, suppose th at  an  individual char ged with receipt  of
stolen  propert y defends on t he claim th at  he or she wa s
unaw a r e of the stolen character of the property. It  would be a
most unl ikely coinciden ce if in fact t he d efend an t wa s in
innocent  pos se ss ion  of st olen  pr ope r ty on  m u ltiple occasions.
Ther efore,  evide nce of such  ot h e r  occas ions could be  ad mis sible
un der  th e doctr ine of chances  to pr ove t he r equis it e le vel  of
mens  rea .
In  other  case s,  the d oct r in e ca n  be  use d t o es tabli sh  actus
reus element s of th e char ged offense. Supp ose, for exam ple, a
provider  of ch ildcare s er vices i s ch arged  wit h  ph ys ica l a bu se  of
a  child a nd  defen ds on  th e grou nd s t ha t t he ch ild’s in juries
resu lted  from an  acciden ta l fa l l and  not  from any  assau lt  by the
defendan t . Ev idence  tha t a significant n um ber  of other  children
had a l so sus ta ined an  unusual  r a te of simila r in jur ies wh ile in
the defendant ’s care could be admissibl e u nde r  the d oct r in e of
chances to pr ove a ss au lt ive  condu ct  by t he d efenda nt . Such
eviden ce wou ld  se em  to fit  sq uarely  wit h in  the “abs en ce of
mis take or accident” cat egory of permiss ible evidence un der
Rule  404(b). If, in th e sam e circums ta nces, the defense was
instead pr emis ed u pon t he p ossibilit y of th e inju ries  ha ving
been inflicted  by an oth er a ssa ila n t , the s ame evid en ce of
sim ilar  injur ies suffered by other children in the defendant ’s
ca re could  be  in t rodu ced , con s is t ent  wit h Ru le 404(b), t o prove
iden tit y.
The doctr ine  of cha nces , th en , is  often  simply a d ifferen t
way of a r t i cu la t ing  how eviden ce m igh t  come wit h in  one or
more of the s pecified per mis sible t heor ies of adm issibilit y
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65. S ee Mar k Ca mm ack, Using the Doctrine of Chances to Prove Actus Reus in
Child  Abuse and  Acqu ain ta nce R ap e: People v. Ewoldt R econs id ered , 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. RE V. 355, 407–08 (1996); Imwin kelr ied, supra  note 63, at 19–20; Imwinkelried,
supra  note 1, at  1136. The use of the doctrin e of chan ces as a t heory of admissibilit y
under  Ru le 4 04(b ) ha s be en  en dor se d by  th e Cr im in al  J us ti ce S ect ion  of th e Am er ica n
Bar Associat ion. S ee Raed er, supra  note 4, at  348.
66. S ee, e.g., Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 7, at  588, 602.
67. S ee id . at  588; Or dover, supra  note 18, at  168.
68. S ee Cam ma ck, supra  note 65, at 396. This pr oposi tion  does  not  dep en d u pon
the re bei ng  a h igh  per cen ta ge of r ap e a ccus at ion s wh ich  a r e well found ed. Sim ply
because mos t p eop le a re  not  accu se d a t a ll—t ru ly or  fals ely—i t  follows that m ost
people  ar e not  accus ed fals ely. Id .
69. Suppose, for  exa mp le,  th at  th e p ro ba bil it y of a  fa l s e r a pe  accusa t ion  be ing
ta rgeted  against  a par ticular individual is one in one hu ndred. Considered
con ta ined in  th e second s ent ence of Rule  404(b). In a ny even t, it
is clea r  tha t  the  doct r ine of chances  i s t r ea ted  as  a  viable theory
of ad mis sibilit y un der  Ru le 4 04(b).65 As  such , t hough , i t  i s
fraugh t with  a l l the difficulties tha t  a t t en d t he im plem en ta t ion
of Rule 4 04(b) gener ally. E ven t he d efend ers  of the d octrin e
concede th at , in m an y cases , th e dis t i n ction between
per mis sible  “doctr ine of cha nces” evidence an d imp erm issible
cha ract e r eviden ce is slim .6 6  And , of course,  there  a re the  usua l
compla int s th at  cour ts u se t h e doctr ine of chan ces to let  in
much  of wha t  shou ld be kept  ou t .67
But  the  prob lem with  th e doctr ine of chan ces is a  syst emic
one an d is not limit ed to an  occas iona l  misappl ica t ion . Take the
prototypica l case for  the  doct r ine of chan ces; i.e., th e case based
upon mu ltip le a ccusa tion s. A defen da nt  is cha rge d with  rape,
and defends on  the  cla im tha t  the  sexua l  encounte r  was
consensua l. The government  wishes  t o in t roduce  the t e st imony
of oth er w omen  who will t e st i fy that , in separa te incidents,
each  of t he m w as  forced t o sub mit  to n onconse ns ua l sexu al
intercourse  by the defend an t. If offered to prove th at  th e
defendan t  is  in  fact  a ra pist, the eviden ce will be excluded by
the char acter  evidence rule. Ther e is  a  fa i r chance , however ,
tha t  such  evidence  cou ld be adm i t ted un der t he doctrin e of
chances.
Because  most people ar e never  accused  of rape,  the
proba bility  of an  in divid ua l be in g fa lsely  accus ed  of ra pe is
low.68 Th er e-for e, i t  wou ld  be  an  im pr oba ble  coin ciden ce for  an
individual to be fa lsely a ccused , even  once, of  rape. The
probabilit y of an in dividu al bein g falsely a ccused on  mu ltip le
occasions is increas ingly improbable.69 There fore , the a rgument
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independen tly,  t he probability of a second false rape accusation being targeted against
tha t  individual would also be one in one  hun dred. Consider ed together , the pr obability
of both false accusations being made against the sa me indiv idua l wou ld be  the
p roduct  of the two rat ios, which would be one in ten thousan d.
70. S ee Cam ma ck, supra  note 65, at  397.
71. S ee id . at  397–98; Im wink elrie d, supra  note 63 , a t  52;  Paul  Ro thst e in ,
Intellectual Coh eren ce in a n E vid ence Cod e, 28 LOY. L.A.  L. RE V. 125 9, 1 263  (199 5);
see also State v. Allen, 725 P.2d 331 (Or. 1986) (admitting eviden ce in  an  ar son
pr osecu tion  of a p ri or a rs on,  un der  th eor y of doct ri ne  of cha nc es , a s  p r oo f t ha t  t he
fire wa s n ot s ta rt ed  acci de nt al ly, e ven  th ou gh  th er e was  on ly on e p ri or  in cide nt ).
goes, th e mer e exist ence of mu ltip le accus at ions is r elevan t in  a
ma nn er  concep tua lly  dist in ct  from  the  cha in  of reason ing
ord ina r ily ba r red  by  the char a ct er evidence ru le.70 Es sen tia lly,
the doct r ine of chances al lows the inference of guilt of rape
based  upon  mu l tiple a ccusa t ion s of r ape , provid ed  tha t , a lon g
the way, th ere is n o inference drawn  th at  th e defenda n t  is a
ra pist becau se he h as r aped before.
There are several problems with  th is  concept .  We can  s t a r t
by st epp ing ba ck a nd  gazin g a t  the b ig p ict ure. I s t her e n ot
someth ing awry with rules of evi de nce tha t  permi t t he  t ri er  of
fact  in a r ape case t o infer guilt  ba se d m er ely  on pr ior
accusa t ions of rape,  bu t ,  a t lea st  in  pr in cip le,  ordinar ily  wil l n ot
a llow  t he  t r ie r  of fact  to in fe r  gu i lt  based on  the  fact  tha t  the
accuse d i s a ctua lly  gu ilt y of r ape  on pr ior  occasions?
In  ad dit ion, conside r  the ext en t  to wh ich  the d oct r in e of
chances ha s pus hed  Rule 404(b)’s sup posed distin ction between
ina dm issible  character evidence and admiss ible nonchar acter
evidence. For exam ple, one of th e issues  which mu st be r esolved
in  a  “doct r ine of chances” scenar io i s the nu mbe r of pr ior
incidents  or  accusa t ions  necessa ry t o ra ise a  rea sona ble
in fer en ce th at  th ey ar e un likely a ccoun ted  for  by innocen t
coincidence.71 Su pp ose  tha t , in  our  hypothet ica l r ape  case, the
cour t  de ter min es  tha t  a  min im um of two p r ior  accusa t ion s of
rape  is  necess a ry t o qu a lify  the evid en ce a s n onchara ct er
evidence. On  the basis  of a p roffe r  from the  government , the
cour t  dete rmines to a llow the t e st imony of two witnesses  a s  t o
two indepen dent  accusat ions of ra pe comm itted  by t he
defendan t . On  th e firs t d ay of tr ial, t h e first of these wit ness es
tes tifies  as  p romised,  concluding he r  t es t imony with  th e close of
the t r i a l un t i l the  nex t  day. Given  th e court ’s pr etr ial
det e rmina t ion  tha t  two such  accounts  a re necessa ry  to qualify
for  the  doct r ine of chances , a s  the case s t ands a t  tha t  poin t , the
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72. If,  in this scena rio, we imagine t ha t t he s econd wit nes s does n ot m at eria lize
a t  tr ial  on t he  secon d da y, t he  tr ial  cour t w ould  pr esu ma bly h ave  to ch oose a mon g
(1) i n st ruct ing the  ju ry  to d is r ega rd  the tes tim ony of t he  firs t w itn ess  from  th e
p revious day, (2) declarin g a m istr ial, or (3) revisin g its pr etr ial orde r lower ing t he
th res hold for t he  doct ri ne  of cha nce s t o one  pr ior a ccus at ion.
73. S ee Cam ma ck, supra  note 65, at  399.
74. Even  this h ypothesis as sum es th at t he defenda nt’s innocence can only be
consistent  with  a conclusion  th at  th e accuse r is lyin g. But  th is is not  necess ar ily th e
case. The a ccuser m ight  be mis ta ken  as t o any n um ber of issu es, inclu ding
ide n t ificat ion.  Moreover , th e accuse r’s test imony could b e flawless ly accura te a nd s till
no t account for a rea sonable mistake or ignorance on the part  o f the  defendant  tha t
would  negate t he requ isite level of scienter .
defendan t  has been enormously preju diced  by t he in t rodu ct ion
of cha racter  evide nced  ba r red  by Rules  404 (a) and 404(b).
The next morning, the second witness appears  in  cour t  and
tes tifies  as a n t icip a ted . Not  only is t he t es t im ony of t he s econ d
witness not char acter evidence, but the testimony of the first
witness from the  previous  day has  now been m agically
convert ed to n oncha ra cter  eviden ce as  well. A p r em i se of t he
doct r ine of chan ces specifically, as well as  of Rule 404(b)
gen er ally,  is th at  char acter  evidence and n onchar acter  evide nce
ar e mut ua lly exclusive cat egories of evidence. Yet here we have
a  t est imonia l account  t ha t  jumps  from one category to the oth er
based  solely upon  th e te st imony of another witness whose
test imony relat es to an  ent irely indepen dent  occurr ence.72
Ult im a t ely, th e flaw in  th e doctr ine of chan ces is t ha t it
collapses  the sl im barrier  separ a t in g  ch a r a ct e r  a nd
noncha ract er  eviden ce as s up posedly d ist ingu ish ed in  Rule
404(b).  The re a re r eally  only two possible explana tions that
a rgua bly accoun t for th e persu asive influence of th e mu ltip le-
accuser s scenar io. The first  m us t s ta rt  with  th e as su mp tion
tha t  accuser s  a r e p roba bly t e ll ing  the t ru th .73 Arguably, th en,
mu ltip le accusers  cor robora te  each  other  and increase the
probability th at  each is telling t he t ru th .74
This  expla na tion  is n ot gen era lly inaccur at e; it simply does
not  get us  an ywhere. E ven if we credit  each of the mu lt iple
accusers, t ha t does not expla in how th ey cross over an d
cor robor a te each other. If the only impact  of t h e mu ltiple-
accuser s scena rio is t ha t we  credit  th e spe cific t es t im ony of
each , th en t he only th ing we learn  fr om  mult iple a ccusa tion s is
tha t  th e defendan t committ ed mu ltiple crimes. Th ere would be
no reason why the second accuser’s testimony increases the
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75. This  corroborat ive impact would only be true if the mult iple accusers wer e
t es t ifying as to th e sam e incident, which of course, is never t he case in a  Rule 404(b )
s itua t ion .
76. S ee Cam ma ck, supra  note 65, at  399.
77. S ee i d . at 400. Professor Rothstein has e xpressed  this conclusion most
succinctly:
The essen ce of this pr obable gu ilt ar gum ent  is t h a t  t he re  is  a  d ispa r ity
between  the  chances ,  or  p robabil ity , tha t  an  i nnocen t  per son  wou ld be
cha rged so ma ny t imes  an d th e cha nces, or  proba bility, t ha t a  guilty per son
would  be ch arged so ma ny t imes . If the re is s uch a  dispa rit y, however , it
is only because a  guilty person would have th e propensity t o  r ep e a t  th e
crime. If it w er e n ot for  th e pr open sit y to r epe at , th e ch an ces,  or t he
proba bility,  t ha t  an  innocen t  per son  and  a  gu il ty person would be charged
repe at edly would be  iden tical. H en ce, the  ar gum ent  hin ges on pr opensit y
and runs  a foul of the firs t sen ten ce of Rule 404(b). The effort t o reconcile
the permission in the Rule with th e prohibition in the Ru le has failed.
Roths t e in , supra  note 71, at  1262–63.
lik eli hood th at  th e defendan t committ ed th e first crime. 75
Indeed, if this  is a ll th ere  is t o th e doctr ine of chan ces in t he
mult ipl e-accuser s scenar io, th en a ccusa tions of unchar ged
crim ina l incide nt s wou ld n ot even  be r eleva nt .
The second, a nd only genuin e, exp la na t ion  of th e per su as ive
in flu en ce of the mu ltip le-accuser s sit ua tion  is t ha t we  credit
precisely th e char acter  inference th at  is supp osedly barr ed by
t h e cha ra cter evidence ru le.76 In  fact ,  the exp lana t ion  for  the
doctrin e of chances in the  mul t ip le -accuser s  con text  i s s imply a
convoluted  expla na t ion of th e genera l propensit y inference.
Each  separ at e accusat ion would have n o bear ing upon  the
accur a cy of another  a ll ega t ion  bu t  for  the  conclusion  tha t  the
mult ipl e accusa t ions  demons t r a t e a  cross -s itua t iona l  pa t t e rn  of
behavior , wh ich  is  bu t  a  va r ia t ion  on t he t aboo in fer en ce of a
genera l p ropens ity  or  cha ract e r  t r a i t. We  connect  one
accusa t ion  to another  accusa tion  of a simila r cr ime p recise ly
because  we credit, at  least  to some ext en t ,  the not ion  tha t
people do beh ave con si st en t ly w it h  pe rson a l ch aract er tra its.77
That is th e only reasona ble explana tion for why even th e
doct r ine of chances is limited to multiple accusations of
iden t ica l or similar crimes. It  is the r ea son  wh y t her e is  lit t le or
no corrobor a t ive  effect  wh e n  the  mu ltip le a ccusa tion s in volve
sign ificant ly dis cr ete  crim es. Th e doctr ine of chan ces ma y in
fact  be tr uly cons ist en t w ith  Rule  404(b), bu t u nfort un at ely t ha t
cons is tency s t ems  from the  fact  t ha t , at least in some cases, the
doct r ine of chances i s t he  la t e st  t heory  for  a llowing cha ract e r
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78. S ee supra  no t e 23 and  accompanying t ext .
79. F o r this rea son, some commen tat ors have a dvoca t ed  abandon ing the
“admiss ible ca t egor ies ” app roa ch of R ul e 40 4(b) in  fav or of a  cas e-by -cas e
det er mi na tion  based  upon  the  assessment  and ba lancin g of t he  p roba t ive va lue  and
poten t ia l pre judicia l effect of the  prior  crim es evid ence. S ee, e.g., Allan, supra  no t e
45, at  271–74; St one, supra  note 41, at  984. This appea rs t o be t h e  cu r r e n t dir ect ion
of th e cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le in E ngla nd. S ee Director of Pub. Prosecut ion s v.
Boardman , [1995 ] App. C as . 421 ; see also Allan, supra  note 45, at  253.
80. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 54.1, at 1152–56.
evide nce to r each  the ju ry wh ile  main ta in in g t he p iou s fict ion
th at  we follow th e char acter  evidence rule.
4. Anoth er look  at  th e su bs ta n ti ve 4 04(b) p rerequ is it es
 As has been discussed,7 8  th e th ird  pr ere quis ite  t o the
ad mis sibilit y of evidence un der  Rule 4 04(b) is th at  th e tr ial
cour t  must  be persuaded that  there is a  legitima te,
noncharacter  purpose to such evidence. The current m orass
tha t  th is  task  has engend ered h as a risen  precisely becau se th e
d is t in ct ion s a llowed  by t he r u le,  and t hus r equir ed  of th e
cou r t s, ar e eit he r b ar ely per cept ible or e nt ire ly illus ory.79 We
admit  wh a t  es se n t ia lly  is  character  evide nce by labeling it
other wise, en ga gin g somet im es  in  the m ost  contor ted  ana lyt ica l
gym nast ics  to preser ve an  en t ir ely  theor et ica l a dh er en ce t o the
cha ract e r evidence ru le.80 Th e s chola r ly p ursu it  of su ch
n oncha ra cter  theor ies  as t he d oct r in e of ch ances  is  not  u n l ike
the in divid ua l wh o, a ft er  hour s  of gazing upon  an  ord inary
pa int ing,  p ronounces that  i f one  stands  a t  a  pa r t i cu la r  angle a t
a  pa rt icular  tim e of day us ing ver y pa rt icula r ligh t ing,  the
pa in t ing will reve al it self to be s omet hin g quit e ext r aord ina ry.
The pr oblem is t ha t ju dges m us t, in  th e ordina ry l ight  of
common sense a nd exper ience, att empt  to implemen t t heories
tha t  a r e  oft en on ly ope ra t ive  in  the a r t ificia l ligh t  of th e
schola r ’s l abora tory . I t  shou ld not  be su rpr is ing  tha t  the
ap plicat ion of Ru le 4 04(b) h as n ot  r esul t ed  in  a  coheren t  and
consist ent body of law.
One remain i n g question is whether th e misadventures tha t
a t t e n d t h e case  law  imp lem en tin g Rule  404(b) ar e en tir ely t he
resu lts  of the  di ffi cu l t  sub ject  mat te r , or  whether  they  ar e  in
pa r t the pr oduct s of w ill fu l d is rega rd of t he limit a t ion s u pon
a d m issibilit y sp ecifi ed  in  Ru le 4 04(b). S ome in sigh t  in to th is
ques t ion  migh t  be at ta ined by explorin g th e fourt h p rer equ isit e
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81. S ee supra  notes 24–25 a nd a ccompan ying te xt. Becau se th e lan gua ge in Ru le
404(b) is permissive (“may . . . be admissible for other  purposes”), even if eviden ce
fits  with in one of th e cate gories of adm issibility, it  mu st still  be exclu de d if t he
“danger of un fa ir  pr ej udi ce ” “subs tan t ia ll y ou twe ig h[s ]” “it s pr oba t iv e v a lu e. ” F E D . R.
E VID. 403; S ee als o 2 WE I N S T E IN  ET AL ., supra note 14, ¶  404[18], at 404–108 to
404–109.
82. S ee Ston e, supra  note 41, at  954.
83. F o r example, the m ore similar th e modus  operand i in the t wo crimes , t he
stronger  the inference that  the identity of the actor in the second crime is the alrea dy
identified actor in th e first crime.
84. S ee Ston e, supra  note 41, at  983.
85. As the sim ilarity of the multiple crimes  i n creases, th e distinction between
the char acter  an d non char acter  uses  of the evide nce ar gua bly disappear s. See supra
notes  79–80  and accompany ing  t ex t .
t o adm issibility under  Rule 404(b). S pe cifica lly , t he t r ia l cou r t
must  ba lance the p roba t ive , n oncharacter  va lu e of such
evidence aga in st  the p oten t ia l preju dice of t he ju ry u sing such
evide nce to de ter min e t he ge ner a l propens ity, or  cha ra cter , of
the accused, t ak ing into consideration that  such evidence is,
seem ingly wit hout  exce pt ion , accomp an ied by a  limit ing
ins tr uct ion juxt apos in g t he p er missible  nonch a r a cte r  use  and
th e forbidden  char acter  tr eat men t of the evidence.81
One of th e in her en t  di fficu lties in st rikin g the r equired
ba lance for adm ission  of evidence un der  Rule 4 04(b) is th at
the re is  frequent ly a par allel relationship bet ween wha t t he
ru le designates as relevant  and wha t th e rule designates as
pr ejud icial.82 For  ma ny of th e th eories  of adm issibili t y  un der
Rule  404(b), th e st ren gth  of the claim  for adm issibilit y
increas es in pr oport ion to t he s imilar ity between  th e char ged
crim e an d th e prior crime. 83 Unfortu na tely,  t h e g rea te r  the
sim ilar ity  between  th e two crimes, th e more compelling  the
forbidden  conclusion  tha t  t he accused  is  p red isposed  to commi t
th at  very cr ime . It  is pa ra doxical, t he n, bu t n ot su rp ris ing, t ha t
the ci r cums tance  in  wh ich  the  dange r  of p rejud ice is
gre at est —i.e., wh en  su ch evidence is offered against the
crim ina l defendan t 84—is a l so the  ci rcumstance  in  which  such
evid en ce is  most  pr oba t ive  and s ign ifica n t .85 Cons equ en tly,
despit e t he fact t ha t t he cha ra cter evidence ru le is designed
pr ima rily to pr otect t he cr imin al d efend an t, a  per us al of the
annota t ions to Ru le 4 04(b) r eve a ls  tha t  the va st  major it y of
Rule  404(b) cases involve evidence offered  by t he p rose cut ion
aga inst  t h e accus ed. And  becau se t he  compet ing va lue s va ry
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86. In  any case in which th e evidence is excluded and t he defenda nt  is
acquitted, no appeal can be hea rd because double jeopardy would bar a r et r i a l.  In  any
case in which the evidence is excluded a nd th e defendant  is nevertheless convicted,
the government  has n o reason to appeal a t all, and t he defendan t ha s no cause to
raise th e Rule 4 04(b) issue on a ppea l.
87. S ee 2 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  404[18], at 404–21.
88. S ee, e.g., Unit ed St at es v. Cun nin gha m,  103  F. 3d  553 , 55 7 (7t h C ir . 19 96),
cert . denied , 117 S. Ct . 1481 (1997); Un ited  Sta tes  v. Pr ocopio,  88 F.3d 21, 30 (1st
C ir . 1996), cert . d eni ed , 117 S. Ct. 620 (1996), an d cer t. d eni ed , 117 S. Ct. 1008
(199 7); Unit ed Sta tes v. Her nan dez, 84 F.3d 931, 935 (7th  Cir. 1996); United St ates
v. P arziale, 947 F .2d 123, 129 (5th Cir . 1991); Oregon v. Allen, 725 P.2d 331, 336 (Or.
198 6).
89. F o r example , i n  Uni ted  S ta t es  v . Brown , 34  F .3d  569 , 57 4 (7t h C ir . 19 94),
the court stat ed tha t, absent  “a categorical rule” requir ing exclus ion of the Ru le
404(b) evidence, “we must  defer to the judgmen t of the t r ial cour t.” And in United
States v. Hadaway , 681  F.2 d 21 4, 21 7 (4t h C ir . 198 2), t he  cour t a nn oun ce d  t h a t,
“[g]iven the wide discretion permitt ed the district judge, it is fruitless to contend that
the eviden ce was  impr operly a dmit ted .”
pr oport iona lly ra th er t ha n inver sely, it is not mer ely the ca ses
at t he mar gin that pr esent difficult issues.
So how do cour t s  actua lly r esolve th e re quir ed ba lan cing
te st ? Th er e a re s ome limit a t ion s u pon  th e in format ion  tha t  can
be gath ered from t he pu blished opinions. Because th e Double
Jeopardy Clau se effectively elim ina tes  govern men t a ppea ls
from t r i a l cour t  ru l ings d isa llowing the in t rodu ct ion  of evide nce
un der  Ru le 4 04(b),86 t he  r eported appellate decisions are
inva ria bly case s in  wh ich  the t r ia l cou r t  admit t ed  the
challenged  eviden ce un der  Rule  404(b). Moreover, t he b ala ncin g
test  requ ired by Rule 40 3, even in  th e Rule  404(b) cont ext, is
one as  to which  the re i s a  grea t d eal of app ell a te cou r t
defe rence to the discretion of the trial courts.87 Cons equ en tly,
wha t appea rs a necdotally to be a high p ercenta ge of appe ll a te
de cis ion s affirming th e allowance of evidence under  Rule 404(b)
m ight  not  rep res en t  the a ctua l succes s r a te of p rose cut or s
seeking t o introdu ce such evidence.
Never th eless, some observations can be made. First,
appel la t e court s readily defer to trial court discretion. Perha ps
because  th e re quir ed ba lan cing tes t is  often s o difficult , th ere  is
a  consp icuous  wi ll ingness  of a t  lea st  some  appel la t e  cour t s  t o
ground their decisions pr e dom inan tly, if not singularly, upon
the deference accorded to the trial court s.88 This suggests a
v ir tua l abd ica t ion  of an y m ea nin gfu l ap pella te a ut hor ity on t his
issue.  In some cases, the repudiation of meaningful appella t e
review is express, and not merely implied.89
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90. S ee, e.g.,  United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631 , 637 (4th C ir. 1995) (finding
tha t  the evidence of the defendant’s prior drug use w a s  n ot  undu ly  pre jud ic ia l  in  a
d rug prosecution “because th e evidence of [the defendan t’s] personal use of  m a ri juana
and cocai ne  did  not  in volve  cond uct  an y  m or e  sensa t iona l o r  di stu rb ing  than  the
crimes with  which  he w as ch ar ged”); Unit ed St at es v. Melin g, 47 F.3d 1546, 1557 (9th
Cir . 1995) (finding that  tapes of the defendan t at tempt ing to hinder a n  inv est iga tion
were not unfairly prejudicial because “the profanity in the tapes was rela tively m ild
by tod ay ’s st an da rd s”); Ca rs on  v. P olle y, 6 89 F .2d  562 , 57 3 (5 th Cir . 1982) (findin g
tha t , in  a ci vil r igh ts  act ion  for  th e u se  of exce ss ive  for ce in  effe ct i n g a n  a r r e s t ,
ad mi ssi on  of th e de fen da nt ’s p er form an ce ev al ua ti on r epo rt  in dica ti n g  t he  defendan t ’s
pr ior  losses of tem per a nd exp res sions of host ility towa rd de ta ine e s  wa s not u njus tly
pre jud icia l beca us e “th er e we re  no h orr ifyin g de ta ils t ha t w ould pre dictab ly  in f lame
the ju ry ’s pa ss ion ”).
This  hands -off app roach  use d b y a pp ell a te court s  in
reviewing the seemingly endless parade of appea ls by convicted
defendan t s who su ffered t he r evelat ion  of t he ir  uncha rged
cr imina l condu ct before th e juries which  convicted t hem  ha rd ly
sugges t s a deep a nd a biding comm itm ent  to th e char acter
evide nce ru le,  wh ich  is  su pp ose d t o pr otect  defendan t s from
such  exposure. It  often  seem s  a s  t h ough once a so-called
noncha ra cter  u se for  t he  pr ior  cr imes evidence ha s been
ident ified and adequa tely defended, the contest is, as a
pract i ca l mat ter, over. It  is a s if char act er e viden ce is ordin ar ily
excluded, not  because  it  is  pr eju dicial, bu t r at her  becau se it  is
just not r elevan t en ough. But  if its p robat ive value can be
enha nced incr em en ta lly by ad van cing a  th eory of rele van ce in
ad dit ion to the suggestion of a general propen sit y, the  ba r  has
been exceeded  an d t he  bala ncin g te s t  is  r ar e ly  an  obst acl e t o
ad mis sibilit y.
Second, th ere  is a  flip side of th is ph enom enon  in cas es in
which  the court  has been persuaded th at t here is a r e al
noncha ra cter  u se for  t he  pr ior  cr imes evidence. In these
ci rcumstances, t o the  ex ten t  tha t  the  poten t ia l  pre jud ice  in  the
equ at ion is mer ely th e da nge r of th e jur y infer rin g a
defendant ’s gener al p ropen sit y to en gage in  su ch crim ina l
conduct ,  the a rguments  for  exclusion  often  fa i l to ca r ry  the day.
Many jud icia l op in ions  seem to requ i re more  than  th is ever-
p resent  da nge r, s uch  as  some th ing p ar ticu lar ly in fl ammatory
about  th e prior crimes  evidence.90 Again, the devot ion  to
guarding aga ins t  t he dange r  of the  genera l pr ope nsi ty in fer en ce
is un impr essive.
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91. Appar ent ly, even some defenders of the chara cter evidence rule woul d agree
with  th is obser vat ion. S ee, e.g., Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 7, at  577–78.
92. S ee supra  note s 61–62 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
93. In  Meling, 47 F.3d at 1557, a p rosecution in wh ich the defenda nt wa s
cha rged wit h v ar iou s offe ns es  ar isi ng  fro m  h is  a t t empt t o kill his wife in order to
collect  $700,000 on a life insura nce policy, e vid en ce of t he  de fen da nt ’s pu rch as e of a n
expen sive firearm was deemed to be more pr o ba t ive of the defendant’s motive (greed)
than  prejudicial (propensity for violence). In Boyd ,  53  F .3d  a t 636–37,  a  prosecu tion
for  conspira cy and p ossession  with  int ent  to dist ribu te m ar ijuan a, te stim ony t h a t  t he
de fendan t used m ar iju an a a nd  coca in e was  foun d t o be  mo re  pr oba ti ve of t he
de fendan t ’s motive t o finance a nd s upply h is own dr ug u se th an  it wa s pr ejudicial in
l ink ing the defendan t to criminal dr ug activities. Moreover,  in  Cun nin gham , 103 F.3d
553, the defendan t, a nu rse, faced crimin al ch ar ges  ba sed  on h er  all ege d t he ft of
Dem er ol from hospita l syringes. The pr osecution was  per mi tt ed t o in tr odu ce ev ide nce
tha t , four yea rs e ar lier, t he de fenda nt  ha d been  addict ed to Dem erol, th at  her  nu rsin g
license had been  suspended  because of her pr i or  t h e ft  of  Demerol  and  tha t  she  had
subsequ e n tly fal sifi ed  dr ug  te st  re su lt s in  or de r t o m ai nt ai n t he  re in st at em en t of t ha t
nu r s ing license. With bar ely a passin g reference to th e requisit e balan cing t e s t , t he
cour t  determ ined tha t th e value of the evidence to prove a motive for th e t he ft  (t he
de fendan t ’s addict ion) exceeded a ny pr ejudicial s uggest ion  of a propensity t o steal
Deme rol. Ev en  as su mi ng  th is t o be  tr ue , giv en  th e e xpl icit  evi de nce  of th e defendan t ’s
add ic t ion , it  is u ncl ea r w ha t t he  in cre me nt al  va lu e of t he  evi de nce  of t h e  p r io r  t h eft
of Demerol was for the st ated pur pose, especially as balanced against  i ts  t endency to
suggest a pr opens ity t o pilfer t he d ru g. See id.  at 556–57.
Third, th ere  ar e ma ny cas es in  which  Rule  404(b) evide nce
is a dmit te d, de spit e a n a ppa re nt ly wea k ca se for t he  pr obat ive
valu e of the evid en ce in  conn ection with its  proffered,
“nonchara ct e r” use. 91 As  noted ea r li er , t h is  is  par t icu l ar ly
apparen t  in some decisions a dm it tin g eviden ce un der  Rule
404(b) to show int ent  or other  levels of mens r ea. 92 Bu t  the
examp les of th i s phenomenon  a re  by  no m ea ns s o lim it ed . F or
examp le, notwithst anding t he fa ct  tha t  it  is  the excep t ion a l
person wh o could  not  use  som e a dd it ion a l cash, eviden ce of t he
defendan t ’s uncha rged, cos t ly  cr imina l appe t it e s some t imes
finds  its  wa y to th e jur y on th e imp roba ble t heor y th at  it
supplies a m otive for th e defendan t’s char ged crime, wher e th e
la t t e r is on e h avin g t he a llu re of some pecu nia ry (a nd
sometim es even  non pecu nia ry) bene fi t .93 In man y of these
cases, one is  left  wit h  the im pr es sion  th a t , not only is t he
genera l ban  aga inst  ch a r acter  eviden ce not  a p rior ity, bu t, t o
the con t r a ry,  t he  cour t s  often  embrace  oppor tun i t ie s  to a l low
charact e r eviden ce in u nd er t he gu ise of tr eat ing s u ch  evide nce
as  some th ing els e en tir ely.
F ou r t h , th ere often is no serious att ention t o what t he
cha ract e r evide nce r u le d eems t o be  pr eju dicia l be cause of a
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94. S ee Par ker v. Ran dolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979); Edward J. Imwink elried,
The Ri gh t t o “Plea d O ut ” Iss ues  an d B lock t he A dm iss ion  of Prejud icia l Ev idence: The
Differential Tr eatm ent  of Civ il L iti gan ts a nd  th e Crim in al A ccus ed a s a D eni al of
Equal  Prot ection , 40 EMORY L.J . 341 , 37 8 (19 91).
95. S ee Spen cer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967). The authority for such  a
l imi t ing inst ru ction is  conta ined  in t he F eder al Ru les of Evide nce. S ee F E D . R. E VID.
105.
96. S ee, e.g., Un ited  Sta tes  v. Her na nde z, 84 F.3 d 931, 9 35 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he  dis tr ict  c ou r t  i n stru cted th e jury both before an d after t he 404(b) evidence was
admitt ed tha t it could be considered ‘only on the quest ion of the d efendan t ’s  in t en t ,
knowledge, ab se nce  of mi st ak e, or  acci den t a s it  re la te s t o th e ch a r g es  in  t he
indict men t.’ Absent any su bstan tial evidence to the contrar y, we presume t hat  the
ju ror s follow ed  th eir  in st ru cti on s.”).
97. S ee Kuh ns, supra  note 60, at  796.
98. See, for example, the decisions discussed supra at n ote 62.
mechanica l , and  a rguab ly  di singenuous,  fait h in  th e efficacy of
limit ing in st ruct ion s t o the ju ry. Of course, t he  en t ir e  ju ry
system  is pr edica te d on t he  as su mp tion  th at  jur ors ca n, a nd
will, follow th e ins tr uct ions from  th e tr ial  jud ge.94 This
as su mp tion  ext en ds  to lim it in g in st ruct ion s,  i.e ., in st ruct ion s
res t r ict ing ju rors’ conside ra t ion  of evide nce t o it s cor rect  scop e
in circumst an ces in which th e evidence could be used for  bot h  a
proper  an d an  impr oper pur pose.9 5  J u d ges  wh o adm it  evide nce
un der  Rule  404(b) rou tin ely assume (or  so they say) tha t  any
poten t ia l prejud ice fr om  such  eviden ce is cont rolled  by an
ins tr uct ion directing t he jur y’s consider at ion of such evidence to
it s  sp ecifi ed  “non ch a r a ct er ” context  an d pr ohibit in g
cons idera t ion  of t ha t  ev idence  a s bea r ing upon  the  cha racter of
the accused.96
But  on  wha t  possible  ba si s d oes  th is  ass umpt ion  res t? Any
meaningfu l cons idera t ion  of p rejudice mus t  focus , not  on  the
theory cons t ruct ed by the  law  and con ta ined in the ju ry
inst r u ct i on s, bu t  ra ther  on the a ctua l u se  to be  made  of su ch
evide nce by th e jur y.97 So th e qu est ion one m us t a sk  is, “How
pr obable  is  i t  tha t  ju rors  wil l unders tand  and fol low
instructions?” For  exa mple , a re ju r ies capable of cons ider ing
evide nce of the d efenda nt ’s p r ior  dr ug sa les  as b ea r in g on  the
defendant ’s i nt en t  t o s el l d rugs  bu t  not  on  the  de fendan t ’s
propensit y t o do so?98 Can  a jur y likewise consider  th e
defendan t ’s pr ior t heft  of drugs  from h ospit al invent ory  as
bear ing on t he  defen da nt ’s m otive for s te alin g dr u g s from
hosp ita l inven tory  bu t  not  on  the  defendan t ’s  p ropens ity  to
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99. See United S tates v. Cunnin gham , 103 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed
supra  at n ote 93.
100. United  St at es  v. D an zey , 59 4 F .2d  905 , 91 5 (2d  Cir . 19 79).
101. S ee, e.g., Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1140–41; Imwin k e lr ied, supra  no t e
94, at 379.
102. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  no te 1, at 1140–41; Geoffrey P. Kra mer a nd Dorean
M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal J ury In structions? Analyzing the Results
of th e Mi chi gan  J ur or Com preh ens ion  Proj ect ,  23 U. MI C H . J.L.  RE FORM  401, 402, 429
(199 0).
103. S ee supra  note s 57–80 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
104. Compare Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 63,  a t  18–2 0 (de fen din g th e doct ri ne  of
chances as a  non char acte r t heor y of releva nce), with  Roth ste in, supra  note 71 , a t
s tea l dr ugs  from h ospit al in ven tor y?99 The  an swer  is t h a t  the
chance th at  such in str uctions a ccomplish t heir in ten ded
pu rp ose is pr act ically nil.
The in ten si ty of the st ruggle between prosecutors and
defense coun se l over  the a dm issibil it y of p r ior  cr im es  evide nce
under  Rule 404(b) exists becaus e both sides r ecognize tha t so
much more  is  a t  st ake than  ju s t  pr oof of motive or inten t.
Pr ivately, ma ny judges a cknowledge th a t  the ir  l imi t ing
inst ruct ions accompanying Rule 404(b) evidence are almost
ce r ta in ly fu t ile . Occa siona lly , t h is  judicia l ca ndor  ascends  to a
pu blic foru m a s well:
T h e u n d u e p r e ju di ce [e vid en ce a dm it te d u n de r  Ru le 4 04 (b)]
e n g en d e r s m a y  b e  g ua rde d aga inst  in  only one w ay:  by an
in st ru ction  .  .  . to  th e effect  th at  th e jury i s  n o t  t o  con s id e r t h e
evi de n ce  as  going t o th e ch a ra cter  of  the  accused  but  only as
goin g t o  id e n t it y . I t  m a y  w e ll  be  t h a t  t h e  ju r y  ca n n ot  m a k e  th is
dist inct ion  in  its  collect ive m in d. I f th at  is s o it is  u n fort u n at e,
bu t it  h ap pe n s a ll th e t im e . . . .100
Even  sch ola r s w ho gen er a lly  su pp or t  the cu r r en t  ru le
acknowledge tha t  ther e is  lit t le con fiden ce in  the u t ilit y of the
accompanying limiting instructions.101
This  conclusion should not be in the least su r p r ising. Ther e
is some suppor t  for  the  propos it ion  tha t  ju r or s  have  di ffi cu l ty
un der st and ing ins tr uct ions ge ne ra lly.102 Her e, th e pr oblem is
much  more a cute. As  discu ss ed  above , t he la w’s di st in ct ion s
between  the  cha racter  an d n oncha ra cter  tr eat men ts  of prior
crim es evi de n ce a r e fr eq u en t ly ob scu r e, occa si on a l ly
imperceptible, an d ar guably, sometim es nonexisten t. 1 0 3
Schola rs disagree over the actuality of at least some of the
d is t inct ions engend ered  by Rule 4 04(b).104 It h as been  suggest ed
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1262–63 (attacking th e distinction between th e doctrine of chances a nd or dina ry
cha rac te r evi de nce  as  illu sor y).
105. S ee supra  no t e 59 and  accompanying t ext .
106. S ee Kra mer  & Koenig, supra  note 102, at  429–30.
107. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  not e 94, a t 379 ; Susa n Ma rlen e Dav ies, Evidence
of Ch ara cter  to P rov e Con du ct: A R eass essm ent  of R eleva ncy , 27 CR I M . L. BULL . 504,
511 (199 1).
tha t  some ju dges d o not fully a ppr eciat e th e dist inctions.105
Those of u s  wh o t each E vidence know th at , when t he syllabu s
rolls  a round t o Ru le 4 04(b), con sidera ble  t im e a nd e ffor t  a re
requ ired  to rem ove even  a  por t ion  of the pe rplexe d e xpres sions
t ha t  st a re back a t  us in  the cla ss room. Yet  ju rors, wit h n o
backgr ound in  the l aw and  no in format ion  as  to the  theory  and
purpose of Rule 404(b), are s upp osed to unders tand  the
dist inct ion on the basi s of a  one or  two sen tence  conclusory
di rect ion  bur ied a mon g a ba rr age  of other  complex instructions?
The proposition is really quite preposterous.
Moreover , eve n  if t he ju rors w er e s ome h ow to comprehend
the limi ting ins tr uction ap plicable to evidence adm itted  un der
Rule  404(b), th ere  would s till be a  consider able  que st ion as t o
whet her  the instru ction would be obeyed. Unremarkably,  ju ror s
a re much les s l ik ely  to follow ins tr uct ions t ha t cont ra dict t heir
own good sens e an d experien ce.106 Con se qu en t ly,  one of t he
major  impedim ent s to th e efficacy of th e Rule 404(b)-prompt ed
limit ing inst ru ction is tha t t he pr ohibited us e of the evid en ce
flies in  the fa ce of wha t  ju rors know to be tr ue: t ha t  cha ract e r  is
r e levan t  t o behavior .107
If limiting instructions in this cont ext a re s o ma nifest ly
inadequa te (a  conclu sion  tha t  has not  es cape d t he a pp reh en sion
of th ose volunt ar ily conn ected  with  th e condu ct of crim ina l
t r i a ls  in t his count ry), then  th e stea dy allowance of evidence of
the accus ed’s pr ior crim es u nd er R ule 40 4(b) is yet  an other
tellin g indica t ion t ha t t he commitm ent  to th e char acter
evide nce ru le in pra ctice falls a good deal short  of th e rhet or ic.
In  fact, the considera ble extent  to which evidence of the
cr imina l defendan t’s char acter  ma na ges to meet  Ru le 4 04(b)’s
crit eria  for adm issibilit y
r e f l ect [ s ] a  ha l f-hea r t ed  and  un pr inc ip l ed  comprom ise be tween
a n  in te re st  in  tr u th se ek in g a n d a  bel ief t h at  we  sh ou ld n ot
j u d g e pe ople  or  t h e i r  a ct s  by  the i r  cha rac te r  .  . .  . (Refusa l  by
som e cour t s  t o  even  acknowledge  the  ex ten t  of t h e  e ffe ct i ve
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108. 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 54.1, at 1156.
109. Th e expla na tion s of, a nd  dis tin ction s be tw een , opin ion a nd  re pu ta tion
evid en ce can be found supra at n ote 8.
110. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 608 (a).
111. S ee 3 WEINSTE IN  ET AL ., supra  note 14 ¶  608[01], at 608–10.
112. S ee id .
re pu dia tion  o f t he  cha rac t e r  ev idence  ru l e  i s  su re ly  the  m os t
un pr inc ip l ed comp rom ise of a ll; th is  compr omise  may  be fa irly
de scr ibe d a s h yp ocrit ical .)108
C. R ule 60 8(a )
 T h e e xt e n t  t o w h ich  t h e  ch a r a ct e r evi de n ce r u l e is
compromised i s not  l imi ted  to the Ru le 404(b ) con text . As  to any
witness who test i fi es  a t  t r ia l , the  opponen t  may ca l l a  cha ract e r
witness to testify,  in  the for m of opin ion  or  rep u ta t ion
tes t imony ,109 r egard ing  the witn ess ’s pr open sit y for te lling t he
t ru th .110 Thus, should a criminal defendant  testify in his own
beh alf, th e pr osecut ion m ay call  one or  more wit nes se s t o tes t ify
tha t , in the opinion of the witness or  of the  communi ty,  the
defendan t  is  dish ones t . Be cause t h i s type  of a t t ack  upon  the
defendan t ’s credibilit y does  not  requ i re tha t  the defendan t open
the door  by first  in t rodu cin g ev iden ce of h is  or  her  own
charact e r, t her e is  noth in g t ha t  the d efenda nt  can  do t o
fores ta ll th is at ta ck exce pt  t o rema in off the witness stan d. In
th i s pa r t icu l ar , t hen, the rules of evidence hardly demonstrate
a  commi tmen t  t o p rot ect ing  the  de fendan t  from such  cha ract e r
evidence. To the contra ry, th e law eith er  a llows evid en ce of t he
defendan t ’s dishon est y or at  leas t t olera tes  a p red icta ble
disin cent ive t o th e exer cise of th e defen da nt ’s r ight  to t est ify.111
It  is tru e th at  su ch cha ra cter  eviden ce is a lmost  alw ays
accompanied by a lim itin g ins tr uct ion r est rict ing t he  jur y’s
considera t ion  of such evidence to th e issue of the defenda nt ’s
credib ility as a  witnes s. Once again , however,  t h e law w ould
appear  to de monst ra te a n  unwa r ran ted  fa it h  in  su ch
instructions.112 Pa rt icular ly in cas es in  which t he d efend an t is
ch a rged wit h a  crim e involvin g dish ones t cond uct , t he
connect ion  bet ween  a gen era l pr opens ity for  d ishonest  conduct
and a part icular act of dishonesty might be too obvious to
ignore.
Should the defendant  testify, and should the defendant ’s
cha ract e r  for  tru thfulness then be atta cked, the defendant  may
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113. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 608 (a)(2 ).
114. S ee supra  note s 13–19 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
115. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 608 (b)(2).
116. S ee 3 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  608[06], at 608–100.
117. S ee supra  note s 16–18 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
118. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 608 (b)(1).
119. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 608(b). The re ason s for th is limit at ion ar e prim ar ily to
avoid th e a lloca tion  of sign ifican t t ri al t im e a llowin g confli ctin g evi den ce t o resolve
disputes  as to uncharged conduct, and to prevent unfair surp rise t o the defendant
forced to defen d aga inst  allega tion s of un char ged condu ct. S ee 3  WE I N STEI N E T AL .,
supra  note 14, ¶  608[05], at 608–45.
th en  call a positive ch a r a cter  wit nes s t o tes t ify,  in  the for m or
opin ion  or  r epu ta t ion  t e st imony,  tha t  t he defendan t  is  a
t ru th fu l person .113 However , just  as  in t he s itu at ion  in  wh ich
the de fen da nt  ca lls  a  pos it ive  character w itn ess r egar din g his
own  characte r  pursuan t  to Rules  404(a ) and 405(a ),114 callin g a
cha r acter  wit nes s t o tes t ify t o the d efenda nt ’s ch aracter  for
tru thfulness ope ns t he d oor  to cross -examina t ion  of the
ch a r a ct e r wit nes s a s t o sp ecifi c in st ances  of dish ones t  act s of
the defendan t .115 Thu s, in ca ses in  which  th e defen da nt  is
cha rged with  a  cr ime in volvin g dis hon es t  cond uct , t he  jur y
migh t  lear n of simila r , pr ior  act s of t he d efenda nt . Th e t heor y
of ad mis sibilit y is, on ce again , tha t t his evidence is not dir ect
evide nce of the d efend an t’s cha ra cter , but  is, ra th er, s imp ly
re leva nt  t o the weigh t  to be  give n  to the con clu sor y t es t im ony of
the characte r  wi tness ,116 and t h e  ju r y will be in st ructed  to tha t
effect . Bu t  the efficacy of such a  limit ing in st ru ction in  th is
conte xt  is ind ist in gu ishable  from the d ubiou s ci rcumscr ip t ion
accomplish ed by th e para llel instruction accompanying cross-
examina t ion  of characte r  wi tnesses  under  Rule  405(a ).117
 Rule 608(a), t hen , pr ovides  yet  another  illu st ra t ion  of th e
law’s glar ing neglect of th e supp osedly importa nt  char acter
evidence rule.
D. Ru le 608(b)
 Any witn ess , including the criminal  defendant , m ay
poten tia lly be cross-exam ined concerning th e witnes s’s own
sp ecifi c act s evidencing an  un t ru th fu l  cha ract e r .118 This  form of
impeachment is limit ed t o th e cross -exam ina tion  its elf, an d any
extr ins ic eviden ce th at  migh t b e ne cessa ry t o comple te the
impeachment of th e reluctan t witn ess is disallowed.119
Nevertheless, a testifying defendant  might well be compelled,
for  reasons of conscience, potential perjury pros ecu t ion  or
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120. S ee 3 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  608[05], at 61–62.
121. S ee 3 i d . ¶ 6 08[05], at  62–63.
122. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 609 (a)(2 ).
123. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 609(a)(1). F o r  a ll  wi tnesses  other  than  the  cr imina l
de fendan t , t he o r di n a r y bala ncing t est of Rule  403, which  pres um es ad miss ibility
unless the “probat ive valu e is su bsta nt ially out weighed  by th e dan ger of un fair
pre judice,” app lies. F E D . R. E VID. 403. In 1990, Ru le  609  was  amended  to
accommoda te the special concerns regardin g potential prejudice when t he impeached
witness is th e accus ed. S ee 3 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., s u pra note 14, ¶  609[04], at 609–42
& n.3. If the prior conviction is not a crime of dishonesty au toma tically ad miss ible
under  Rule 609 (a)(2), the defen dan t m ay only be impeached “if the court det ermin es
tha t  the p rob at ive v al ue  of ad mi tt in g t hi s e vid en ce ou tw eigh s it s p re jud icia l effe ct t o
the accus ed.” FE D . R. E VID. 609(a)(1). For all im p e a ch a ble convictions, there is a
s t rong pr es um pt ion  th at  a co nv ict ion  is s ta le a nd  in ad mi ss ibl e if m o re  than  t en  yea r s
ha ve pa sse d fr om t he  lat er  of th e da te  of convict ion or  t h e  d a te of r ele as e fr om
inca rcera t ion . S ee F E D . R. E VID. 609 (b).
124. S ee 3A J O H N  H EN RY WIGMORE , E V ID E N C E  IN  TRIALS AT CO M M O N  LAW  § 926,
a t  750  (197 0).
125. S ee Kar p, supra  note 57, at  29.
other wise, t o adm it p rior  act s of dish ones ty. Mor eover, t he
ques t ions themselves, even if followed by denials, might  ha ve a
damaging impact .120
Aside from th is differe n ce as  to form, a ll th at  was  st at ed in
th e previous section rega rdin g Rule 608(a) applies he re as  well.
The accus ed m ight  be fur th er d ete rr ed from  tes tifyin g in  the
face of un leash ing evidence of specific inst an ces of dishonest
conduct .121 Su ch im pea chm ent  will tr igger t he u su al lim itin g
inst ruct ion , bu t , pa r t icu la r ly in  case s in  wh ich  th e impeach ing
conduct  bea rs  some s imila rit y t o the  charged  cr imes , the
dir ection  to t he  jur y will be of su spe ct u tilit y.
E. Ru le 609
 Any w it n e ss  w h o t e stifies may be imp eached by t he
in t rodu ct ion  of h i s or  he r  pr ior  conv ict ions . Under  the  federa l
rules, a d m is s ion  of p r ior  con vict ion s for crimes of
d ishonesty—such  as p er ju ry, b r ibe ry or  fraud—is a llowable
without  pos sibil it y of exclu sion  for  preju dice, even in
ci rcumstances in  wh ich  the wit nes s s ubject  to imp each men t is
the cr im i n al defendant .122 All other  felony convictions m ay be
ad mis sible  t o impeach  the wit nes s,  pr ovid ed  the ba la nce of
pr obat ive value a gainst  unfa ir  pr eju dice is  res olved in  favor  of
ad mis sibilit y.123 Th e fede ra l r u le,  wh ich  gen er a lly  conforms t o
the pr act ice in other Amer ican  ju r i sd ict ions124 and  longstand ing
pract i ce und er th e comm on law,125 is  actua lly  pr em ised  upon  a
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126. S ee 3 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  609[02], at 609–28.
127. S ee Uviller , supra  note 12, at  886–87.
128. Argua bly th e r e would be m uch gr eat er r elevan ce to a conviction  res ult ing
from  a t ria l in wh ich th e defen dan t t est ified. See id.  a t  888. We ca n in fer  from  th e
convi ction  itself th at  th e defend an t’s testim ony at  th e ear lier t ria l  was found to be
un tr ut hful.
129. S ee Davie s, supra  note 107, at 506, 520; Roselle L. Wissler  & Michael J .
Saks, On  th e In effica cy of L im iti ng  In str uct ion s, 9 LAW &  H U M . BE H A V. 37, 41, 43–44
(199 1).  One possible explanation for this is that,  given the defendant’s motive to lie
in  h i s o r  h er own  defen se, t he d efend an t’s credibilit y is inh ere nt ly sus pect. See id.  a t
43, 47. C ons equ en tly , pr ior con vict ions  mi gh t p rod uce  lit tle  or n o increment al da ma ge
to th e defend an t’s credibility.
t heory wh ich bla ta nt ly disr ega rd s t he  re as ons u nd er lying t he
cha ract e r evidence ru le. Specifically, th e re as oning u nd erlyin g
Rule  609 is t ha t p rior  cr im es  in dica te a  gen er a lly  poor
cha ract e r , which  in  turn  suppor t s  an  in fe rence  tha t  the
ind ividu al w ould t est ify falsely. 126
There a re s eve ra l proble ms w it h  th is  hypothesis .  F ir s t , the
connect ion  between  the exis ten ce of a  p r ior  conv ict ion  and
tes t imonia l dishonesty is te n u ous  a t  best .127 Because t he
impeach ing conviction need n ot be for  d ishonest  conduct ,  and
fur the r becau se it  is  n ot  l imi ted  to the  case in  which  the
defendan t  tes tified fa lsely128 at  a pr evious t rial, t he Ru le 609
premise is  simply ba se d u pon  the defendan t’s gener al bad
cha ract e r . This inferen ce of perjurious beh avior based  solely
upon gen er a l cr im in a l condu ct  is  actua lly fa r less  rea sona ble
than  th e more specific logic (i.e.,  t h a t  a  per son  who commi t s
par t icu la r cr im es  is  more likely t ha n ot her  per sons  to commit
tha t  sa me, p ar t icu la r  cr im e a ga in ) supposedly ba rr ed by t he
character  evide nce r u le.  Even  in  case s in  wh ich  the p r ior
convict ion  is  one base d u pon  dish ones t  condu ct , t he p r ior
conduct  might be unrelated to testimonial untr uth fulness
except for  the  ve ry genera l pr opens ity t owar d dis hon est y. Sma ll
wonder, then, tha t stu dies suggest t ha t  ju ror s  do not  va ry th eir
assessment  of th e defendan t’s credibility with t he pr esence or
absence of impeachable prior convictions.129
Second, despite the often unimpr essive impa ct  of th e
imp each able  convict ion  upon  the  as ses smen t  of th e defendan t ’s
cred ibi lit y a s a  wit nes s,  evide nce adm itted  un der Ru le 609 does
appear  to ha ve an u nint ended  impact. One simulated study
sugges t s that  evidence of prior convictions does increase
convict ion  ra tes , es pe cia lly  wh er e t he p r ior  convictions ar e for
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130. S ee Wissler  & Sak s, supra  note 129, at  41–46.
131. S ee, e.g., U ni te d S ta te s v.  Alvarez, 833 F.2d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 1987)
(admit t i ng evidence of prior cocaine conviction to impeach defenda nt ’s tes tim ony in
cocaine pr ose cut ion ).
132. S ee 3 WEIN STE IN E T AL ., supra  note 14, ¶  609[05], at 609–84 to 609–85.
133. S ee Robert G. Sp ect or, Rule 609: A Last Plea for its Withdrawal , 32 OKLA.
L. RE V. 334, 352– 53 (1979); Wissler  & Sak s, supra  note 129, at  44.
crimes  similar  to th e char ged crime.130 And , a l though  the
sim ilar it y be tween  the p roffer ed  im pe achable  convict ion  and
the charged crim e sh ould or din ar ily counsel against
ad mis sibilit y in cas es in  which  th e ba lan cing te st  of Rule
609(a)(1) con t r ol s,  su ch  sim ilar -crimes  eviden ce stil l
occas iona lly finds  its  wa y to th e ju ry  under  th is  p rov is ion .131
Moreover , if the  pr ior conviction is for a  crim e of dishon est y, it
must  be allowed  for impe ach men t u nd er R ule 60 9(a)(2) even if
the defen da nt  is cur re nt ly ch a r ged with  th e ident ical crim e.
Thus, a t estifying defendan t cha rged  wit h, for exa mp le, per jur y,
can  be  im pe ached  wit h  h is  or  her  pr ior  pe r ju ry con vict ion .
Once aga in,  the only sh ield pr otectin g th e te st ifying
defendan t  from the ver y evil su ppose dly pr ohibit ed by t he
cha ract e r evide nce r u le i s t he limit in g in st ruct ion. A pr ior
convict ion  of the d efend an t a dm itt ed u nd er R ule 60 9 is
inva ria bly accompa n i ed by a n in st ru ction t ha t s uch  eviden ce is
to be considered in evaluating the defendant’s credibility as a
witness, but  not  as  eviden ce of the d efend an t’s prope ns ity t o
have comm itted  th e char ged crime.132 Bu t  emp irical st udies
confirm  that  these instr uctions are h opelessly powerless to
preven t  ju rors  from us ing  the pr ior convictions in  assess ing  the
defendan t ’s  gu i lt .133
The fact  tha t  ju rors  do not  cons ider  p r ior  conv ict ions in
accordance with  the  limit ing inst ruct ions  tha t  accompany Rule
609 impeachment doe s n ot  re flect poorly on  eit he r t he  good
sense or  the good faith of jurors. Consider, first  of all, wheth er
the ins t ruct ion  itself is sensible. For exam ple, suppose a
defendan t , on  t r ial for  per ju ry , t akes the  st and  and  is
impea ched wit h a  pr ior conviction  for per jur y. The req uis ite
limit ing ins tr uct ion would  esse nt ial ly d irect  the  jury  to make
the followin g dis t in ct ion :
You  ma y  no t  cons ide r  t h e  de fendan t ’s  p rior  p er ju ry  conv iction
as  evid en ce t h at  th e d efen da n t is  gu ilty  of t h e crim e of pe rju ry
w i t h wh ich  he  i s  cha rged .  You  may ,  however ,  cons ide r  t h e
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134. Uvil le r , supra  note 12, at  882.
135. S ee H ARRY KA LV E N, J R . & H A N S  ZE I S E L, TH E  AM E R I CA N  J UR Y 146–47 (196 6);
Ad m iss ion  of Cr im in al H ist ories , supra  note 34, at  741.
136. See F E D . R. E VID. 413 and 414.
137. 1A WIGMORE , supra  no te  34,  § 54. 1, a t 1 156  (foot no te  om it te d).
d e fe n d a n t ’s  pr ior p er jur y conv iction  in e va lu a t in g  th e
c red ib il i t y  of  t he  de fendan t  a s  a  w i tnes s .
The la t t er  ha l f of th e  di ch otom y ess en tia lly per mit s t he  jur y to
use th e defen da nt ’s pr ior pe rju ry conviction t o dete rm ine
whet her  th e defendan t committ ed perjury in the insta nt case in
which  th e defen da nt  den ied comm itt ing per ju ry  on  the occasion
which  is the subject of the prosecut ion. How can jur ors be
expected to even  un der st an d, ne ver m ind fol low, such  a
convolu ted  di rect ion ?
Take a  more str aight forwa rd exa mple. Su ppose th e
defendan t  is on  t r i a l for  robber y a nd i s impe ached  wit h  a  pr ior
robbery convict ion . The ju ror  t h inks  tha t t he  pr ior  robbe ry is
rele van t  to t he is su e of whet her  th e defen da nt  commit s
robberies. The law s ays t ha t t he pr ior robber y  means  no such
th ing, bu t  on ly means tha t  the d efend an t lies  while t est ifying
un der  oa th . It  ha rd ly seem s consciona ble t o say t ha t t he
pr oble m her e li es  wit h  the ju ror .
The heart  of the ma tter is t h a t  the limit in g in st ruct ion
given in t h is  context  “fail s t o corres pon d t o the a ctua l effe ct  of
t he evidence even in th e mind s of th e most sober  a nd
conscien t iou s jurors.”134 P rosecu tors  and  defense  lawyers  a re
keen ly awa re of th is r e a lity. This explains why a defendant ’s
pr ior convict ion s—e sp ecia lly  for  cr im es  simila r  to the cha rged
crim e—hea vily in flu en ce t he d efenda nt ’s d ecis ion  as to whet her
to t est ify.135
Thus, even before t he r ecent a men dmen ts t o the Fed era l
Rules  of Evidence allowing chara cter evidence in sex offense
prosecutions,136 t he  cha racter evidence rule was already so
fraught wit h gaping exceptions, the most subtle distinctions,
and imp ossible jur y inst ru ctions  so as  to be pr act ically
eviscerated  in  numer ous ci rcumst ances . In  the words of one
commenta tor , “th e windings a nd t wistings of the cha ra cter
evide nce ru le and i t s va r iou s e xcep t ion s a re la rgely wi thout
ra tion al exp lan at ion,” and t he e xist ing pr act ice as t o th e ru le is
an  “effort[] to m ak e sen se ou t of non sen se.”137
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138. S ee supra no tes  3–6  and accompany ing  t ex t .
139. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 413 (a).
140. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 414 (a).
141. F E D . R. E VID. 413 (a) a nd  414 (a).
142. S ee, e.g., United S tat es v. Sumn er, 119 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1997); United
Stat es v. Me ach am , 115  F.3 d 14 88, 1 492 (1 0t h C ir . 199 7); Un ite d St at es v . La rs on,
112 F. 3d  600 , 60 4–0 5 (2d  Cir . 19 97).
143. “The practical effect of the n ew ru les is  to put evidence of uncharged
offenses in s exu al a ssa ult  an d ch ild m oles ta tion  cas es on  the sam e footing as other
types of relevan t evide nce th at  ar e not  subject  to a s pecial exclus ion ar y ru le.”
Sumner, 119 F.3d at  662.
III. RE C E N T  E X P AN S I O N
 Do r e ce n t  a dd it i on s  t o t he Rules of Evidence remedy or
compound the problem? As detailed ea r li er ,138 th e char acter
evide nce ru le h a s  u n dergone a r eversa l of fort un es in sex
offense an d child molesta tion pr osecut ions by the a ddi t ion s of
Rules  413 a n d  41 4 t o the Federal Rules of Evidence. As to
cr i m in a l prosecutions for sexu a l  a ss a ult 1 3 9  or child
moles t a t ion ,140 the n ew ru les  simply provid e t ha t  evide nce of
the defendant ’s pr ior commis sion of th e sa me offense  “is
ad mis sible.”141 Desp it e t he m anda tory la ngu age of th e Ru les,
the case law quit e sen sibly in dicat es t ha t t he vir tu ally
omnipr esent  bala ncin g form ula  of Rule 403 r eta ins  its  vita lity
even in th e cont ext of the new r ules. 142 Bu t  the new ru les  have
tr iggered a r ealignm ent  of th e potent ial probat ive an d
prejud icia l uses of prior crimes evidence.143 The infe ren ce of
cr imina l conduct  from s imi la r  unch ar ged cond uct —form er ly a
poten t ia l misuse of the  ev idence which  had  to be factored into
the “preju dice” side of the Ru le 403 equa tion—is now a proper
a n d end orse d de du ction in  th e circu ms ta nces  govern ed by t he
new rules. The new rules then (unlike som e of t he well-
esta blished evidentiary rules which at least p a y h om age t o the
cha ract e r evide nce r u le e ven  wh ile  fa iling t o observe it  in
pra ctice) rep res en t  an  over t  reject ion  of the ch aracter  evide nce
rule as it  relates to the specified crimes.
Rules  413 and 414 can be attacked and defended by
marsha ling argu men ts for  and a ga in st  the ch aracter  evide nce
ru le genera lly.  But  such  a rguments  miss  the mark  because,
even  if accepted , th ey pr ove eith er t oo much or  too litt le.  If t he
genera l propens ity conclusion ma kes sen se gener ally, then
there is no principled rea son for limit ing th is use of cha ra cter
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144. In  th at  year , a Br itish  sta tu te pr ovided (contra ry t o the  gener al comm on law
rule) for th e admission of evidence to establish a gen eral p ropens ity  to r ece ive and
possess st olen  pr oper ty i n p ros ecu tion s for  th at  ver y offense . S ee Ston e, supra  no t e
41, at 978–80.
145. S ee 1 CH A R LE S E. TORCIA, WHARTON ’S  CRIMINAL E VIDENCE  § 188, at 795 &
n.17 (1985); 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 62.2, at 1335.
146. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1127.
147. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  not e 34, a t 133 4–35; Im wink elrie d, supra  note 1,
a t  1127.
148. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, at  1335–36.
evide nce solely to case s in volving sexu al a ssa ult s or child
moles ta t ion . On t he ot her  ha nd , if t he  ob ject ion  to th e new r ules
is th e pred ict ed  cataclys m tha t  wil l a t t en d t he r eve rsa l of t he
cha ract e r evide nce r u le,  eve n  for  ce r t a in  crim es only, t hen  it is
difficult  t o unders tand  the de fen se  of the la w a s i t  exi st ed  pr ior
to the new rules, with its permeable resi st ance  to the
in t roduct ion  of such  characte r  ev idence .
The t ru ly  notab le  fea tu re of t he ne w r ule s is t he  exclus ive
focus upon sexual offenses. While it  ma y seem odd that
evide nce other wise  de em ed  to be  pr eju dicia l should  become
re leva nt  bas ed solely upon  the specific crime charged, there is a
fair  a m ou n t of historical supp ort for th is proposition. Crime-
specific exceptions t o the char acter  evidence rule da te a t le a st
as far ba ck as 1871.144 In  ma ny ju ris diction s, t here developed a
“lus t fu l disp osition” exception  to t he comm on la w char acter
evide nce ru le,  sp ecifi ca lly al lowing evid en ce of prior s exu al
crimes  to demonstr ate a disposition to commit such offenses.145
Of course , Ru le 4 04(b) of the  Federa l Rules  of Evidence cont ain s
no “lustful disposition” exception  to th e char acter  evidence rule,
and,  wit h  the a dop t ion  of st a te r u les  of evidence patt ern ed after
Rule  404(b), th e “lustfu l disp osition” exception  ha s a rgu ably
been  abandoned.146 Nevertheless, court s have continued to
avoid the  characte r  ev idence ru le and t o admit  char acter
evide nce against th e accused in sex crimes prosecu t ion s. 147 In
many case s, su ch evidence is a dm itt ed u nd er t he q ues tion able
ra t iona le tha t  it  p rove s i nt e n t  or  a  common scheme or  p lan ,  or
for  som e ot her  au thor ized p urpos e u nde r  Ru le 4 04(b).148 But
whet her  such evidence is allowed by a perp etu a t ion of th e
“lus t fu l disp osi t ion ” excep t ion  or  by t he cr ea t ive  manipula t ion
of the exception s a ut hor ized by Ru le 404(b), th e fact r ema ins
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149. S ee Thomas J.  Reed, R ead in g Goa l R evis ited : Ad m iss ion  of U nch arg ed
Mi scon du ct Evidence in Sex Offense Cas es , 21 AM . J . CRIM . L. 127, 159 & n.181, 189
(199 3).
150. S ee 23 CH A R LE S AL A N  WRIGHT & KE N N E T H  W. GRAH AM , J R ., F ED ERAL
P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE  § 541 1, a t 2 63 (S up p. 1 997 ).
151. S ee 23 i d . § 5411, at 263–64.
152. S ee 23 id . § 5411, at  264; J am es J oseph  Dua ne, Th e New Federal R ules of
Ev idence on  Pr ior A ct s o f A ccu sed  S ex  Of fenders: A  Poorly Drafted Version of a Very
Bad  Idea, 15 7 F .R. D. 9 5, 9 5–9 7 (19 95).
153. S ee Dua ne, supra note 152, at  96.
154. S ee supra  no t es  4–6  and accompany ing  t ex t .
155. S ee 23 WRIGHT & GRAH AM , supra  note 150, § 5411, at 264–65; Dua ne, supra
no te 152, at 96–97.
tha t  th e “lustfu l disp osition” notion  is far  from d ead  in a ct ua l
pra ctice.149
So w hy t he n eed,  or  even the desire, to revitalize, or at least
rest at e, the  repud ia t ion  of the  charact er evidence ru le in sex
offense cases? It ha s been  suggest ed th at  th e new r ules
cons t it u t e a  fi r st  s t ep in a  scheme t o eradicat e th e char acter
evide nce rule in criminal prosecutions.150 In  any  even t ,  the
measur es, as pa rt s of more com p r ehensive bills,  failed to
em er ge from Con gres s in  both 1991 an d 1992.151 In  1994 , the
rela tively  few su ppor ter s of the  new  ru les of evidence wer e ab le
to secure pa ssa ge of th ese provisions  in excha nge for p rovidin g
the n ecess a ry m argin  of su pp or t  for  a  la rger  cr im e bill  in  wh ich
the new rules became incorporated.152 The  n ew rules,
consider ed indepen dent ly, never comm an ded un fett er ed
s u ppor t  in Congress,153 an d, as m ent ioned ear lier,154 have
suffered ext ens ive cr it icis m since t hey e mer ged  from
Congress.155
Odd ly, then, Rules 413 and 414 en joy  the impr imatur  tha t
accompanies h ist orical r oots, bu t s uffer t he s tigm a of owing
th eir  exist en ce t o a  pol it ica l dea l. But  thes e fa ct s a lon e d o not
dicta te t he  r esu lt  of our  ap pr ais al of th e ne w ru les. Not  all t ha t
can  claim  a  l ong hist ory is wor th while , just  as  not  everyt hin g
tha t  is born  of political b a ck  scra tch ing is  wort hle ss. An
evalu a t ion  of the  mer i t  of the  add it ions  to the  Federa l  Rules
requ ires a n exam inat ion of th e proffered jus tificat ions for t hese
rules. Tha t exa min at ion  r evea ls  the followin g t wo con clu sions:
first,  tha t  both  the a t t ackers and defenders  of Rule 413 an d 414
have done an excellent  job of demonst ra ting th at  th e new ru les
may ma ke ve ry lit tle  differen ce as  a p ra ctical m at te r, a nd
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156. S ee 137 CO N G. RE C . 3240 (da ily ed. Ma r. 13, 1 991). 
157. Of course, und er Rule 404(b), th e t ri al  cour t m igh t h av e ex clu ded  su ch
evid en ce on the groun d tha t th e potentially prejudicial use of the evidence to
establish a gen era l propen sity t o commit s exua l assa ult s out weighed  th e proba tive
va lue of the evide nce to pr ove motive. U nder  Rule 413 , a ba lan cing t est  must  still be
applied, see supra  n o te 142 an d accompa nyin g text , but  th e gene ra l propen sity
conclu sion  need no lon ger  be a voide d. N eve rt he les s, e ith er  th is p roffer ed ju st ificat ion
for  th e r ule  is d isin gen uou s, or  it s ug ges ts  th at  th e r ule , for t he  s t a t ed pu rp ose of
p rov ing mo ti ve,  is a n e nt ir ely  un ne ces sa ry  du pli cat ion  of Ru le 4 04(b ).
158. S ee 140 CO N G. RE C . 12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994); 137 CO N G. RE C . 3238
(daily ed . Ma r.  13,  199 1).
159. S ee Dua ne, supra  note 152, at  98–99.
160. S ee 140 CO N G. RE C . H2 433  (da ily e d. Ap r.  19,  199 4).
161. S ee 137 CO N G. RE C . 3240–41 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991); Imwinkelr ied, supra
no te 1, at  1130–35 ; Kar p, supra  note 57, at  20.
162. S ee Dua ne, supra  note 152, at  97-98.
163. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1136.
second, tha t  th e new r ules constit ut e an  ent irely unp rincipled
addit ion  to a n a rea  of the la w alr ead y brim min g with
disingenuous foolishness.
To begin , ma ny of th e proffered jus tificat ions for Ru les 413
a n d 414 ar e prem ised on th e notion th at  th e evidence allowed
by those ru les is needed  to es tabli sh  many of t he ve ry is su es  for
which  prior crimes  evidence is permit ted  un der  Rule  404(b). F or
examp le, one  a rgument  for  the  new ru les  i s tha t  evide nce of th e
defendan t ’s de si re for  noncon sens ua l sexu al gr at ification is
esse nt ially ak in t o proof of mot ive.156  But  on  t h a t  theory , the
evide nce would  h ave been adm issible to prove “motive” un der
Rule  404(b).157 A second reason put forth for th e new rules is
tha t  th e a dm itt ed evid en ce is n ecess ar y to di sprove the
defendan t ’s claim of consen t, 158 but th e concepts of “in ten t” and
“absence of mist ak e” in Rule 404(b) have been st ret ched to
a llow  prior crimes  evi de nce to disprove a claim of consent  an d
t hus to de monst ra te a  pr ope nsi ty t owa rd in ten t ion a l
assaults. 159 A th ir d cla im  for  the n ecess it y of Rules 413 an d 414
is t ha t  su ch  evide nce will  es tabli sh  a  pa t t er n  of condu ct
identifying the defendant  as  t he  a ssa il ant .160 A varia tion  of this
t heory is ba sed on  th e doctr ine of chan ces: th e imp roba bility of
an  in divid ua l suffer in g m ult ip le fa lse a ccusa t ions of sexu al
assaults. 161 But  again , Rule 404(b) alrea dy allows evidence of
pr ior crim es t o prove “iden tit y” in t his  conte xt, 162 and n o
addit iona l ru le seem s n ecessa ry t o app ly the  doct r ine of chan ces
to such evidence.163
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164. S ee 140 CO N G. RE C . 12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994); 140 CO N G. RE C .
H8991–92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994); 140 CO N G. RE C . 10, 276  (daily ed . Aug . 2,  199 4);
137 CO N G. RE C . 3238–39  (daily ed . Mar . 13, 1991); Ka rp, supra  note  57, at  20–2l.
To the  ex ten t  tha t  the  deba te over Rules 413 an d 414 ha s
focused on th e overlap with  Rule 404(b), num erous pa ra doxes
have mater ia lized . F ir st , in  an  app aren t  effor t  to d em on st r a t e
tha t  th e ne w r ule s a re  “not  so ba d,” th eir  pr oponen ts  ha ve
likened  these rules in practice to Rule 404(b), ther eby
un witt ingly su ppor tin g th e opposit ion a rgu me n t  t hat  th e new
ru les a re en t ir ely  unnecess ary. S econ d,  in  an  app aren t  effor t  to
demons t r a t e that  Rule 413 and 414 ar e en tir ely un ne cessa ry,
th eir  opponen t s have  hast ened  to em ph asize t ha t  su ch  evide nce
will frequen t ly,  if n ot  normally, get in  un der  th e pr eexist ing
Rule  404(b), th ere by un int ent iona lly docum ent ing th at  th e new
ru les ar e “not so bad.” Third, th e opponents  of Rules 413 an d
414, wh ile  poin t in g t o Ru le 4 04(b) in  theor y in  orde r  to pr ot e st
th i s su pp osedly dr amat ic n ew viola t ion  of th e  ch a ra cter
evide nce ru le,  a lso poin t  to Ru le 4 04(b) in  pr act ice t o advance
the a rgumen t  tha t  t he governm e n t  h a s no need for th e new
rules.
Be th a t  as it m ay, we are st ill left with t he quest ion of why
the re should be a sepa ra te—indeed a  convers e—rule for sex
offenses. Any practical similarity between the results under
Rules  413 and 414 and th e results u n d er  R u le 404(b) proves
noth ing except the ext ent  t o which  Rule 4 04(b) falls woefully
shor t  of vin dica t in g t he ch ar a cte r  ev idence  ru le . I f the
sim ilar ity  to Ru le 404(b) in pr act ice is all t h a t  com mends the
change in  the new ru les , then  there is certa inly no principled
dist inct ion between  thes e n ew ru les  and com pa rable  ru les  for
robbery, drug offenses, or any other crimes.
One a rgument  for Ru les 413 and  414 th at  at  least  addr esses
the righ t qu est ion is t ha t s ex crim es (inclu din g child
moles ta t ion) a re  pa r t icula rly difficult  to pr ove becaus e th ere  is
often  no corrobora tin g eviden ce to su ppor t t he vict im’s
tes t imony , and because, in child molestation cases, the child’s
tes t imony is often regarded with skepticism.164 Ther e ar e,
however , seve ra l fa ta l proble ms w it h  th is  pos it ion .
F i rs t , if the pur pose of th e new rules is  to ass is t  the
govern men t in  cases  built  exclusively up on t he  te st imon y of the
victim,  then  the r ules  sh ould s ay exa ctly t ha t. Bu t cu rr en tly,
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70 CH I .-KE N T L. RE V. 3, 1 3 (19 94).
the robber y pr osecut ion ba sed s olely upon t he vict im’s
tes t imony falls outsid e t he r u les , wh ile  the r ape  case  in  wh ich
the victim ’s tes t i m on y is confirm ed by D NA evide nce, a
videotaped  confes sion  and twen ty disin ter est ed byst an der s falls
with in  the ru les .
Second, the claim t ha t s ex offens es a re s ingu lar ly difficult  to
p rove is unsubstan tiated. Many other crimes (such  as
homicides, burgla r ies  of unoccupied p rem ises , t heft s of
un guar ded property and so-ca lle d v ict im les s cr im es ) do n ot
offer th e govern men t even t he  t es t imony of th e victim , and  sex
offense p rosecu t ions  a re fr equen tly a ided by m edical a nd
scientific evidence.165
Third, and  mos t  importa nt , if cha ra cter  eviden ce tr uly is
pr ejud icial, th en wh y allow it only in th e ca ses in  which  the
govern men t’s case is presum ably weak est ?166 I f t he  idea  is  t o
give th e govern m e n t  a  lit t le e xt ra  ass is t ance in  case s in  wh ich
it  nee ds t he h elp, wh at  is t he lim ita t ion  on  th i s opera t ing
prin ciple? If we m ak e t he  gover n m e n t ’s ta sk a  little eas ier
when  it only has  a litt le eviden ce, sh ould  we  make it s job  a  lot
easier  when  it h as  no eviden ce at  all? On e very p lau sible
exp la na t ion  for a la ck of str ong eviden ce of guilt  is  a ct u a l
innocence. It  is  simply cou nter in tu it ive  to expose only the most
pla us ibly innocent to supposedly dan gerou sly pr ejud icial
evidence.
T h e t rut h is t ha t Ru les 413 and  414 cannot be pr emised
upon a  de si re t o corr ela te t he a dm ission of pre jud icia l evidence
with  a we ak  govern men t ca se. E ven t he s ta un chest  an ticr ime
leg is la tor  wou ld  not  pu rpos ely  vot e t o pe rmit  convict ion s on  the
bas is of evidence not  fair ly corr elat ed  t o fa ctu al guilt. Whet her
sta ted  explicitly or not, th e necessar y prem is e of th e new r ules
is t h a t  the ch aracter  evide nce a t  is su e is  se en  as p roba t ive , n ot
pr ejud icial. Con se qu en t ly,  a  much more  genu ine defense of
Rules  413 a nd  414 sh ould focus  on  wha t  i t  is th at  is pa rt icular ly
probat ive about cha ra cter evidence in sex offense cases .
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167. 140 CO N G. RE C . H899 1 (daily ed . Aug. 21, 1994) (statement  of Rep.
Moli na ri ).
168. S ee Kar p, supra  note 57, at  20.
169. S ee 1A WI G M ORE , supra  note 34,  § 62.2, at  1345; Reed , supra  no te 149,  a t
219.
170. S ee Raed er, supra  not e 4, at  350; Reed , supra  note 149, at  149 & n.117.
171. S ee 23 WRIGHT & GRAH AM , supra  n ote 150, § 5412, at 274; Kater ine K.
Baker , Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and R elevancy in Rape Law , 110 HARV.
L. RE V. 563, 578 (1997 ); Duan e, supra  not e 15 2, a t 1 13; Da vid P . Leon ar d, T he
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 F O RDH AM  URB . L.J . 305, 339
(199 5).
172. S ee 23 WRIGH T  &  GR AH A M, supra  not e 150, § 5412 , at  274; Bak er, supra
no te 171, a t 578 -79; Dua ne, supra  not e 152, a t 113 ; Leona rd, supra  note 171 , at 339.
Some effor t s h ave b een  made  to just ify t he n ew ru les  a lon g
these  lin es . It  has been  su ggest ed , for  exa mple, by one of t he
Con gr es siona l sponsors of the n ew ru les  tha t “a h ist ory of [child
moles ta t ion] ten ds  to be  exce pt ion a lly  pr oba t ive  because it
shows an  unusu a l d ispos it ion  of the d efenda nt—a se xu a l or
sado-sexua l in t e r es t  in child ren —th at  sim ply does n ot exist  in
ord ina ry people.”167 It h as a lso been sugges ted tha t  persons who
have a h ist ory of sexua l crimes poss es s a  “combin a t ion  of
[uninh ibited and un deterred] aggressive and sexual impulses”
not  sh ar ed by p eople gen er ally. 168
Once again, however, these argument s for Rules 41 3 a nd
414 do not  ta ke u s wh ere  we n eed t o go. No doubt  ma ny p eople
who commi t  a ll sorts of crim es possess cert ain d esires a nd
disp osi t ion s that  are different from those people who manage
not  to run  a fou l  of the penal codes. The re is  not hin g in pr inciple
un ique about  sex offenders. Dr ug us ers m ay be a ddicted ,
t hieves gr eedy, a ss a ila n t s v iolen t , a nd s o on. It  is  simply n ot
very d iffi cu l t t o i den t ify  cha ract e r  t r ai t s a s socia ted with
par t icu la r  ca tegor ies  of cr im in a l con du ct . To d o so d oes  not
expla in  wh y a  di ffer en t  ru le for  character eviden ce shou ld
contr ol for on e su ch cat egory. 169
On this point, the opponents of Rules 413 an d 414  ha ve
ta ken  th e offensive. The counter a rgument  is that, because
recidivism for  sexua l offenses  i s not  h igher  than  for  other
crimes,170 and inde ed  is  actua lly lower  than  for  m a ny other
crim es,171 th e spe cial valu e of cha ra cter  eviden ce in sex cr ime
offenses is th ereby dispr oved.172
It  i s t r u e that  the absence of a higher ra te of recidivism for
sexua l offen ses  re moves  one p ossible a rgu me n t for specia l
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t r ea tment  of such  cr imes . I t  is  not ,  however ,  t rue tha t  the  on ly
w a y tha t  a  sh owin g of a  rela t ive ly gr ea ter  pr oba t ive  va lu e for
cha ra cter  eviden ce in sex cr ime  prosecutions can  be esta blished
is by sh owing a  great er degr ee of recidivism for su ch offenders.
Suppose, for example, tha t th e recidivism rate for both rape
and th eft is fifty per cent, but  th at  th e ra te for each crim e
commi t ted by sam e-crim e repea t offender s is  twenty per cen t  for
the ft s and e ight y per cen t  for  rape s.  In  th is  cir cumst ance, p r ior
crimes  evidence for rap es would be r ela tive ly mor e pr obat ive
than  prior crimes  evidence for  t hefts because t he former  gives
us a r ela tive ly mu ch gr ea te r lik elih ood of iden tifyin g th e
cr imina l in a  p a rticular case ba sed upon pr ior conduct. Or
suppose th at  fifty per cent of all crim es (includin g both  rape and
the ft ) ar e comm itt ed by p rior  offen der s wh o ha ve pr eviously
commit ted  the sam e crime. Supp ose also tha t t her e ar e 100,000
pr ior th eft offender s a nd  only t en pr ior r ap e offend ers . En tir ely
independen t of the r elat ive recidivis m r at es, a s well a s t he
above-hypoth esized rep ea t  offen de r  ra t ios , pr ior  cr imes
evide nce in the rape case would be more proba t ive  than  the
same evide nce in  the t heft  case sim ply becau se th e ra w
numbers ena ble u s to n ar row d own m ore s ub st an tia lly a
plausible  gr oup of s usp ect s in  the r ape  sce nar io.
Be this as it  ma y, these alterna tive possible methods for
demons t ra t ing th e super ior probat ive value of char acter
evidence in th e prosecutions covered by Rules 413 an d 414  a re
of no avail in defense of these provisions because th ere is no
actua l da ta  yie ld in g a ny of t he a bove  conclu sions. In  fact ,  the
new ru les  a re s im ply devoid of a ny em pi r ica l supp or t .173 Ther e
is no ba sis w ha ts oever  for  be lie vin g t ha t  pr ior  cr im es  evide nce
is more probative in th e situ at ions governed  by Rules 413 an d
414 th an  it would be in t he prosecutions of oth er crimes
govern ed by the pr eexisting, cont ra ry (in th eory) cha ra cter
evidence rule.174
But  even if recidivism r at es or  other  da ta  suppor ted  an
inference of heigh ten ed pr obat ive valu e in s ex crim e
prosecutions, th e crime-specific amend men ts in  Rules  413 and
414 would be unacceptab le. Fir st , a d ifferen ce in d egr ee ough t
not  to accoun t for a completely convers e ru le. If char acter
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evide nce were m ar ginally more pr obative in sex offense cases,
one sh ould e xpect  at  most  a r ela tive  re laxa t ion  of t he  cha ract e r
evide nce rule, not what  appears from t he face of th e ru les to be
a  complet e  about -face from a r ule of exclusion t o a complet e
ru le of inclusion .
Second, the  vi r tue and  success of the F ed er a l Ru les  of
Evidence can be attributed precisely to their universal
app lica t ion , gener ally m ak ing n o dist inct ions  among l it i gan t s
and subject ma tter, and impe r viou s t o va r ia ble  pol it ica l
agendas and shifting statistics.175 Rule s 4 13  and 4 14 are wrong
for  a l l the  reasons th at  th e Feder al Rules of Evidence are
gener ally r ight . Cons ist ency a nd  int egrit y dicta te t ha t ou r r ule
on  ch a r a ct er e viden ce not va ry fr om crim e to crim e wit h t he
wind s of today’s pa rt icular  cause celebre.176
Fin ally, a s ha s been det ailed above,177 t he  st a te  of the la w of
evide nce rega rding ch aracter  evide nce p r ior  to the enactmen t  of
Rules  413 a nd  414 wa s a lre ad y a h opeless ly complex,
un work able  and la rgely d is in gen uous m orass . Like t he t op floor
of a  st ructura lly  unsou nd b u ild in g, t he n ew ru les  not  only d o
noth ing to remedy the  preex is t ing d isorder , they a l so compound
the problem by adding yet another unpr incipled and
indefensible distin ction to the cha ra cter evidence ru les.
If we a re  to do better tha n this, we need to pursue t wo goals.
F i rs t , decons t ruct ion  i s in  order. Noth ing significan t is t o be
gained  by furt her building upon the present disarr ay. And
second, we  need t o discover  the t rue, w or thwh i le ju st ifica t ion s,
if any , for  the cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le, an d t hu s iden tify wh at  is
wort h p re ser ving a nd  wh at  is in  nee d of discar din g.
IV. RE A SO N S  F OR  T H E  CH A R A C T E R  E V ID E N C E  RU L E
 Pe rhaps  no single  r a t ion a le a ccoun t s for  t he cha ract e r
evide nce ru le.178 Var iou s explana tions for th e ru le have been
advanced, in clu ding t he s uggest ion  th at  th e ru le is, a t lea st  in
pa r t , “a senseless pr oduct  of hist ory.”179 Bu t  before r e t r ea t ing to
tha t  conclusion, an  examin at ion of th e more flatt ering pr offered
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181. S ee Old Ch ief v. United S ta tes, 51 9 U.S. 172, 180 -82 (1997); Michelson  v.
United  St at es,  335 U .S. 4 69, 4 75–7 6 (194 8); 2  LOUISELL & MU E L L E R, supra  n o t e 28,
§ 136, at 128–29; 1A WI G M ORE , supra  note 34, § 29a, at 979, § 58.2, at 1212–15; 23
WRIGH T  &  GR AH A M, supra  not e 15 0, § 54 16, a t 3 07; Adm ission of Crimin al Histories,
supra  note 34 , at  730–31; Im wink elrie d, supra  not e 63, a t 18; Im wink elrie d, supra
no te 1, at  1138; Imw inkelr ied, supra  not e 165, a t 289 –90; Im wink elrie d, supra  no t e
7, at  581–82; Me nde z, supra  note 180 ,  a t  1044; Ra eder , supra  note 4, at 349; Stone,
supra  note 41, at  957.
182. S ee 2 LO UISELL  & MU E L L E R, supra  note 28, § 136, at 130; 1A WIGMORE ,
supra  not e 34 , § 29a , at  979,  § 57, a t 1 185,  § 58.2 , at  1212 –15; Adm ission of Criminal
Histories, supra  note 34, at  730–31; Dua ne, supra  note 152, at 110; Imwinkelried,
supra  note  165, a t  290–91;  Imwinkel r ied, supra  not e 7, at  580, 582; N an ce, supra
no te 166, a t 11; Ra eder , supra  not e 4, at  349; Reed , supra  note 34, at  166.
183. S ee 2 LOUISELL  &  MU E L L E R, supra  note 28, § 136, at 130–31; 1A WIGMORE ,
s u pra not e 34, § 58.2, a t 121 2-15; Edwa rd J . Imw ink elrie d, The Need to Amen d
Federal R ul e of E vid ence 4 04(b ): Th e T hr eat  to t he Fu tu re of  th e Fed eral  Ru les of
Ev idence, 30 VILL . L. RE V. 1465, 148 9 (1985); Kar p, supra  note 57, at 27; Reed, supra
no te 34, at  167; St one, supra  note 41, at  957-58.
184. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  n o t e 34, § 58.2, a t 121 3 n.2; Ku hn s, supra  note 60,
a t  777; Na nce, supra  note 166, at  11.
just ification s for  the r u le i s r equir ed . Th es e defen se s of t he
cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le can  be de scrib ed in  th e following five
formu lations:
1 . c h a r a ct e r  ev idence  i s  e xclud ed b eca us e it is  ess en tia lly
i r r e le v a n t ;180
2 . c h a r a ct e r  evid en ce is ex clud ed b eca us e of th e like ly
dan ge r  tha t  su ch  evi de n ce w ill be  a fford ed  too m u ch
weigh t  by  ju r i e s ;181
3 . c h a r a ct e r  ev id en ce is  ex clu de d, a t l ea st  wh en  offer ed
a g a in s t  t h e  a c cu s e d , b e ca u s e  of t h e  l ik e ly  d a n g er  t h a t
t h e jur y will convic t t h e d efe n da n t t o ex a ct
p u n i s h m e n t  fo r  t h e  pr i or ,  u n ch a r g e d  m i sc on d u c t ;182
4 . c h a r a ct e r  ev id en ce is  ex clu de d, a t l ea st  wh en  offer ed
aga ins t  t he  a ccused ,  because  o the rw ise  t h e  accused
will  no t  ha ve  been  p rov ided fa ir  n ot ice  a s t o t h e
al lega tion s  of m iscon du ct a s t o wh ich  a  de fen s e  n e e d s
t o  b e p r e p a r e d ;183 a n d
5 . c h a r a ct e r  ev idence  is  exc luded  becau se  i t  i nvo lves
t ime-consu ming  ven t u res  in t o  co ll a t e ra l  ma t t e r s . 184
Ea ch of the se r at iona les will be d iscus sed in  tu rn .
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186. S ee Davie s, supra  not e 107, a t 511 ; Imwin kelr ied, supra  not e 94, a t 379;
Uvil le r , supra  note 12, at  883.
187. S ee Na nce, supra  note 166, at  3.
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p roponen t .
189. S ee Na nce, supra  note 166, at  3-4.
190. S ee F E D . R. E V I D. 404(a )(1); see supra  note s 10–12 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
191. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 404 (a)(2 ).
A. Relevance
The ar gum ent  th at  cha ra cter  eviden ce is irr elevant is just
pla in  wrong; an exh au st ive list  of aut hor ities  on th is
poin t—many suppor t ive of th e genera l ban on cha ra cter
evide nce185—is in accord. Th e not ion  tha t  cha ract e r  t r ai t s
in flu en ce beh avior is  s o m u ch  a  pa r t  of common sense and
everyday exp er ien ce186 th at  th e contr ar y su ggest ion is r eally
quite r ema rk able.187
Imagin e r etu rn ing home from work t o find a  sha tt ered
living room win dow  and a  br ick  res t in g a mid  br oken  gla ss  on
the living r oom floor . Without  more, t her e would  be  a  wor ld  of
equ ally plau sible culprits. But  supp ose tha t t he n eigh bor hood
conta ined an individual who had been apprehended on  several
occasions in  the recen t  pas t th rowing br icks t hr ough t he livin g
room win dow s of ot her  homes . Wh ile  by n o mea ns d ispos it ive  of
tha t  ind ividua l’s com pl icit y on  the occa sion  in  qu es t ion , such
in forma t ion  would u nq ue st iona bly be r eleva nt .188 Only  a  fool
would  fail to include su ch  i n formation in a report t o the police,
a n d only the disingenuous would claim that  they would n ot
r epor t  it  beca use  of th eir  comm it men t  to the fa ncy  t h at
cha ra cter  eviden ce is ir re leva nt .
In  fact, the law’s t rea tm ent  of cha ra cter  eviden ce is
confir mat ion  of the  re leva nce of such evidence.189 The cr imina l
defendan t  is  unqu a lified ly p er mit t ed  to in t rodu ce op in ion  and
repu ta t ion  evidence of h is  or  he r  own  cha ract e r ,190 a s  we ll  a s
tha t  of the crim e victim ,191 an d sur ely such evidence would be
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192. S ee 1A W IGMORE , supra  note 34, § 55, at 1157-59.
193. S ee supra  note s 109–137 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
194. S ee Roth ste in, supra  note 71, at  1264–65.
195. S ee 1A WI G M O R E , supra  not e 34, § 54.1, a t 115 6; Roth ste in, supra  note 71,
a t  1264–65.
196. S ee Adm ission of Crimin al H ist ories , supra  note 34, at  735–36; Kar p, supra
no te 57, at 51.
197. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 54.1, at 1157 n.2.
198. S ee Bak er, supra  note 171, at 578–79 & n.80; Raeder ,  supra  note 4, at  350.
199. F o r th is rea son, cont ra ry t o what  Mend ez sugg ests , it  should not  be
“troublin g .  . .  t ha t  ju ro r s may  give  grea t e r weigh t t o evi den ce of m iscon du ct a nd
d ishones ty tha n to favorable evidence.” Mendez, supra  note 180, at 1045. It  is a
happy  circum sta nce th at  most  people do not  commit  crime s. Ther efore, crim ina l,
rat her  tha n noncrimina l, conduct is distinctive an d especially relevan t. M oreover, it
is per fectl y se ns ible  to focu s u pon  ne gat ive con du ct a s a  tr ue  ind icat or of cha ract e r .
People  we know to be honest do not gener ally lie, but people we know t o be dishonest
do ofte n t ell t he  tr ut h. I t is  th e pa tt er n of e ven  occas ion al fabr icat ion th at , in
comm on exp er ien ce, ca n q ua lify on e for  th e la tt er  re pu ta tion .
200. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  not e 7, at  582; Men dez, supra  note 180, at  1052.
disallowed if it wa s ir re leva nt .192 Cha ract er e viden ce is
adm itted  to est ablis h or  at ta ck th e cred ibilit y of a witness.193
Pr ior  cond uct  evide nce a dm it t ed  unde r  Ru le 4 04(b) m ay
tech nica lly fall out side t he la w’s defin ition  of cha ract e r
evidence, but  i ts  rele va nce is  neve r thele ss  pr em ised  upon  the
ass um ed cons is t en cy of an  ind ividua l’s behavior .194 The  sa me is
t rue of evide nce of h abit , a dm it t ed  unde r  Fed er a l Ru le of
Evidence 406.195 Evidence  of past  con d u ct  to establish
p ropens ity is r out ine ly consider ed in  det erm inin g pr etr ial
re lea se a nd  sen te ncin g.196
Evidence excluded by the char acter evidence rule is no less
re leva nt  than  the evid en ce a dm it t ed  pu rsu ant  to the va r iou s
exce pt ion s to, an d dis tin ctions  from, t he r ule of exclusion .197
Whether based upon  common anecdotal exper ience or
s ta t is t ica l eviden ce of high  recidivis m rat es,198 we qu ite s ens ibly
as sign  sign ificance, for  exa mple, t o the p r ior  br ick  toss es  of th e
above-hypoth esized n eighbor  b eca u s e h e  or  s h e h as
demons tr at ed a disposition t o cross a lin e th a t m ost p eople will
not cross.199
Neverth eless, some commenta tors  have  sugges ted  tha t  the
nonexi st en t , or at  least  tr ivial, probative value of cha ra cter
evide nce is est ablis hed  by psychological st ud ies su ggest ing tha t
cha ract e r is a poor pr ed ict or  of behavior , which is determined to
a  greater extent by situational factors.200 There a re th ree flaws
in  th is  pos it ion .
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201. S ee Davie s, supra  note 107, at  506, 516–17, 533; Imw ink elrie d, supra  no t e
27, at 37.
202. S ee Davies, supra  not e 107, a t 516 –17; Lyn n McLa in, New Federal R ules in
S ex Off ens e Cas es, 25 MD . B.J . 34,  37 (1 995 ).
203. S ee Andre w E. Ta slitz, M yself Alone: Ind ividu alizin g Ju stice Th rough
Psychological Ch ara cter  Ev id ence , 52 MD . L. RE V. 1, 33 (1 993 ).
204. S ee supra  note s 42–52 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
205. Compare Imw ink elrie d, supra  n ote  7, a t 5 82 (w ri ti ng  in  199 0: “[T]h e
empir ica l st ud ies  ind icat e t ha t t he  gen er al con st ru ct of ch ar act er  is a  re lat ively  poor
pr edi ctor  of a per son’s conduct  on a g iven occas ion. . . . I n  li gh t  of the a vailab le
studies, we can have little confidence in the constru ct of character a s a predictor  of
condu ct.” (foot no te s om it te d)) with  Imwinkelried, supra  note  27, at  45 (writin g in
1994: “[T]he  pr eva ilin g . . . i nt er act ion ist  th eor y . . . cu ts  in favor of liber alizing t he
[adm ission  of ] chara cter e vidence,” but  “we should pe rh aps  be hes ita nt  to legisla te  on
the ba sis  of th e cu rr en t p opu la ri ty  of th e in te ra cti on ist  th eor y.”).
206. In  t h i s r e s pe ct ,  wh a t  P rofess or I mw ink elr ied  ha s ca ut ione d in  1994  ab out
re ly ing upon  a cur ren tly popu lar  psychological th eory is a bsolut ely cor rect . S ee
Imwinkelried, supra no te  27,  at  45.  It  wa s a lso  cor re ct a t t he  ti me  of P rofessor
Fi rs t , th e mor e re cent  psychologica l  li t era tu re  suppor t s  the
pr oposition  tha t  characte r  ev idence  is  indeed r eleva nt .201 It
sugges t s tha t  characte r  t r a its  do ha ve predictive value,202 even
in cross-situational circumstances.203
Second, th e cita tion  of psychological lite ra tu re in  th is
conte xt  ha s a ll th e flavor of a welcome dis covery of a n ew
just ifica t ion  for  t r avel in g on  a s hip  th at  act ua lly left the s hore a
very lon g t im e a go. The ch aracter  evide nce r u le,  in  one for m or
anothe r , has been around for  a few centu ries.204 I t  seems
un likely tha t  it  or iginat ed from a  p resci en t  an t icipa t ion  of la t e
twen t ie th cen tur y psych ological t he ories  su ggest ing t ha t t he
concept  of behavior based on char acter traits is all premised
upon misconcep t ion . Mor eove r , t he s h ift in g con se nsu s a mong
psychologists has  made  it  r a ther  p reca r ious  to pr e m ise one’s
position upon t his liter at ur e.205
Third, even if empirical resea rch d id suggest  th at  char acter
t r a it s a r e  poor  ind ica tors for  p red ict ing  human  behavior , i t
would  sh ed  lit t le l igh t  on  the ques t ion  of th e lega l r ele va nce of
cha ract e r evide nce. T his  is  because  it  is  not  the t a sk  of t he  ju ry
to p red ict  the  de fendan t ’s  behavior. I f we  could  pr ed ict  human
behavior , we could presumably dispense with  ou r  cu r ren t a ft e r -
the -cr ime syst em of ad judica t ion  and inst ea d d evi se  som e
pr eem pt ive met hod of crime control. But we can not pr edict
behavior , an d consequ ent ly wha t m ay be of enor mou s in t e r est
t o psychologist s a s t heor ies of hu ma n be ha vior ha s it self lit t le
relevan ce to the evident iary issu e of relevan ce.206
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Imwinkelried’s art icle four years ea rlier when  a differe n t  t h eory  of hu ma n b eh avi or
was th en in  vogue. See supra  note 205.
207. S ee Davie s, supra  note 107, at  518.
208. S ee David  J . Kar p, R espon se t o Prof essor  Im wi nk elri ed’s Com m ent s, 70 CH I .-
KE N T L. RE V. 49,  52 (1 994 ).
To illustra te, we ca n  re turn  to our  hypothet ica l  br ick-
th rower . The fact  t ha t  ou r  su spe ct h as  th rown  br icks t hr ough
living room win dows on s ever al p r i or occasions h ar dly enables
us to pr ed ict  wh en  he or  sh e will  do s o again. In fact ,  we  can
add to our  hypothesi s tha t ,  dur ing  the same per iod  of t ime tha t
our  susp ect thr ew four bricks thr ough four windows, he or she
pas sed by some four t housand windows wit hou t flingin g
a n y th ing in  thei r  di rect ion .  Even  assuming  tha t  pas t
per formance i s an  accu rate in dicat or of futu re  beh avior , a
pr ediction  th at  a p ar ticu lar  wind ow will su ffe r  a  sha t t e r ing fa t e
on  a  pa r t icu la r  occas ion  a t  the  hands  of our  suspect  would have
only a bou t  a  one in  one t housa nd ch ance of bein g cor rect .
Does th is  r ender  evidence of our a ctor’s prior a dvent ur es
irr eleva nt ? Of cour se not .  To ins is t  t ha t  evidence ha ve
pr edict ive valu e as  a condit ion  of rele va nce is  to im pos e u pon
such  evidence at  the a dm issibil it y s t age a  requ ir em en t  of
su fficiency tha t  need on ly be m et  by t he cu mula t ive  tota l of a
pa r ty’s evidence when tha t par ty rests its case. 2 0 7  The  que st ion
should not be whet her  th e char acter  evidence is sufficient to
establish guilt ; inva ria bly t ha t will not be th e case. The rea l
i ssue is  w h et h er t he ch ar act er e viden ce could  be a cont ribu tin g
piece of evidence in a  case es ta blish ing gu ilt. 208
F or  example, in  a  pr ose cut ion  of our  br ick -chuckin g susp ect
for  the most recent incident, without more than t he defendant ’s
h i story of similar  crimes, th e govern men t could not su rvive the
defendan t ’s mot ion for judgm ent  of acquit ta l at  th e close of its
case. Bu t  suppose tha t t he governm ent ’s case also included
tes t imony th at  th e defendan t wa s, minu tes before th e crime,
seen  hea din g in t he  dir ection  of the  re leva nt  hom e, ca r ry ing  a
br ick  and  mut t er ing  th rea t s aga ins t  th e res ident  of th at  home.
In  add it ion , im agin e t es t im ony t ha t , m in utes  a ft er  the cr ime ,
the de fen da nt  wa s s een  runnin g in  a  di rect ion  awa y fr om the
re leva nt  home car r ying n oth ing. N ow th e govern men t’s cas e is
su rely  one  tha t  wi ll  r each  the ju ry, wh ich  migh t  we ll con vict  on
such  evidence. And a lthough  th e eyewitness  accounts  of the
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ M E L - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1598 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
209. S ee Tas litz,  supra  note 203, at 68. Professor Taslitz also hypothesizes the
sit ua tion  in which, beca use  of distin ct, ind ividua l aggr egat es of char acte r t ra its, t he
lik elih ood of th e de fen da nt  ha vin g commit ted  th e char ged crim e is only 4.5%, while
the likelihood of anoth er individual ha ving commit ted th e charged crime is on ly 0.9 %.
Even  though th e character evidence  doe s  not  make  it  l ike ly  tha t  t he de fendan t
commi t t ed the  cr ime , i t  is  clea r ly  re levan t  because this  eviden ce does ma ke it  five
times  more likely that  the defendan t committed t he crime  tha n th at t he other
ind iv idua l commit ted  th e crim e. See id.  As in  the c ir c u m st a n ces  hypothes ized  in  the
t ext , th e govern men t would  requ ire m ore t ha n jus t t his ch ar acter  evid e n ce  to
establish a prima  facie case.
210. S ee supra note 181. In part icular, the a rgum ent  i s t h a t  j u ror s , hav ing
concluded th at  an  individu al h as a  propen sity t oward  a pa rt icular beh avior, will
ove rest ima te the va lue of such evidence in resolving th e questio n of wh et he r or  not
tha t  same individu al b eh ave d in  accor da nce  wit h t ha t ge ne ra l pr open sit y on t he
occas ion  in qu est ion. S ee, e.g., Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 7, at  581.
defendan t’s condu ct immed iately before and  after  th e crime ar e
most imp ort an t, t he p rior  crim es evide nce is a lso plain ly
relevan t, as  it logically stren gthen s th e govern men t’s case.
As a final variation on our hypothetical, sup p os e t ha t  the
defendan t  is only one of thr ee suspects with a tr ack record of
th rowing br ick s t h rough  win dow s.  Th is  a lt er s t he a na lys is  not
a t  all. Beca us e th e cha ra cter  eviden ce ma kes  it in crem ent ally
more likely t h a t  one  of t he  three p r ior  offende r s (a s  con t r a s t ed
with  the  genera l  popula t ion  of th ose wh o ha ve his tor ically
abst ained  from th rowing b r icks  th rough  windows) commi t ted
th i s cr im e, s uch  evidence is relevan t. The fact t ha t t her e ar e
two othe r s eq u a lly dama ged by such char acter  evidence goes
only to the weigh t  ass ign ed  by t he ju ry t o th is  evide nce a nd
mer ely incr ea ses  th e sign ificance of th e eyewitness accounts,
testimony which incriminates only the par ticular defendant. 209
Characte r evidence, then, is manifestly re levant. Or ,
perhaps  a better way to state th e proposition is as follows:
evide nce which is sens ibly and logically relevant  does  not
become irr eleva nt  sim ply beca us e it  is cha ra cter  eviden ce. If
t he re i s a  good r eason t o exclude su ch evidence, it will ha ve to
be for  some reason  other  than  the bogus cla im tha t  such
eviden ce is n ot r eleva nt .
B. Da nger of  Ov erv al uat ion
 T h e second (and m ore s oph is t ica t ed ) a r gu m en t  for  t he
cha ract e r evide nce r u le i s t ha t  ju rors t en d t o overva lue  the
signi fica nce of such evidence.210 The initial question tha t mu st
be a n -sw er ed  in  eva lu a t in g t he m er it  of th is  a rgu men t  is : How
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211. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  not e 1, at  1138; Im wink elrie d, supra  no te  7 , a t  581;
Ordover , supra  note 18, at  144.
212. S ee Admissio n of  Cri m in al H ist ories , supra  not e 34, a t 731 ; Kar p, supra  no t e
57 at 22.
213. S ee, e.g., Men dez, supra  note 180, at  1041–44.
214. S ee supra  note s 185–209 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
215. S ee supra  note 181.
do we know tha t  th is  is  t rue? Perh aps  we should inqu ire even
more funda men ta lly: How could  we know th at  th is is tr ue?
The s t a r t ing poin t for  addressing these inquiries is the
oft en -as ser t ed p ropos it ion  th a t  jur ors ar e influenced by
cha ract e r evidence and, in p ar ticular , by evidence of pr ior
sim ilar  crimes  comm itted  by the a ccused in  a crimin al case.211
This  p ropos it i on  is  a lmos t  cert a in ly  t rue and , in  any even t , can
be accepted as tru e for the purpose of our inquiry. But to state
tha t  ju ror s  a r e per suaded by cha ract e r  evidence, without  more,
is merely to s t a te tha t  such evidence is relevant. Jur ors are
un doubt edly a lso per sua ded by DNA evidence, fingerprints,
con fes si ons,  eyewitness accounts,  and th e film  from
survei ll ance cam era s, bu t it  would be  lud icrous  to exclud e s u ch
evide nce sole ly on  accoun t  of it s p er su asive e ffect. To s ta te the
ma tt er  in a  differen t fa sh ion, eviden ce is not  u n fa ir ly
prejud icia l simply because it  ten ds t o improve the governm ent ’s
chances  of obt a in in g a  convict ion .212
The pr oble m is  tha t  it  is  a  huge l ea p fr om the proposit ion
tha t  ju ror s  a ss ign value to ch a r a ct er  evide nce t o the con clu sion
tha t  jur ors over va lue  cha ra cter  eviden ce. One  wa y to br idge
th i s gap  is t o insis t t ha t ch ar act er  eviden ce ha s n o proba tive
valu e a t  a ll , i n wh ich  case the  a ss ignmen t  of any weigh t  to su ch
evide nce would  const itu te  “overva lua tion .”2 1 3  Bu t  tha t  ana lysi s
fails  for  the simple r eason t ha t, as  discussed a bove,214 cha ract e r
evidence often does ha ve probat ive value.
Nevertheless, th er e is n o short age of scholar ly au th orit y in
suppor t  of the  propos it ion  tha t  ju rors  t end  to overva lue
cha ract e r evidence.215 Consequen t ly,  the p ropos it ion  has
acquired  th e st at us  of a cert ain  convent iona l wisdom , with
commenta tor s often either blithely assum ing it  to be  t rue or
citing  to each  other  in  wha t migh t  be no more  than  a
tau tological house of cards.
Consider  first of all the par adox of the  role of popula r
opin ion  in  the equa t ion  suppor t ing the  propos it ion  tha t
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216. S ee Kar p, su pra not e 57 , a t 2 7. O ne  au th ori ty  som et im es  cit ed a s e mp ir ica l
suppor t for t he  pr oposi tion  t h a t jurors overvalue character evidence is The Am erican
J ury . S ee KA LV E N & ZE I S E L, supra  note 135. For example, Professor Imwinkelried h a s
wr it t en :
As par t of th e Chica go Ju ry P roject, r esea rche r s  a t t empted to  de t e rmine  the
im pa ct  of a d efe nd an t’s p ri or  cri mi na l r ecor d on  th e p ro ba bil it y of conv ict ion.
T h e re se ar che rs  foun d t ha t co nv ict ion  ra te s w er e s ign ifica nt ly gr ea te r a fter
a  j u r y learn ed th at t he defenda nt h ad a crim inal re cord or had be en
cha rged with  even  a  m inor crime. The res earcher s concluded th at jur ies
aware of prior misconduct employ an ent irely “differen t . .  . cal culu s of
probabilities” to determ ine the defenda nt’s guilt or innocence.
Imwinkelried, supra note 183, at  1487–88 (footn ote s om itt ed). I n fa ct, P rofe ssor
Imwinkelr ied is incorrect as to what  the r esea rchers  were inten ding to determ ine,
what they did det erm ine, and  what  inferences can be d rawn  from what  th ey did
determ ine.
Ga the r ing information from sur veys completed by judges who presided over
crimi na l jur y tr ial s, P rofe ssor s Ka lven  an d Zeis el a ctu all y sou gh t “t o an swe r t wo basic
questions: First , what is th e magnit ude an d direction of the disagreemen t between
judge and jury? And, second, what are th e sources and explanations of such
dis ag re em en t?” KA LV E N & ZE I S E L, supra  note 135, at 55. The authors found that
over va lu a t ion  occurs.  If th e da nger  of overva lua tion  is
sign ifica n t , i t  mus t  be tha t  mos t , i f not  a l l,  ju rors  overva lue
cha ract e r evidence. To i llu st ra te, s upp ose  tha t  the va lu e of
evide nce could be m eas u r e d on  a  scale of one to ten, wit h t en
bein g the  grea te s t  v a lue. I f th e da nger  of overva lua tion  is r eal,
it  mus t  be  that t her e is  a  correct  va lu e of ch aracter  evide nce
(assume “th ree” on  our  hypothe t ica l sca le),  bu t  tha t  mos t , i f not
all,  jurors will ass ign such evidence a  h ighe r  va lue  (a s sume
“five” on our  hyp oth etica l scale). Now, if it is t rue th at m ost
ju ror s be lie ve t ha t  the cor rect  valu e of cha ra cter  eviden ce is
“five,” and if a conse nsu s of op in ion  is  a  va lid  pr oxy for
accuracy , th en t he a ctu al cor r e ct  value of t he  cha ract e r
evide nce is “five,” and  there is  no over va lu a t ion  wh at soe ver . F or
the dan ger of overvalua tion to be rea l, then  it must  be the case
tha t  wha t m ost people believe to be tr ue (i.e., th at  char acter
evidence has a  value of “five”) is in reality false.
If popu la r  op in ion  i s thus discredited as a  measu re  of r ea li t y
in  the a bove  context , t hen  how ca n  the p ropos it ion  tha t  jur ors
overva lue  cha ract e r  ev idence be ju st ifia bly  pr em ised  on the
not ion  tha t  the  st a ted p ropos it ion  i s commonly believed to be
tr ue? Th e exclu sion  of releva nt  evide nce ou gh t  to be  ba se d u pon
somet h ing more  than popu la r  myth . Bu t  the  fact  i s t ha t ,
popula r  rh etor ic a side, t her e is  no ba si s for  the con clu sion  tha t
ju r or s overvalue char acter  evidence.216 Moreover, if the focus is
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ M E L - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1547] CHARACTER EVIDENCE  REVISITED 1601
judge  and ju ry a gre ed on  th e ver dict in  75.4% of crim ina l tr ials  an d th at  a h un g jur y
resulted  in a not her  5.5% of such t ria ls. See id.  at 56. Thus, excluding hung juries,
judg e-jur y disagr eeme nt  on guilt  or inn ocence occurre d in only 19 .1% of all tria ls.
This  19.1% is divided bet ween  th e 16.9% of trials  stu died in wh ich th e judge w ould
ha ve convicted in cases i n  whi ch t he  ju ry  act ua lly a cqu it te d, a nd  th e 2. 2% of t he
tr ials  in wh ich th e judge w ould h ave a cquitt ed in ca ses in  which the j ur y actu ally
convicted. See id.  Even  when  cases in  which t he ju ries h un g an d cases in wh ich  the
jud ge an d ju ry  dis agr eed  only  as  to t he  cha rg e we re  incl ud ed i n t he  qu an tifi cat ion of
judg e-jur y disagr e e m ent s, su ch disa gree men ts occur red  in on ly 30% of all case s. S ee
id . at 110. This disagreement was found to be “massiv el y i n  one dir ection,” with t he
ju ry acquits/judge convicts split occurring m ore tha n  s ix  t im es  a s  of ten  a s  t he ju ry
convi cts /judge  acqu its s plit. Id . at  58. The a ut hors  th us d efined t he cas es r esu lting
in  the former split  as “n o r m a l disagreemen ts” and the cases r esulting in t he latt er
split  as “cross-over  disa gree men ts.” Id . at 110. The bu lk  of the book, in cluding t he
por tion  err oneous ly relied u pon by P rofessor I mwin kelr ie d , i s a n  att empt t o discover
“reasons for th e nor ma l disa gree men t . . . .” Id . at 119.
In  the port ion of the book relied upon by Professor Imwinkelried, th e a u tho r s
concluded f rom the empir i ca l  da t a  t ha t  t he re exi st ed  a  st rong cor re la t i on  between
normal disagreemen ts an d close cases involving serious char ges in  wh ich  the
de fendan t test if ied and ha d no cr imin al r ecord. See id.  at  177– 81. (P rofe ssor
Imwinkelried’s r e fe r en ce  t o t h e  im pact  of th e  ju ry  lea rn ing tha t  the  defendant  “had
been charged  with  even  a  minor  crim e,” Imwin kelr ied, supra  note 183, at  1487,
complete ly misreads t he  da t a i n  The Am erican J ury .  Professors Kalven and Zeisel do
distinguish between “serious crimes” and “minor crimes,” but the distinction refers to
the crime  for which t he de fenda nt  was t hen  on tr ial,  n o t  to t he  na tu re o f t he
defe n d a n t ’s prior  crim ina l recor d. S ee KA LV E N & ZE I S E L, supra  not e 135. a t 180 .)
What this m eans is th at t he abs ence  of a cr imin al r ecord, in combination with oth er
factors, i n flu e n ced th e jur ies to a cquit in  cases in  which t he ju dges wou ld ha ve
convicted . Th e cor olla ry  of th is con clus ion i s t ha t, i n s ome  cas es (d epe nd ing  up on t he
a l ignmen t  of th e ot he r fa cto rs  me nt ion ed  ab ove) i n  wh i ch  t h e ju ry  doe s le ar n o f th e
de fendan t ’s c r imina l r ecor d, the jur y is more likely to beha ve as does th e judge. If we
accept  th e ju dge ’s vi ew a s t he  “corr ect ” valu at ion  of th e ev ide nce , t he n t he  em pir ica l
da ta , far from demonstr ating t hat  the jur y overvalues prior crimes evidence, actu ally
shows tha t  t he jur y overvalues t he absen ce of prior crimes evidence. If this were t rue,
then  a rule which excludes prior crimes evidence actu ally crea tes t he su pposedly
un desir able  danger of overvaluation, albeit in the defendant’s favor in most cases.
Of course, on e migh t qu ite r eason ably qu ar rel wit h t he pr emis e  t h a t th e judge
a ss igns the “correct” value to such chara cter evidence. But if the judge does n o t  kn ow
the “correct” value of this evidence, then wh o does? And if no one k n ow the “cor rect ”
va lue of character evidence, then on what possible basis can it be assert ed that  ju r o rs
ove rva lue such evidence?
217. S ee Admission  of Crimina l H ist ories , supra  not e 34, a t 710 ; Davies , supra
no te 107, at 533.
placed on th e quest ion of whet her  jurors overvalue cha ract e r
evide nce (as  opposed to the  a lmos t  mean ingless  quest ion  of
whet her  jurors value cha ra cter  eviden ce), ther e sim ply is n o
emp irica l su ppor t for t he over valu at ion hyp oth esis. 217
The fact  tha t  the  overva lua t ion  hypothesi s i s w it hout  any
demonst ra ble su pp or t  sh ould  not  rea lly  be  su rpr is in g. F or  the
hyp oth esis  to be tr ue, we would need t o be able to dete rmine
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218. S ee Teit elbau m et  al., supra  note 60, at  1153, 1193.
219. S ee 1 WIGMORE , supra note 34, § 10a, at 688.
220. S ee Teit elbau m et  al., supra  note 60, at  1153, 1193.
221. S ee id . at 1163.
222. S ee id . at 1153, 1193.
223. S ee Victor J . Gold, Lim iting Jud icial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial
Ev idence, 18 U.C. DA V IS  L. RE V. 59, 85 (1 985 ).
224. S ee Teit elbau m et  al., supra  note 60, at  1166, 1176, 1193–95.
225. S ee id . at 1165, 1172, 1193.
two th ings. Firs t, we would need  to be able  to de ter min e h ow
ju ror s actu ally asses s char acter  evidence.218 Second, we w ould
need  to be able to deter mine t he correct valu at ion of char acter
evide nce as a  benchmark for  mea su r in g t he a pp ropr ia ten es s of
the ass es sm en t  of su ch  evide nce by jurors.219 Unr ema rka bly, we
simp ly la ck  the ability to make either one of these necessary
determinat ions.
As to the fir st  requ ir em en t—the d et er min a t ion  of how
ju ror s ass es s ch aracter  evide nce—t he immediate problem is the
un sta ted  assumpt ion  that  ju r ors  ar e fair ly homogen eous in
th eir  appraisal of such evidence.220 Ju rors,  however ,  r epresent
v ir tua l ly the entire ra nge of human a ttitudes an d perceptions,
so it  is  ha rdly u nexp ect ed  tha t  em pi r ica l s tudies  in dica t e  tha t
ju ror s ha ve ver y diver se r ea ctions  to, a nd  in terpreta tions of,
items  of evidence.221 And  even  i f th i s r a the r  presumptuous
s te reotyping of juror s wer e tr ue, ju dges or  legal s cholar s would
st ill h ave to determ ine wha t t he jur or asses smen t of cha ra cter
evide nce would actu ally be.222 Ther e is, however, n ot h ing  about
a  lega l ed uca t ion  tha t  qu a lifies  one to predict  human  react ions
to evidence,223 and  aga in  the empi r ica l  da ta  d oe s  n ot  suggest
tha t  lawyer s a nd  judges  ar e pa rt icular ly capa ble of accura tely
ass essing t he r eactions of jur ors to evidence.224
As to th e second r equirem ent —t he  de termina t ion  of the
cor rect  valu at ion of cha ra cter  eviden ce—simila r  problems exist.
Empir ica l d a t a  sugges t s  tha t  there  is  no more  agreement
among lawyers and judges a s to how to ass ess evidence th an
exists  among people in  gener al. 225 And e ven  if t her e wer e s ome
consensus among t hose  wit h  a  lega l ed uca t ion  about  the correct
va lue  of char acter  evidence, what  rea son would th ere be t o
believe  that  assessme n t  t o be superior to that  of those
individua ls with d ifferen t t ra ining an d experien ce?
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226. 1 WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 10a, at 688 n .22.
227. S ee 1A WIGMORE , supra  note 34, § 29, at 976–78.
228. S ee CL EARY ET AL ., supra  note 15, § 61, at 155, § 71, at 168; Karp, supra
no te 57, at 29.
229. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 403. In addition to “unfair prejudice,” Rule 403 also
speci fics  “the da nger [s] of . . . confusion of the  issu es [an d] mislea ding  th e jur y” as
[T]h e  claim  th at  th e ju dge  ha s su per ior ex per ien ce or in sigh t is
u s u a ll y s im p l y  gr a t u i t o u s  an d u ns up por te d. H ow d oes s itt ing
in  a cou rt room , as  opp osed  to, for e xa m ple, w ork ing  in a
fact ory  or  rea ding n ove l s  or  r a i s ing  a  f ami ly  or  an y th ing  e l se
con fer  s u ch  supe r io r  expe r i ence  and  in s igh t?  Migh t  one  no t  s ay
w i t h equa l  force th at  courtr oom “expe r i e n ce” or le ga l pr a ctice
or  tr ai n in g d ist ort s in sigh ts  in to h u m an  m otiv at ion  an d
ch a r a c te r ?226
In  th e end, th e proposition th at  jurors overvalu e char acter
evide nce is  u nsupported and un supportable. No empirical data
sugges t s th at  jurors overvalu e such evidence. Moreover, th ere
is no qu ant ifica t ion  of the va lu e t ha t  ju rors a ss ign  to su ch
evidence, and  there  is  no reason ,  or  even  consensus , a s  to the
value t ha t ought  to be assigned  to such evidence.
The flaws in th e overvaluat ion hypothes is do not end t her e,
however. What  is  fundamenta l ly  unacceptab le  abou t  the
over v a lu a t ion  hypothes is  is  the p rem ise t ha t  the va lu a t ion  of
re leva nt  evide nce s hould  not  be  exclusively wi th in  the p rovin ce
of th e jury. This pr em ise is  one  of th e la st  ves t iges of a n
an tiqua ted  d is t rust  of th e jur y an d it s a bility t o perform  its
es se n t ia l fa ct -fin ding fu nct ion .
If, a s  is  oft en  t h e  ca se wit h ch ar act er e viden ce, evidence is
re leva nt  and th e sole issue is the weight to be attributed to
s u ch  evidence, it is axioma tic tha t su ch evidence is admiss ible,
and it is  for th e jur y to de te rm ine  wh at  weigh t  t o ass ign  to the
evidence.227 Man y older, common law eviden t i a ry rules
(pa r t icu lar ly those r e la t ed to the competen cy of interes ted
witnesses) excluded eviden ce for  fea r  tha t  ju rors w ould  not
appreci a te th e redu ced value such eviden ce should be given, bu t
the hist ory of th e law of evidence is a movemen t  away from
such exclusionar y rules.228
It  is  t rue, of course, that  court s have auth ority to exclude
re leva n t  eviden ce if the p roba tive va lue of su ch eviden ce is
su bst an tia lly outweighed by t he da nger of unfair  prejud ice.229
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grounds for e xclu din g r ele van t e vide nce  if th e ba lan ce so d icta tes . Id . In pra ctice,
“unfa ir  preju dice” is under stood to in clude a ll th ree  grounds  for exclusion, see 22
WR I GH T & GRAH AM , supra  note 53, § 5215, at 273 –74, and tha t sam e parlan ce is used
here.
230. F o r exa mp le, e vide nce  of des ign  cha ng es m ad e t o an  all ege dly d an ger ous
p rodu ct  following an in jury resu lting from that  product is not adm issible to prove tha t
the product wa s defective as originally designed, but  th at sa me ev idence can be
adm issible  to p ro ve t he  fea sib ilit y of a  sa fer  de sig n i f th e m an ufa cture r  cla ims  tha t
the sup erior  design  was  not  possible . S ee F E D . R. E VID. 407. In s uch  an  inst an ce, a
single  item of evidence could be employed for two distinct purposes. He nce, t he  va lue
and significance of the evidence for the lat ter, permissible purp o se  m ust be balan ced
against  the da nger of the evidence for th e former , impermissible purp ose.
But , at least ordinarily, this aut hority is not under s tood  to
jus t ify th e exclusion of relevant  evidence in  cases  in  which  the
only possib le ha rm  is t he  pote nt ial for t he  jur y afford ing  the
evide nce too grea t a  significan ce. The n otion  of bala ncin g
pr obat ive va lue  aga inst  unfa i r prejud ice inh eren tly pres upposes
tha t  th er e exist  tw o sepa ra te  us es t o which  th e evide nce m ight
be put, one legitimat e and one illegitim at e, an d t he q ues tion  is
whet her  t he  dange r  of t he  la t t er  outweigh s t he va lu e of t he
form er. 230 The matt er can be illustrated as follows:
   EVIDEN CE
   Process of        Pr ocess of imper mis sible
   per mis sible    rea son in g fr om, or
reason ing    em ot ive  rea ct ion  to,
 from evide nce   evide nce
Per missible  in fer en ce Im pe rmissible  in fer en ce
from evide nce from evide nce
(P R O BA TI VE  V AL U E) (U N F A I R  P R E J U D I C E )
In  this two-pronged schem e, t he d anger  of unfa ir  pr eju dice
ar ises from a  poten t ia l  misuse (as  opposed to a  misweigh ing) of
the evide nce. O nce t h is  pot e n tia l m isuse  is  iden t ifie d,  the cou r t
is requ ir ed  to ga uge t he s ign ifica nce of, an d t he  lik ely ju ry
rea ct ion  to,  such evidence, b u t  only for  the p urpos e of
per forming th e una voidable  task  of ba la ncin g t he va lu e of t he
evide nce in su pport ing th e perm issible infer ence  aga inst  the
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231. S ee  als o F E D . R. E VID. 403 ad visor y com mittee ’s not es (“Situa tions  in t his
area  call  for ba lan cing  th e pr oba tiv e va lue  of an d n eed  for t he evidence aga ins t  t he
ha rm lik ely  to r es ul t fr om  it s a dm iss ion .”).
da n g er  of it s u se  in  su ggest in g t he en t ir ely  dist in ct
imper missible inferen ce.
By con t ras t , i f the  on ly cla imed  poten t ia l for  pr eju dice i s the
dan ger th at  such evidence will be overvalued, the re i s bu t  one
use to which th e evidence could be put , and  th e “b a la n ci n g”
suggest ed by the la ngua ge of Rule 403231 is no more possible
than  is the u se of a seesa w by a single child. Unlike th e
pr ecedin g, two-pronged illustr at ion repr esent at ive of the  t rue
Rule  403 ba lan cing pr ocess, th e over va lu a t ion  hypothes is  can
be  illust ra ted  by a  single -pr onged  sch em e, a s fol lows :
EVIDEN CE
 Process of
   per mis sible r eas oning
 from evide nce
Per missible  in fer en ce
from evide nce
(P R O BA TI VE  V AL U E)
Ove rva lu ed  in fer en ce
from evide nce
(U N F A I R  P R E J U D I C E )
It  is  ext rem ely  qu es t ion able  tha t  the a u thor it y t o exclude
re leva nt  evidence beca us e its  pr obat ive valu e is su bst an tia lly
ou t weighed by a d an ger  of unfa ir p re jud ice (th e t wo-pron ged
model) should in clu de  the p ower  to exclude  rele va nt  evide nce
solely because t ha t evidence might  be overvalu ed (the sin gle-
pronged  sch em e). As  noted  above , t he p roces s of exclu sion in
the single -pr onged  si tua t ion  doe s n ot  in volve  any “ba la ncin g”
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232. S ee Gold, supra  note 223, at  60, 73.
233. S ee 22 WRIGHT & GRAH AM , supra  note 53, § 5215, at 277.
234. S ee Gold, supra  note 223, at  65.
235. S ee, e.g., F E D . R. E VID. 403  ad vis or y com mi tt ee ’s not es  (“ ‘Unfair pr ejudice’
with in  its context mean s an u ndue t endency to suggest decision  on an improper basis,
commonly,  t hough  not  necessa r i ly , an  em otion al one.”); Old Chief v. United States,
519 U. S. 1 72,  180  (199 7) (impr oper basis); 22 WR I GH T & GRAH AM , supra  note 150,
§ 5215, at 231  (illegitimate,  as oppos ed to legitimat e, inference); 22 WRIGHT &
GRAH AM , supra  note 53, at  274–76 (per su as ion  by il legi ti ma te  me an s, s uch  as
inappropr ia t e logic or un desir able e mot ion); Gold, supra  n ote 223, at  67 (“Rule 403
can  advance tr uth  and fairn ess by excluding evidence tha t  t ends  to induce the  ju ry
to th in k i llog ica lly o r e mp loy a n i mp ro pe r b ia s.”).
236. S ee 1  WI G M O R E , supra  note 34, § 10a, at 684  (“The p r imary  a im o f t he
pr eju dice  ru le is t o preve nt  jur y ‘mis decision ,’” including “t he jur y at tr ibut [ing]
greater  evi de nt ia l va lu e t o th e e vid en ce t ha n i s w ar ra nt ed .” (footn ote  om it te d)).
237. R icha rd O. Lem per t, Mod elin g R eleva nce , 75 MICH . L. RE V. 1021, 1030
(197 7).
what soeve r , and it is only a balancing of distinct uses of
evide nce which  is t he a ut hor ized jud icial fun ction u nd er R ule
403. Some  fu r the r clue on  th is  poin t m i gh t  be gath ered by
looking to the definition of “unfair prejudice” to discover
whet her  th at  concept in cludes th e dan ger of over va lu a t ion .
Unfortu na tely, “unfa i r  pre jud ice” i s not  defined  in  the  Federa l
Rules  of Evidence,232 its  me an ing is  ra re ly discussed  by  the
court s,233 an d consequ ent ly its exact mea ning is u nclear. 234
When  “un fair pr ejudice” is dis cussed, the discussion almost
inva ria bly seems  to envision t he t wo-pronged  scena rio,235
alt hou gh t his  obser vat ion is by n o mea ns  un ivers al. 236
In  an y event , actu al ju dicial pra ctice “ra rely, if ever,
exclud[es] evidence of subst an tia l pr obat ive valu e sim ply
because  th e jury ap pear s likely to give th e evidence even  more
weigh t  th an  it deser ves or because t he pr ecise weigh t to be
given i s unclea r .”237 This  is su rely t he corr ect pr act ice, for it
pres erves  th e jur y’s pr eroga tive t o ass ign wh at ever  weight  it
chooses  to r eleva nt  eviden ce, and i t cu rbs  th e occas iona lly
encroach ing t empta t ion  of some tr ial  judges  to exclude  evide nce
solely because  they p er son a lly  a re n ot  pe r su ade d b y such
evidence.
Even  if t her e exis t ed  a  sou nd basis for  believin g th at
cha ract e r evidence is in realit y less pr obat ive th an  wha t is
common ly believed , th e solut ion sh ould not  be the  in fr ingement
of the jury’s aut onomy by t he k eepin g of su ch eviden ce from it s
cons idera t ion . The  ap pr opria te r eme dy—th e one se lected  in
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238. S ee, e.g., BRIAN  L. CU T L E R & ST E V E N  D. P ENROD , MI S T AK E N  IDENTIFICATION :
TH E  E Y E W I T N E S S, P SYCHOLOGY, A N D T H E  LAW  (1995 ); ELIZABETH F . LO F T U S  & J A M E S
M. DOYLE , E Y E W I T N E S S  TE S T I M ON Y: CIVIL  AND CRIM INAL  (199 2).
239. S ee, e.g., MI C H AE L H . GRAH AM , H A N DB O O K O F  F EDERAL E VIDENCE  § 702.4
(1996 & Su pp . 19 98).
almost a ll compa ra ble circum sta nces—would sim ply be to
provide t he jurors with t he informa tion necessary to adjust
th eir evalua tion of such cha ra cter evidence.
For  exam ple, t her e now exis ts  a body of liter a tu re  ca l ling
in to qu es t ion  the r eli abil it y of eyewit nes s ide n t ifica t ion s,
sugges t ing tha t  thes e id en t ifica t ion s m igh t  not  be  as a ccura te
as commonly supposed.238 It  would be ludicrous to suggest tha t,
a s a  resu l t  of th i s l it e ra tur e, eye witnes s ide n t ifica t ion
tes t imony should be disallowed. At most, the sole  react ion  has
been to permi t expert  test imony in ap propria te cases
concern ing th e foibles of eyewitness  identifications.239 Even  if it
wer e su ppor te d by m ore t ha n m er e sp ecula tion , th e
over va lu a t ion  hypothes is  as t o character  evide nce would mer it
no g rea t er  accommoda t ion  than  tha t  a llowed  in  the eyewitness
iden tificat ion cont ext .
Ult ima te ly, t he overvaluation hypothesis confesses a
fundamen ta l mi st rus t  of t he  ju ry in it s as sign ed fun ction in  th e
cr imina l just ice syst em. Bu t if t he ju ry can not  ad equ at ely
det erm ine t he p roper  weight  to a ccord  to eviden ce—especially
evide nce r equirin g no legal or t echnical expert ise to
comprehend and  eva lua te—then  the pr oblem we fa ce is a  much
larger  one t han can  be  add res se d b y t he ch aracter  evide nce
ru le. In t ru th , the jur y system  is too well  estab li shed and  too
valu able to just ify t he con t ra ry prem ise of t he ove rva lu a t ion
hypothesis. And our faith in tha t jury system is not grounded
on the presu m p t ion t ha t t welve jurors will typically see the
evide nce jus t a s t welve la wyer s wou ld pe rceive  it.  To t he
con t r a ry, the  fact  tha t  ju rors  may see th e evidence in a ma nn er
diss imila r  to t he  wa y lawyers would view it demonstr ates an
acceptable, even des ira ble, in fusion  of the  commu nit y’s
perceptions a nd va lues int o the crimin al just ice system.
Ult ima te ly, th ere  is n eith er e mp irica l  da t a  nor  any  sound
reason to conclude th at  juries overvalue cha ra cter evidence.
The supposition that we as lawye rs n eve r thele ss  know h ow
a ll—or  at  lea st  most —jur ors p er ceive cha ra cter  eviden ce, an d
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240. S ee supra  note 182. Consequently, the concern under lying this rati onale is
of par ticula r, a nd poss ibly exclusive, in ter est r egar ding  c h a r a ct er evidence offered
against  t he  cr imina l  de fendan t .
241. S ee supra  note s 227–239 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
242. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 7, at  581.
243. The ar gu me nt  for p re jud ice in  th is s ub sect ion  t h us clear ly fits with in t he
two-pronged schem e discu ssed  above. See supra  no t e 230  and accompany ing  t ex t .
244. S ee supra  note s 185–209 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
245. S ee Ad m iss ion  of Cr im in al H ist ories , supra  note 34, at  731.
fu r the r tha t  we as lawye rs h ave t he s in gu la r ly cor rect  view of
such evidence, is not only baseless, it  is also a r rogan t . Thus the
sea rch  for a  viable justificat ion for t he cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le
continues.
C. Da nger of  Un ju st  Pu nishm ent
 The th eory of th is ra tionale i s t h a t  the  ju ry , hav ing l ea rned
of th e p r ior  miscondu ct  of the d efenda nt , wi ll con vict  the
defe n da n t  of the  charged  cr ime as  a  means  of pun ish ing  the
defendan t  for his  or  her  pr ior  miscondu ct .240 Unlike t he da nger
of over va lu a t ion  discu ss ed  in  the p revious s ubs ect ion ,2 41 t he
concern  ar ticu lat ed h er e un qu est iona bly qualifies a s “unfa ir
prejud ice” within  th e mea ning of Rule 403.242 Even  assuming
tha t  th e jury is per mitted t o use evidence of th e defendan t’s
un char ged misconduct as evide nce of t he d efenda nt ’s gu ilt  of
the char ged crime, usin g tha t evidence for t he p ur pose of
pun ish ing t h e defen da nt  for such  un cha rged  mis condu ct is
clearly a dist inct an d imper missible us e of th at  evidence.243
The fundamenta l  prob lem tha t  the un jus t  pun ishm en t
hyp oth esis  sh ares  wit h  the ove rva lu a t ion  hypothesi s i s an
absence of any  sound  bas is  for  bel ieving tha t  the p r ojected
dan ger is  a  rea l on e. T he fa ct  t h a t  evidence of the defenda nt ’s
pr ior mi sconduct  m igh t influ en ce jur y verd icts p roves  n ot h ing
in  th is r egar d. On ce it is  accepted  (as it  sh ould be) t ha t s imila r
crimes  eviden ce is r eleva nt ,244 an y correla t ion  of su ch  evide nce
with  convict ion s i s n o more ca use  for  concern  than  the
cor rela t ion  of convict ion s w it h  scien t ific evid en ce or  confes sions
or  an y other  form  of relevan t inculpa tory evidence.245 And aside
from this meaningless correlation, there is simply no empir ica l
bas is for th e specu la t ive  ass er t ion  tha t  ju rors w ill  convict
persons believed to be not guilty of th e char ged crimes in order
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t o impose san ct ions for unchar ged crimes.246 In fact, the most
tha t  can  be sa id  in  suppor t  of the  un jus t  pun ishment
hyp oth esis  is tha t  it  “ha s wide ly been  pr esum ed” th a t  jur ors
wil l convict  a s  a  sanct ion  for  uncha rged misconduct .247
In  the  absence  of any  documenta t ion  tha t ju ror s beh ave in
accordance with  the  un jus t  pun ishment  hypothesis, one wou ld
exp ect  at  leas t s ome se ns ible in tu i t ive suppor t  for  the
pr esu mp tion  underlying the unjust pun ishment  hypothesi s.  Bu t
in fa ct, th e idea  th at  every ju ror  in a  pa r t icu la r case (or at least
a  commanding  majorit y of ju rors s ufficie n t  to coer ce
acqu iescence fr om  a  principled min ority of th e jury) would be
willing  to convict  a  de fen da nt  those  ju rors b eli eve  to be  not
guilt y of t he  cha rged cr ime solely to pun ish  for  uncha rged
conduct  is count erin tu itive. Th e not ion th at  it i s u nfa i r t o
punish  someone for something other t han  the ma tter a t issue is
so stra ightforward and s o fundamen ta l t ha t  it  i s d iffi cu l t t o
fa t h om  th at  an  ent ire ju ry wou ld a gree  to do jus t t ha t, even  in
the abs ence of th e nom ina l safegua rd  of t he  st anda rd
cau t iona ry inst ru ction to this effect. Moreover, what ever
crit icisms  ma y be leveled at  jurors, it is n ot genera lly suggested
tha t  an  ent i re jury is so lacking in conscientiousness  th at  it will
violate  i t s oa th  and  fab r ica t e  it s verd ict  in  order  to in fl ict  an
illegal a nd  very s eriou s pu nis hm ent  up on a n in dividu al.
But  perh aps  th e prem ise un derlying th e un just p un ishm ent
hyp oth esis  is th e vision of a m ore su btle  influe nce. P erh ap s it  is
n ot  t h a t t he ju ror s would  willfully ma nip ula te t heir  verdict t o
exa ct  ext ralegal retribution, but rat her th at t he ant agonism
engend ered  by k nowle dge of pr ior  cr im in a l condu ct  could e ffect
an  unconscious sa n ct ion. Here, of course, we ha ve enter ed th e
world  of pure specu la t ion . By definit ion, ea ch of us is
incompeten t  to know what is in his or her own unconscious, so
one wonders h ow we are t o k n ow what is in the un conscious of
others (or even if such a thing as an u nconscious exists).
Moreover , this entirely conjectur al variation is a fu r t her,
and indeed a ggravat ed, ma nifest a t ion  of the  pa t ron izing
att itude un der lying t he over valu at ion hyp oth esis. U nd er t his
theory , most  if n ot  a ll ju rors (w hich  es se n t ia lly  amounts t o the
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genera l popula t ion) a re  consol ida ted  in t o t he s in gle  im age of a
group of persons  not only lacking th e capacity to exercis e
fundamenta l fa ir nes s b u t  a lso the ap t itude to apprecia te wha t
th ey are doing. Jurors, it  is suggest ed, d o not  rea li ze  tha t  they
a re actua l ly  pun ish ing the defendan t  for  uncha rged misconduct ;
lawyers, however, by virtue of att end in g law s chool,
mys ter iously know that t his unjust  pun ishment  is r eally t ak ing
place. But  if juror s believe in st ead  th at  th ey ar e sim ply us ing
the uncharged miscondu ct e viden ce in eva lua tin g th e
defendan t ’s gu ilt  or  in nocen ce of th e cha rged  crim e—a pe rfectly
ra t iona l thought  process—and th ere  is absolut ely no evidence to
contr adict  th at  self-ass essm ent , why s hou ld we n ot a ccept t his
ta cit assu ra nce as t ru e?
Fu rt her more, we mus t  be  r ea sonably secure against t he
con t r a ry possibility or we would never  allow oth er crimes
evide nce to make it s w ay t o the ju ry a s oft en  as w e d o, such as
th rough cross -examina t ion  of the  de fendan t ’s  own char acter
witnesses,248 th rough Ru le 404(b) 249 and  to impeach  the
defendan t  as a witness.250 If we real ly believe t ha t t he ju ry is
powerless t o focus upon  the cr im e a t  issu e on ce it  lea rns of t he
defendan t ’s un char ged misconduct, th en t he well-establish ed
r a n g e of oppor tun i t ie s  for  the  prosecu tor  to del iver  such
a ppa ren tly  intox ica t ing informa t ion  to the  ju ry under  exi st i ng
law ma kes n o sense wha tsoever.
Be tha t  as i t  may, t her e is  one m ea su re which  wou ld gua rd
against  t he  con jectu ra l dange r  of un jus t  punish ment  wi thou t
forfeitin g an  ent i re class of perfectly relevant  evidence. Because
the conce rn  is  t ha t  t he ju ry might  be t empted  to pun ish  the
defendan t  for pr ior, u ncharged  cr im es , a ny such  in clin a t ion
should only occur  (if at  all) if th e jury believes the d efendan t
h a s  someh ow escap ed  sa nc t ion s for  t hes e pr ior
tr an sgr essions.2 5 1  To th e exte nt  th at  pr ior crim es evide nce is
limited  to condu ct  wh ich  has b een  the s ubject  of pr ior
convict ion s,  such  danger  ought t o be complet ely or su bst an tia lly
eliminated.  The counter intu itive notion th at  jurors would be
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irr esist ibly in fluenced to convict an  innocent defend an t t o
punish  for unchar ged crimes is all the more implausible in
cases in wh ich  the  ju ror s  a r e well awar e tha t  the  accused  has
already suffered the law’s sanctions for th e prior misdeeds.
The un just  pu nishmen t  hypothes is  thus m er it s s ome
cons idera t ion  because, at least in theory, it  does isol a te  a
legitim at e concer n . Th er e is , h owever , n o ba si s for  believing
tha t  this concern is substa n t ial in  act ua lity. N ever th eless , th at
concern  can  be accommoda ted  shor t  of embracing the  cha ract e r
evide nce rule in its fu ll scope, by overruling the rule as to
re leva nt  u n char ged condu ct wh ich r esu lted  in crim ina l
convict ion s.  Consequently, the search for a persu asive
jus tificat ion for t he  cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le cont inu es. 
D. Fa ir  N oti ce
If a crimin al defenda nt ’s char acter  ma y be at ta cked by p roof
of all s or t s  of mi sdeeds , r ea l or  imagined , t hen  it  might  be
unfa i r to saddle the  accused with  the t a sk  of p repa r ing to
defend aga i nst a lifetime of allegations.252 Especially because
such  a lle ga t ion s m ay be  fa lse, i t  could  be  im pos sible  for  the
defendan t  t o an t icipa te, a nd t o ar range t o rebut , such
accusat ions.253 Such worries a r e le git im ate. I nde ed , on e a u thor
has suggest ed th at , unlike r ecent  concer ns a bou t  over va lu a t ion
and un just  pu nis hm ent , th e pr oblem of un fair  not ice actu ally
accoun t s in part for the genesis of the character eviden ce
ru le.254
Of cour se, to the ext ent  th a t t he  objection is  solely t he
absence of not ice,  the s olu t ion  wou ld  simply be  a  not ice
requ i rement rat her th an a br oad exclusion a r y ru le.255 Even
with  a notice requirement, defendant s migh t  compla in tha t  it  is
undu ly burde nsom e t o be  requir ed  to de fen d a ga in st  bot h
cha rged and uncharged  miscondu ct  in  case s in  wh ich  the
defendan t  disput es both. Whet her  such a  bur den would be
unfa i r or  not , t he bu rde n  is  en t ir ely  reli eve d i f the u ncha rged
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misconduct  has b een  the s ubject  of a  pr ior  convict ion .256 F ir st ,
t h e defenda nt  ough t  to be  on not ice a s t o h is  or  her  own  pr ior
convict ion s,  and i n  a n y event , th is in forma tion  is r out inely
provided in discover y.257 Se cond,  by v ir tue of t he fa ct  tha t  the
defendan t ’s pr ior  miscondu ct  has b een  the s ubject  of a  pr ior
convict ion , the defendant  would be precluded from d ispu t ing
tha t  he or sh e comm itted  the prior crime. 258 Th us,  lim it in g pr ior
crimes  evide nce t o condu ct  wh ich  has r es u lt ed  in  pr ior
convict ion s es se n t ia lly  elimin a tes  bot h  the un sup ported  concern
about  the  danger  of un jus t  pun ishment  as  well as  th e re lat ively
plau sible concern  about  th e dan ger of unfair n otice.
E. Col la teral  Is su es
 The fina l ra tion ale fr equ ent ly offered  in  suppor t  of the
ch a r a ct er  eviden ce ru le is t ha t a llowing t he  pa rt ies t o litiga te
whet her  or  not  uncharged m iscondu ct a ctu ally occurr ed could
be extr eme ly t ime consuming259 and  cou ld d is t r act  t he  ju ry from
the r e levan t  is sue of whethe r  or  n ot  t he  accused  commit ted  the
cha rged cr ime.260 Th is  conside ra t ion  is  the p r im ary r ea son  tha t
impeachment of a  wit nes s b y spe cific a ct s of m iscondu ct  not
resul t ing in  conviction is lim ited  to cross-exa min at ion, wit h
p roof of such m iscondu ct by extrins ic evidence bein g
disallowed.261  As with the un fair notice rat ionale discussed
above, 262 th ere  is some sugges t ion  tha t  th is  theory , r a the r  than
the cu r ren tly popu la r  theor ies  abou t  the d anger s of
over va lu a t ion  and un just punishment , explains the origin s of
the cha ract e r evidence ru le.263 On ce a ga in , h owever , if t he
cha r a ct e r eviden ce is limit ed t o miscondu ct wh ich r esu lted  in
an  ear lier conviction, th e concern  is eliminat ed.264 Ther e can be
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no d ispu te as  to the  fact  tha t  the d efenda nt  commit ted  the p r ior
crime,265 an d even  in  t h e ra re ins ta nce in which t her e might  be
a  disp u te a s t o the s pe cific con d u ct t ha t s up port ed t he p rior
convict ion , t he  r ecord  from the ea r lie r  gu ilt y p lea  or  t r i a l shou ld
provide an  expedit ious r esolut ion of the cont rover sy. In  all  bu t
the most  unusu a l cir cumst ances , proof of rele va nt  pr ior
cr imina l conduct  for  which  the  de fendant  ha s been convicted
should be  most  econ omica l a nd n ot  the lea st  likely t o divert t he
jury’s focus from the pending char ges.
An exa min a t ion  of the five r a t ion a les  offer ed  in  su pp or t  of
the cha ract er e vidence ru le thu s revea ls th at  th ese sup posed
justifica t ion s ar e eit her  err oneous , un su ppor ted  by an yth ing
bu t  speculative mistrust of the jury, or ar e at most plaus ibly
legitim at e only t o th e ext en t of limit ing ch a r a ct e r  ev idence  to
conduct  which ha s res ulted  in crimina l convictions. However,
the case for t he cha ra cter evidence ru le does  not  end h ere.
Apparen t ly unwilling to defend the ru le solely on the grounds
tha t  it s h ou ld  be pr eser ved, s ome p ropon en ts  of the  ru le ha ve
ar gued tha t  it  m ust be preser ved. Specifically, th ere h ave been
var iou s con ten t ions  tha t  the characte r  ev idence  ru le  is
cons t itu t iona l ly ma nd at ed. As will be shown, none of th ese
constitut ional theories is at all meritorious.
V. CO N S T I T U T I O N A L  CO N S I DE R AT I ON S
 The va r iou s a t t em pt s t o cloa k th e  ch a r a ct e r  evide nce ru le
with  a  cons t itu t iona l veil have included claims pr edicated  upon
due process, double jeopard y, the p r ivil ege  aga in st  se lf-
incr imina t ion  and Sixt h  Amen dm en t  not ice requ i rements . Each
of thes e will be a ddr esse d in  tu rn .
A. Due Process
 There is som e judicia l  su p p or t  for  the  propos it ion  tha t  due
process has some application to char acter  evidence, but th e
ana lysis is sp ur ious. As a  th eoret ical possib ility, any
eviden tia ry  ru ling by a  tr ial judge (in clu ding r u lin gs  on the
ad mis sibilit y of character  evide nce) cou ld be s o funda men ta lly
unfa i r that  due process could be implicated.266 But  th e Unit ed
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Sta tes  Supreme Cou r t  has n eve r  su ggest ed  tha t  the a dm ission
of prior crimes  evidence to establish  th e defendan t’s gener al
p ropens ity to engage in crimin al conduct of the type cha rged
would  violate  due process.267 In  fact ,  the Cour t  has  held tha t  the
adm ission of prior crimes  evidence under  a  s t a t e coun te rpa r t  t o
Rule  404(b) does not offend due p rocess.268 If evident iary r ules
per mit  the  in t r oduction of th e prior convictions of the accused
for  som e s pe cified p urpos e, d ue p rocess is  not  a  license  for
judicia l second -gu es sing of s u ch rules.269 Moreover ,  the
possibilit y th at  th e jur y will di sr ega rd l im it in g in st ruct ion s and
use prior crimes  evidence  to un jus t ly  pun ish  the defendan t  for
un char ged miscondu ct  doe s n ot  pr es en t  a  const it u t ion a l
issue. 270
Notwiths tand ing these admonitions, the United St a t es
Cou r t  of Appeals  for  the Nint h  Circu i t  has seen  fi t  to hold tha t
the in t roduct ion  of character  evide nce in  a  st a te p rose cut ion
can  violate t he d efenda nt ’s fe de ra l “cons t it u t ion a l r igh t  to a
fundamen ta l ly fair tr ial as guarant eed by the Due Process
Clause of the  Four teen th  Am end me nt .”271 In  McKinney v.
R ees, 272 a  case  wh ich  en ter ed  the fede ra l cou r t  syst em  on a
pet ition  for  a  wr it  of habeas  corpus following a state
prosecu t ion  which resu lted in t he conviction of th e petit ioner
for  the m urde r  of hi s m other  by s lit t in g h er  th roat  wit h  a  kn ife
of un spe cified dim en sions , the s t a te h ad in t rodu ced  evide nce
tha t  the petitioner ha d possesse d k nive s t ha t could  ha ve
inflict ed  the wounds  in  qu es t ion ; tha t  the p et it ion er  wa s p roud
of hi s k n ife coll ect ion ; tha t  he h ad  occas iona lly st ra pped  a k nife
to his  body wh ile wea rin g cam ouflage  pa nt s (th e sa me  typ e of
pan t s worn by th e mu rder er); and t ha t h e ha d used  a kn ife to
scra t ch  th e words  “Dea th  is  H is” on  a  closet  door .273 The s t a t e
had ar gued su ccessfully before th e s t a te t r i a l and  appe lla te
cour t s tha t  the  ev idence was  admiss ib le  under  the s t a te
coun te rpa r t  to Ru le 404(b) to re fut e th e pet itione r’s claim  t h a t
he was  not  in  possess ion  of a kn ife at  th e time of the m ur der
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and to sh ow th at  th e pet itione r h ad  an  opport un ity t o comm it
the crime.274 Lacking any auth ority to distu r b  the stat e courts’
conclu sions th at  th e evidence in ques t ion  was  not  genera l
p ropens ity character evidence but ra ther fit  within a so-called
noncha ra cter  t h eory of admissibility under t he stat e rules of
evidence, th e M cKinn ey cour t did ess ent ially the sa me t hing by
recas t ing the id en t ica l is su e a s on e of fede ra l con st it u t ion a l
significan ce. The cour t  concluded tha t  much  of th i s evidence
was “offe red  to p rove cha ract e r , not eviden ce of oppor tu nit y,”275
and was “thu s, irrel eva nt .” 276 Wor kin g ba ckwa rds  from the
premise th at  char acter  evidence is inadm issible t o t he
conclu sion  tha t  such  evidence is th er efore lega lly irr eleva nt , th e
cour t  concluded  th at  “McKinn ey’s tr ial wa s im per mis sibly
ta int ed by ir re leva nt  eviden ce.”277
The decision can be viewed in one of two wa ys. F i r st ,  to the
extent  tha t  the  cour t  s imply  concluded tha t t he eviden ce in
que st ion wa s in ad mis sible ch ar act er  eviden ce, th e cour t
b la t an t ly act ed wit hou t ju ris diction a s a  su per ap pella te  cour t
on  a qu est ion of pur ely st at e evide nce la w. Second , to the  ex ten t
t h a t  th e cour t wa s rea lly int endin g to const itut ionalize the
cha ract e r evide nce ru le, it did pr ecisely what  th e Unit ed Sta tes
Supreme Cou rt h ad directed it  not to do.278 I t  so happens  tha t
the st a te in  qu es t ion  had in  place the char acter  evidence rule as
a  mat te r  of s t a te evidence law. But  if a sta te evidence code were
instead to a llow cha ract e r  evidence to establish gen era l
pr opens ity, and i f the N in th  Cir cu it  is  t ru ly s er iou s a bou t  the
McKinney decision, then presum ably such rules of evidence
would be unconst itut ional on th eir face.
Tha t conclusion  would be w holly fan ta st ic, as is t he
McKinney decision itself.  If it  is truly the United Stat es
Cons t it u t ion , an d not just  evidentia ry ru les, which ren ders
cha ract e r evide nce le ga lly  ir r ele va nt , a nd i f du e p roces s ca nnot
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t ol era t e a p rose cut ion cont ain ing s uch  legally ir re leva nt
evidence, then  eve n  the F ed er a l Ru les  of Evidence wou ld  en joy
no exempt ion  from th is  cons t it u t iona l manda te.  Pr esu ma bly,
then , Rules 413 an d 414279 are un const itu tion al. Bu t a lso Rule
609, wh ich  a llows p r ior  conv ict ion s a s evid en ce of t he
defendan t ’s character for tr uth fulness as a witness,2 8 0  must
violate  due process. Th e s ame would  be t rue for  Ru les  608 (a)281
and 608 (b). 282 To the extent  th at  Rule 404(a) allows the
govern men t  to intr oduce ch a ra cter  eviden ce concern ing t he
defendan t  once t he d efenda nt  in t rodu ces  character  evide nce
concern ing him self or h ers elf,283 su rely it  violates due process,
a t  leas t in  th e Nin t h  Cir cuit . If McKinney is to be tak en
ser iously,  t hen  every de cis ion  of every cour t a tt emp tin g to ap ply
the often ba rely p ercep tible (or, d epen din g u pon  the  pa r t i cu la r
case an d th e reader’s par ticu lar  point  of view, illusor y)
dist inct ion bet ween  ina dm issible ch ar act er e vidence and
evide nce which is ad missible un der one of the var ious th eories
listed  in Rule 404(b)284 or an equivalent st a t e ru le is a ctu ally
resolving a  cons t itu t iona l  is sue.  Can  someth ing  as fundamenta l
as due pr ocess r eally tur n on wh eth er th e evidence  is  more
like ly to dem onst ra te a n in ten t t o deal d ru gs or a  pr opens ity to
dea l drugs? It is hardly surpr isin g tha t  t he Supreme Cour t
war ned  th e Nint h Circuit  not t o open  th at  Pa ndora ’s box,285 and
it  should n ot be s ur pr isin g wh en , given a  fut ur e oppor tu nit y,
the Cour t  chas t is es  t he Nin th  Ci rcu i t for  t r es pa ss in g on to the
stat es’ i nt er p r e t at ion and a pplication of their own rules of
evidence.
The simple t ru th  is th at  th ere is  no reason why due process
should  re qu ire  th e exclus ion of such  factu ally r eleva nt 286
evidence. The  bas ic fact t ha t t he  cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le, at
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His  Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause,
28 LOY. U. CH I . L.J . 1, 32  (1996 ); see also Weisse nbe rger , supra  note 28, at 608 n.87.
291. 395 U. S. 6  (196 9).
292. S ee Na ta li & Stig all, supra  note 290, at  25.
293. S ee id . at 27–28.
least in  theory, ha s been  ar oun d a  long tim e287 does  not  a lone
es tabli sh  it  as a  funda men ta l r igh t  of const it u t ion a l propor t ion .
The us ua l explicit or im plici t  a ssumpt ion  under lying the
case for  due p rocess p rotect ion  i s the  fami li a r  one  tha t juries
will convict  t o pun ish  for  uncha rged misconduct ,288 r e su l ti ng in
a  fundamen ta lly un fa i r t r ia l. To be sure, if the unjust
pun ishment  pr emis e wer e est ablis hed,  the conclusion  of
fundamenta l un fair nes s would  be beyond pera dvent ur e. There
would  be  no need t o dr ag t he Const it u t ion  in to the fr ay, for  no
pol icy cons idera t ion  could jus t ify  such  a  resu l t  even  in  the
absence of cons t it u t ional lim ita tion s. Bu t, a s pr eviously
discussed,2 8 9  ther e is  no rea son ed  or  em pi r ica l supp or t  for  the
premise of un jus t  pun ishmen t , e specia lly when  admit t ed
evide nce is limited t o prior convictions. That  bein g th e cas e, a
due pr ocess ar gum ent  bas ed en tir ely up on t he s am e fau lty
assumpt ion  adds  noth ing to th e equa tion. Unless  th e act u a l
conse qu en ce of admit t i ng  re levan t  evidence would be to deny
t he accus ed a  fair  tr ial, t her e can  ha rd ly be a cons tit u t ion a l
ent itlemen t t o exclude su ch evidence.
One imag ina t ive—and  t ru ly  imaginary—var i at ion  on  the
due p rocess th eme is t he claim t ha t cha ra cter evidence violates
due p rocess because  it  is  in consi st en t  wit h  the p res umpt ion  of
innocence.290 Relying u pon  Leary v. United States,2 9 1  t h e
p roponen t s of t h is  a rgu m e n t  have reasoned that due process
requ ires  th at  evidence offered a gainst  th e accused mu st r ender
the fact to be esta blished more  li ke ly  to be t rue  than  not ,292 t ha t
pr ior cr im es  evide nce d oes  not  make i t  m or e l ike ly  than  not
tha t  th e defendan t h as commit ted t he ins ta nt  offense,293 a nd
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t h a t  t herefore the adm ission of such evidence violates due
process.294
The argument  is specious on its face. The ar gumen t
illegitim at ely su bs t it u tes  a  su fficie ncy of t he evid en ce s t anda rd
for  the appr opriate sta nda rd for ad mis sibilit y of evidence. It
sugges t s th at  each  item  of evidence in t roduced by the
govern men t  i n a  cr imina l p rosecu t ion  mus t  mee t  a
“preponderance of the evidence” stan d a rd  s imply  to cross  the
th res hold of adm issib ility. App ar ent ly, then, t he governm ent
may not  in t roduce  any piece of evidence unless t ha t evidence,
consider ed in  isola t ion , wou ld convince  the t r i er  of fact  of the
u l tim a te issu e in a  civil case. N o ma tt er  how over wh elm ing t he
cumula t ive effect of th e govern men t’s eviden ce, un der  th is
requ i rement it  is  en t ir ely  pos sible  tha t  no single  it em  of
evide nce in  the gover nmen t ’s ca se  wou ld  eve n  be  a llow ed  for  the
ju ry’s con side ra t ion .
The fa ta l misst ep in  the a rgument  i s the  confus ion  of the
law  govern ing t he u se of pres um pt ions a gain st  th e cr imina l
defendan t  w ith  the ord ina ry t e st  of rele van ce for t he a dm ission
of evide nce. A p res umpt ion  is not its elf evidence but  is ra th er “a
procedura l ru le w hich  requir es  the exis ten ce of fa ct  B
(presu med  fact ) to be a ss umed  wh en  fact  A (ba sic fact ) is
esta blished un less a nd  un til a  cert ain  specified condit ion is
fulfilled.”295 Ordin ar ily, a pa rt y with t he bu rden  of es tabl ish ing
fact  B (pres umed  fact ) may t ake  advantage of a n  ava ilable
pr esu mp tion  by intr oducing evid en ce of fa ct  A (ba sic fact ) and
th ereby sa t is fyin g it s b urde n . Be cau se due pr ocess r equires
tha t  the gover nmen t  in  a  cr im in a l ca se  pr ove,  beyon d a
rea sona ble doubt, every fact necessa ry to const itut e th e char ged
crime,296 th e que st ion  has  a r isen whether  the use of a
pr esu mp tion  aga ins t  a  cr imina l  de fendan t  uncons t itu t iona l ly
relieves th e govern men t of its b ur den  of proving th e presu med
fact . In  Tot v. United S tates,2 9 7  t he Cour t  app roved  the u se  of
presumpt ions aga ins t  the accused , bu t  on ly where  there is  a
ra t iona l connect ion  between  the basic fact  and th e pres um ed
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300. S ee id . at 36. The constitutional limitations upon the use of presump tion s
against  the criminal defendant h ave unde rg on e additional modifications since Leary.
A man datory (but r ebut ta ble) pres um ption, a s dist ingu ished  from a  perm issive
inference, must  pass th e rat ional connection test  on the face of the presu mpt ion , and
no t merely as applied to the particular circumsta nces of th e case . S ee U l st e r  Coun ty
Cou rt  v. Allen, 442 U .S. 140, 157 –60 (1979). Moreover , a presu mption th at is eith er
irr ebut ta ble or tha t shifts to th e defend a n t  t h e ul ti ma te  bu rd en  of pe rs ua sio n (a s
distinguished  from m erely s hiftin g th e bur den  of pr odu cing  som e ev ide nce  cont ra ry
to th e pr es um ed fa ct t o de fea t t he  effect  of t he  pr esu mp tion ) is u ncon st itu tion al
no twi thst and ing a ra tional connection between the ba sic fa ct  and  the p re sumed  fac t.
S ee Sa nd st ro m v . Mon ta na , 44 2 U .S.  510 , 52 3–2 4 (19 79).
301. S ee Na ta li & Stig all, supra  note 290, at  25.
302. Reed, supra  note 2, at  713.
303. Id . at 714.
304. Id . at 713.
305. Id .
fact .298 The Court  further refined t h i s r equ i rement  in  Leary v.
United States299 by specifying tha t t he r at ion a l conn ection test
means th at  th e presu med fact m ust  be m or e li kely  than  not
t rue a s a  conclu sion  de r ived fr om the basic fact .300
The ill-conceived n otion t ha t d ue p rocess r equ ire s evid en ce
to meet  t he  “more  li ke ly  to be t rue  than  not” t e st  for
adm issibilit y is premised on a misinterpr etation of this Leary
t e st .301 But character evidence is not  a presu mp tion , an d it
involves no use of presumptions. It is sim ply evidence. As  such ,
its  ad mis sibilit y tu r ns on t he  ordin ar y ru les gover nin g th e
ad mis sibilit y of evidence  and not  some  ex t raord ina ry
cons t it u t iona l p rerequ i si t e.
One relat ed defense of the ch ar act er e viden ce ru le is
P rofessor  Reed’s claim  th at  th e ru le “had it s r oots in t he
accusat ive, as  opposed t o inqu isit or ia l, n a ture of t he An glo-
Amer ica n  crimina l process,”302 and  the cha rge  tha t  a  con t r a ry
ru le wou ld “t r ans form[] t h e Amer ican  cr imina l ju s t ice  syst em
from an a ccusa tive  to a n in qu isit oria l pr ocess.”303 “Under  an
accusa t ive system,” stat es Professor Reed, “the state mu st
establish th at  th e accused did some a ct forbidden  by law .”304 An
inqu isit oria l sys t em,  on  the  othe r  h and, “assum es th e accused
commi t ted the  cr ime and  imposes upon  hi m  t h e burden  of
est ab lish ing h is in nocen ce.”305
Professor  Reed’s a na lysis ea rn s h igh m ar ks  for hype rbole
bu t not  for  much  e lse.  Fi r st ,  t he essen tia l his tor ical dist inct ion
between  the accusat orial and inquisitorial systems of procedure
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had noth ing a t  a ll  t o do with  cha ract e r  ev idence  or  t h e ru les
govern ing t h e adm issibil it y of ev iden ce in  gen er a l for  tha t
ma t t e r . The essen tial feat ur es of th e inquisit orial system  were
the combina t ion  of t he  prosecu tor i al  and  adjud ica t ive fun ct ion s
in  a s ingle in dividu al or  ins tit ut ion, wit h p roceedin gs t ypically
being  writt en a nd secret ive.306 By con t ras t , the  accusa tor ia l
system  separat ed the accusat ory and inves t iga t ive  funct ions
from th e adjud icative function, and  proceedings were  typ ically
ora l  and publ ic.307
Second, even un der P r ofessor Reed’s definitions of the two
sys t ems of crim in a l justice, it is difficult to compr ehen d th e
re la t ionsh ip of t he  cha ract er evid ence ru le to the posed
juxt apos it ion . Th e p er ceived  dist in ct ion  appea r s to be one w hich
focuses on the a ss ign men t  of the burde n  of p er s u asion, but t he
a llow ance of a cert ain t ype of evidence does not alter  th e
obvious requirement th at t he government pr ove the defendant
guilt y beyon d a  rea son able doubt . Appar ent ly th e ar gum ent  is
tha t  th e effective cons equ en ce of allowing ch a r acter  eviden ce is
to place the defendant  at such a disa dva nt age a s t o pra ctically
as sign  to him or h er  th e bur den of proving his or her in nocence.
In  th is r espe ct, Pr ofessor Reed  illu st ra tes  th at  th e climb is
alw ays  easier  if one st ar ts a t t he t op, for he h as a ssu med
pr ecisely wha t is a t issu e wi t h r egard s to th e char acter
evidence rule.
The fact th at t he government is assigned the burden  of
per su as ion does not mean th at t he government is forbidden
from me et ing t h a t  bur den. When ever th e govern men t
in t roduces su bst an tia l eviden ce in sa tis faction  of its bu rd en , th e
defendan t  might, as a p r a ct ical m at ter , find h ims elf or her self
ha rd p res sed  to int roduce  some exculpatory evidence. Tha t does
n ot  mea n t ha t t he d ays  of the I nqu isit ion ar e once aga in upon
us. The fact th at  th e case put  on by the governm ent  includes
cha ract e r evidence involve s n o syst em ic per muta t ion  from the
typica l ca se in wh ich  the  governmen t  a t te m pt s  t o meet ,  and
often  su cceeds  in  mee t in g, it s b urde n . Th e r ea l qu es t ion —the
only quest ion—is  wh et her  the p roba t ive  va lu e of such  evide nce
is outweighed by an y unfair  prejud ice, as discus sed above.3 0 8
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T h ere is  no us efu l shor tcut  for r es olvin g t he is su e of t he
char acter  evidence rule.
B. Double Jeopardy 
A second  cons t it u t iona l p rovis ion  occasionally suggested a s
a  pos sible  lin chpin  for  the  characte r  ev idence  ru le  is  the
pr oscript ion aga ins t d ouble jeopa rd y.309 The super fi cia l appea l
of th e ar gumen t is t ha t a n a ccused w ho is convicted because t he
ju ry seeks t o pun ish  h im or  he r  for  uncharged  misconduct
which  h a d been t he su bject of a prior pr osecut ion has  been
“subject for  t he s ame offen se  to be t wice  pu t  in  jeopardy of life
or lim b.”310 Ther e ar e, however, two flaws in  th is ar gumen t.
F i rs t , once  aga in the  cons t it u t iona l a rgumen t  is  en t ir ely
dependen t  up on t he n onconst itu tion al p rem ise t ha t ju ries  will
un jus t ly pun i sh  t he  accused  for  uncharged  misconduct .  If tha t
premise were cor rect , th e defense of th e char acter  eviden ce ru le
wou l d be com plet e wit h  no ass is t ance r equir ed  from the
Con st it u t ion . Bu t  in  fact  th e unju st  pu nis hm ent  hyp oth esis
fails  for  w a n t  of any nonspeculative basis,311 an d consequ ent ly
the double jeopa rdy ana lys is  does n ot  advance t he ca use  of th e
char acter  evidence rule.
Second, like th e due process argument , the double jeopardy
claim , if it sa ys a nyt hin g at  all, s ays far  too mu ch. If it is  tr uly
the Cons t it u t ion , and  not  ju s t  lawm ak er s’ pr er ogat ive, th at
dictat es th e cha ra cter  eviden ce ru le, th en a ll of th e well-
es tabli sh ed  ru les  a llow in g for  character  evide nce u nde r  va r iou s
ci rcumstances312 would also be constitutionally invalidated.
C. Priv il ege Again st  S elf -In crim in at ion
 The claimed connection between  th e char acter  evide nce ru le
and the privilege against  s el f-incr imina t ion  is  t ha t  pr ior  crimes
evidence ma y compel t he defenda nt  to test ify to refut e th e
un char ged a lle ga t ion s,  wh ich  may em ph asize h is  or  her  fa i lu re
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t o test ify as t o the char ged offense.313 The a rgum ent  is flawed in
several part iculars.
F i rs t , the  a rgument is  cer ta in ly  not  a  v iab le  de fense  of the
h i stor ica l character  evide nce r u le,  because  wha tever  force  it  has
is equa lly  app lica ble  to pr ior  cr im es  evide nce a dm it t ed , for
examp le, un der a  Rule 404(b)-type th eory. Second, a defenda nt
may feel stra tegically compelled t o t est ify be cause  of th e
s t r ength  of th e govern men t’s evidence, b u t  th is  is  not  a
compu ls ion  tha t  is  of an y const itut ional significan ce.314 The fact
tha t  th e evidence, the us e of which influences the defendant ’s
volunta ry tact ica l decis ion  to tes t ify,  is  character  evide nce is  of
no sp ecia l im por tance.315 F ina lly,  to the  ex ten t  tha t  the
uncha rged crimes r esult ed in a  prior conviction, th e argum en t
is inapposite because th e defendant  would be estopped  by  the
judgment of conviction from  den ying t he p rior  crim ina l
conduct .316
D. Notice 
The last  const itut ional window dres sing th at  ha s somet imes
adorn ed the  charact e r evidence  ru le  is  t he a rgumen t  tha t  a
con t r a ry ru le would violate t he requirem ent  th at  th e accused
“be in formed  of the  na tu re and  caus e of th e a ccusa tion .”317 The
shor t  answ er  is  tha t  ther e is  no inh eren t r elationsh ip between
charact er  evidence and in adequ at e notice. To th e extent  th at
not ice  m igh t  be  requir ed , a nd e ven  to the ext en t  tha t  not ice
would  be de sir ab le, it  i s a  very  easy mat te r  to impose  tha t
obligation u pon th e govern men t. 318
The constitut ional and r elated argument s for  th e cha ract e r
evide nce ru le a dd n oth ing of an y sign ifica nce t o the fa te of t he
cha ract e r evide nce ru le. The ru le mus t  s t and or  fa l l on  i t s own,
and, as d iscussed a bove,319 so viewed th ere is litt le to comm end
it,  at least in its present form. What follows is a  pr oposal for
revamping th e ru les of evidence governin g chara cter evi de n ce
in  accordance  wi th wha t  has  been  d iscussed  thus fa r .
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324. S ee Teit elbau m et  al., supra  note 60, at  1196.
325. S ee Karp,  supra  not e 57 , a t 5 2. T hi s r es ul t i s a rg ua bly a  sig ni fican t
dis tor tion  of th e t ru th . If t he re  is a ny  conclu sion  on t hi s  p oi n t  t h a t  can be dra wn
from  the data collected and analyzed by Professors Kalven and Zeisel,  it  is that t he
ab se nce  of a criminal r ecord is a significant factor in explaining why the j u r y  a cqu i t s
in  cases  in wh ich th e jud ge would  ha ve convicte d. See supra  note 216.
VI. P RO PO SAL
 The pr ima ry p ur pose of th e ru les of evidence is t o allow t he
t r ie r of fact to discover the tr uth  concerning the matt ers a t
issue. 320 Consequen tly,  all relevan t evidence should be a llowed
absen t some pla in and forceful reason not to do so.321 The
Federa l Ru les  of Evid ence represen t t he modern  tr end t oward
“re laxa t ion  of the  bar rie rs  to a dm itt ing r eleva nt  eviden ce.”322
The cha r a cter  eviden ce ru le is en tir ely at  var ian ce with  th e
modern  view of facilitat ing th e sear ch for t he t ru th  by
admit t ing all relevan t evidence when ever possible.3 2 3  To the
extent  tha t , a s s omet im es  happ en s b y t he p rocess of object ion s,
ju r or s becom e a wa re t ha t  su ch evide nce is  bei ng kep t  from
them, th ey qu it e na tu ra lly become fru st ra ted  at  th e ap pa ren tly
inexp licable int erfer ence wit h t heir  per forma nce of th eir
ass igned task.324 And to the extent th at such evidence is never
men tioned in t he  pr esen ce of jur ors, t he y migh t  reasonab ly  bu t
err oneous ly conclude  tha t  t he  accused  has engaged in no p r ior
cr imina l conduct , quit e ra t iona l ly concluding tha t  such  evidence
is so pa ten tly  rele van t  tha t  the  prosecu tor  would have
presented it if it  in fact existed.325
We have discovered th at , while ther e is still widespr ead
suppor t  for th e char acter evidence rule, the reasons advanced
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326. The only ru le govern ing cha ra cter e vidence left  un distu rbed  in t his  p r oposa l
is Rule 4 12, th e ra pe sh ield la w. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 412. To the exten t t ha t t his r ule
is base d on t he du al policies of rem oving th e tr ibula tions  of testifying a s a victim  of
a  sex offense a nd en coura ging th e rep ortin g of such crim es by v ictims , th e ru le is
beyon d the scope of any of the issues addr essed in th is article.
327. S ee supra note s 259–265 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
328. S ee supra  no t e 251  and accompany ing  t ex t .
for  it s con t in u in g ex is ten ce d o not  wit hst and s er iou s
examina t ion  an d a na lysis . Moreover, while there continues to
be a  zealou s comm itm ent  to t he r ule a s a  th eoret ical mode l, the
ru le in  pr act ice i s oft en  honored  in  the brea ch . Th e r u les  of
evide nce explicitly per mit  the in troduct ion  of cha ract e r
evide nce in  severa l ci rcumstances . Fur the rmore , the  b eh a vior
of the court s in  liber a lly  a llow in g ch aracter  evide nce t o rea ch
t he juries u nder  a var iety of exceptions a nd gu ises confesses a
recognition of th e tr ue valu e of such evidence.
What is needed is a  complet e r econs t ruct ion  of the  ru les
govern ing cha r a ct er evidence. The ru les should r ecognize the
t rue worth  of such evidence an d should m ore genuin ely describe
w h at  we actua lly do with it .  Tinkering at th e margins of th ese
ru les will n ot be s ufficient , an d a ddin g more unpr incipled , ad
hoc “exceptions” such a s Rules 413-415 simp ly contr ibutes to
the pr oblem. As  a st ar ting point , Feder al Rules of Evidence 404,
405, 413, 414, 415, 608 and  609 sh ould be a bolished  in t heir
en t ir e t y.3 26 Th es e s hould  be  rep la ced  wit h  the followin g fou r
relatively straightforward r ules.
P R OP O SE D  R U LE  O N E : E vi d ence of  specific  cr im es,  wron gs
or a cts t ha t h av e r esu lte d in  crim ina l convict ions  is  ad m issib le
for  any  pu rpose  for  wh ich  su ch  ev idence  is  r e le va n t , su bje ct t o
Rule  403 .
Pr oposed Rule One is t he cru x of th e ma tt er. Severa l
fea tu res of t h is  p roposed  ru le  dese rve  comment .  F ir s t , the  ru le
govern s only p r ior  miscondu ct  wh ich  has r es u lt ed  in  convict ion
of a cr ime. Th is lim ita tion  pr event s pot ent ially in efficien t  and
distracting commitments of t ime  to col la t e ra l ma t t e r s.327 It  also
subs tan t i a lly re du ces w ha tever  un lik ely t em pt a t ion t he  jur y
migh t  have t o convict  solely  to sa nct ion  t he defendant  for wh at
the ju ry m ay per ceive t o be  unpu nished , pr ior  miscondu ct .328
Second, Pr oposed Rule On e is  not  a  ru le  of au tomat ic
ad mis sibilit y for  pr ior  convict ion s,  for  se ver a l r ea son s.  Th e fa ct
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329. S ee, e.g., Uviller , supra  note 12, at  882–85.
330. The danger of unfair pr ejudice would not include th e possibi li t y t ha t  t he
ju ry would draw the general propensity inference from th e prior cr imina l mi sconduc t .
To the exten t th at t he evidence logically suggests such a  general  p r opens ity, th is is
precise ly wha t  makes  the  ev idence  r e levan t .
331. S ee F E D . R. E VID. 609 (b).
of a  p r ior  conv ict ion  i s a  p rerequ isite for adm issibility under
Pr oposed Ru le O ne, b u t  it  is  the con du ct  un d er lyin g t he p r ior
convict ion  tha t  wil l det er min e whet her  the evid en ce of t he p r ior
crim e is relevant . To th e extent  th at  th e evidence is offered t o
demons t r a t e a  gr ea ter  lik eli hood t ha t  the a ctor  behaved  on the
occas ion in  que st ion consi st en t ly w it h  h is  or  her  pr ior  behavior ,
the pr oba t ive  va lu e of such  evid en ce log ica lly  correla tes  to the
degree  of similar ity between  the  pr ior  misconduct  and  the
pending allegations.329 To the exten t  th at  th e evidence is offered
to a t t ack the cr ed ibi lit y of a  wit nes s,  the p roba t ive  va lu e of
such  evide nce logica lly  correla tes  to the d egr ee  to wh ich  the
pr ior  cr ime evidences a d ishonest  char acter . Thus for exam ple,
in  a  pe r ju ry prose cut ion , t he d efenda nt ’s p r ior  dr ug con vict ion
should ordin ar ily be imm at eria l. And, in a  dr ug p rosecu tion  in
which  the defendant  does not take th e sta nd, the defendant ’s
pr ior per ju ry convict ion  ordina rily sh ould be comp lete ly
irr eleva nt . Moreover, in circumstances in  wh ich  the con du ct
under lying th e pr ior conviction h as  only min imal probat ive
value,  the  t r ia l cour t  migh t  we ll exclu de  the evid en ce because  of
the p resence of any of th e exclusion ar y crite ria  specified in  Rule
403.330
Third, no au tomat ic t ime  limit  has been  pla ced u pon t he  age
of th e pr ior conviction in  Pr oposed Ru le One. Under  the  cur ren t
law, th ere is a pr esum ptive age limit  for pr ior convictions used
to impeach t he credibility of a witness. 3 31 Pr oposed Rule On e,
however, is not limited to the use of prior  convict ion s for
impeachment only.  On e ca n  cer ta in ly envis ion  cond u ct
r esu lt ing in  a  convict ion long ago which bears  such a  s t r ik ing
sim ilar ity  to t he  cha rge d crim e so a s t o be extr em ely re leva nt
desp it e the  in te rven ing pass age of tim e. Conse que nt ly, th e tim e
between  the  pr ior  misconduct  and t he cu r ren t  a lle ga t ion s
should be  t r ea ted  as on e of t he fa ctors for  the t rial judge’s
consider at ion und er Ru le 403.
Four th , if evidence is admitted a g a inst  th e accused un der
th i s pr ovision, th e defen da nt  would s till be e nt itled  to a  limit ing
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332. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 1, at  1144–46.
333. S ee supra  note s 13–18, 94–10 8, 112, 132–135 a nd a ccompan ying te xt.
334. S ee Imw ink elrie d, supra  note 94, at  379–80.
335. S ee Kra mer  & Koenig, supra  note 102, at  433.
336. S ee id . at 429–30.
337. S ee Davie s, supra  not e 107, a t 511 ; Imwin kelr ied, supra  note 94, at  379.
338. S ee Teit elbau m et  al., supra  note 60, at  1196.
ins tr uct ion cau t ion ing the  ju ry  not  t o convict t he d efend an t in
order to pu nis h h im or  her  for th e pr ior m isconduct .332 Bu t  th is
ins tr uct ion does  not  ca r ry  wi th  i t  t h e sign ifica n t  da nger s of
misu nder s t and ing or  disob ed ien ce t ha t  accompa nies  se ver a l of
th e ins tr uct ions t ha t a re cu rr ent ly employed under  the  ex is t ing
character evidence rules.333
Ju ro r s ordinar ily  a re con scien t iou s in  a t temp tin g to comply
with  di rect ion s r ece ived fr om th e  t rial judge.334 It  is
un rea sonable, however , t o exp ect  ju rors t o compr ehend
inst ruct ions which ar e extrem ely complex and  appea r t o be
delivered solely  for  the legal pretense tha t  t he ins t ruct ions  were
t ech n ically correct .335 Fur ther , it  is  unrea son able  to exp ect
jur ors t o comply  wi th ins t ruct ions  tha t  a re  con t r a ry to w h at
th ey know to be tr ue. 336 One r eason wh y the cu r rent  char acter
evide nce inst ru ctions hu rled  at  jur ors a re s o hopeless ly
in effectua l is t ha t ju ror s kn ow from t heir  own common sense
and exp er ien ce t h a t  t ru ly sim ilar  crim es evid en ce is r eleva nt
pr ecisely to dem on s t r ate a  gener al cha ra cter  tr ait , which  in
turn  is  rele va nt  to the li keli hood of r ep ea ted  simila r  condu ct .337
By con t r a s t , t he re i s no popu la r  commi tmen t  t o t he  not ion
t ha t  pe ople s hould  be  pu nished  for  cr im es  for  wh ich  t h e y a re
not  on trial. Quite to the contrary, the cautionary instr u ct i on
accompanying evidence admitt ed un der P roposed Rule One is
not  only easy to underst an d, it is also perfectly consist ent wi t h
common, in tu it ive  not ions  of fundamenta l  fa i rness . Even  to the
unsubs t an t ia t ed extent that  a juror might be unconsciously
tem pted  to punish  for pr ior crimes, an  inst ru ction tha t a lerts
the juror to guard against t his possibility is ver y likely t o ha ve
it s in ten de d e ffect .338
P R O P O S E D  RU LE  TWO: E vidence of  specif ic  cr imes,  wr ongs
or  act s w h ich  h av e n ot r es u lte d in  a cr im in al  conv iction , an d
n ot  in clu d in g  con d u ct  w h ich  is  t h e sub jec t of a ch ar ge, cla im  or
de fen s e  which  i s  the  s ub jec t  o f the  p roceed ing ,  sha l l  no t  be
ad m issib le  un le s s  t h e court  d eter min es th at  th e pr obat ive
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va lue  o f such  ev idence  ou twe ighs  any  d a n g er  of u n fa i r
p r eju d ice , con fu s ion  of t h e  is su e s, m i sle a din g  th e  ju r y , u n d u e
de la y , w a ste  of  t ime  or  nee dless  pr esen ta t ion of  cumu lat ive
ev idence .
Pr oposed Ru le T wo would  govern  a ll s pe cific in stan ces of
conduct  not resu lting in a  crimina l conviction offered as
cha ract e r evidence. It is envisioned that th is rule would also,
th erefore, cover evide nce h avin g special relevan ce becau se of a
s t r ik ing simila r it y t o the con d u ct  a t  i ssue (such  as  some of the
evide nce cur ren t ly a llow ed under  Rule 404(b) un der t he
mislabel  of noncharacter  evide nce), e ven  though  s u ch  conduct
did  not  res ult  in a  crim ina l conviction. Because  th is  evide nce
la cks th e sa fegua rd s a nd  vir tues  of evide nce of con du ct  wh ich
has resulted in criminal convictions,33 9  Proposed Rule Two
con ta ins a  pr es umpt ion  of exclusion , a s d is t in gu ished  from the
pr esu mp tion  of adm issibility in Pr oposed Rule On e. The bur den
is pla ced u pon t he  pr oponen t of su ch evid en ce to sa tis fy the
t r i a l cou r t  t ha t  t he p roba t ive valu e of the ch aracter  evide nce
outweigh s any  dangers  of un jus t  pun ishment  or  undue
att ention to collateral matt ers.
P R O P O S E D RULE  THRE E:  Ev idence  o f spec if ic  cr imes ,
w r on gs  or a cts of t he  accu sed  offered  by t he  pr osecu tion  in a
cr im i n a l cas e, ot h er  th a n  th e cr im es  or a cts  wh ich  a re  su bje ct
of th e  c h a r g es  in  t h e  cas e, sh al l n ot b e a dm iss ible  u n les s, u pon
reques t  b y t h e  a ccu s e d ,  t h e  p r os e cu t i o n  s h a l l p r o v id e
re as ona ble  n o ti ce  in  a d v a n ce  of t r ia l , o r d u r i n g t r ia l if t h e
cour t  excuses  p re t r i a l  no t i ce  on  good  cause  s h ow n , of t h e
g en e r a l n a t u r e  o f a n y  s u c h  e v id en c e  i t  i n t ends  t o  in t r oduce  a t
t r ia l .
The la ngu age of th is P roposed  Rule  Thr ee is t ak en ver bat im
from th e 1991 a men dm ent  to Ru le 404(b) add ing a pr e t r ia l
not i ce r e quirem ent  to th at  ru le. Proposed Rule Thr ee
complet ely accommoda tes  any conce rn , cons t it u t ion a l or
other wise, abou t p rovidin g th e crim ina l defenda nt  with  a fa ir
op p or tun ity to prepare a defense. Moreover, it  provides the
defendan t  with s ufficient in form at ion to move in  limine t o
exclude evide nce of p r ior  m is conduct, t hu s avoiding th e dan ger
of unfa i r  pre jud ice  tha t  can  occur  when objections are made and
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340. S ee CLEARY ET AL ., supra  note 15, § 186, at 550; L e on a r d, supra  no te 12 , a t
16; Uviller , supra  note 12, at  885.
sus ta ined  only after  th e jury ha s hea rd t he imp erm issible, yet
neve r thele ss  pot en t ia lly  da magin g, ques t ion .
A case can  be made tha t  such  a  p ret r i a l not i ce  requ irement
shou ld apply t o a ll evid en ce of u ncharged  miscondu ct  and n ot
just tha t  of the  cr imina l  defenda nt . This would include, th en,
evide nce of p r ior  misconduct  by th e victim  of the  crim e, by t he
par ties  in a  civil action, a nd  by wit nesses (which might  be
in t roduced to a t t ack cred ibi lit y). I  have n ot  in clu de d s uch  a
br oad not i ce  r equ ir emen t  in P roposed Rule Thr ee because t he
specia l pr otect ion s t o be  a fforde d t o the cr i m in a l  de fendan t  a r e
man ife st , and b eca use  in  other  context s a  pr et r ia l n ot ice
requ i rement might be too burdensome. For example, a part y
m i gh t  not  know t he id en t it y of a ll of t he wit nes se s t o be  ca lled
by the opponent, and t herefore the circumst ances migh t  be too
fluid reasonab ly  to requ i re a  pa r ty t o sp ecify , in  advance of
t r i a l, th e cha ra cter  evid en ce it  exp ect s t o use  to a t t ack the
credibility of the opposition witnes ses.
P R OP O SE D  RULE  FOU R:  Ev idence  of  t he  ch a r a ct e r  of a
pe r son  i s  n ot  a d m i s s i b le  by  tes t imon y  as  to  repu ta t ion  or  by
te st im on y in  th e for m  of a n  opin ion, e xcep t t ha t t he  accu sed  in
a  cr im in a l pr ose cu tio n  m a y in tr odu ce s u ch  evi de n ce
co n ce r n in g  h is  or  h e r  ow n  ch a r a c te r .
The gen er a l ba n  on cha r a ct e r  evide nce in  the for m of
opin ion  or  r epu ta t ion  t e st im ony is  ju st ifie d b eca use  su ch
evide nce is t he weakest, least reliable and relatively most
m i slead ing form that  character  evidence can take .340 The
exce pt ion  for t he cr im in a l defendant ’s proof of his or her  own
good character is warran ted for two reasons. F i r st ,  the
consequ ences of a  cr imina l  prosecu t ion  war ran t  specia l
p recau t ions aga ins t a n er ron eous conviction . Second, it  is
especially  difficult to demonstrate good character solely by
in t roducing sp ecifi c in st ances of good  conduct .  A defendan t
accused of seria l killings does not advance his or her defense
sign ifica n t ly by calling individua ls to test ify only tha t wh en
each  of t hem encoun te red  the defendan t , t he d efenda nt  did n ot
k il l each  of t hem.
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341. S ee supra  no t e 11 and  accompanying t ext .
T h er e is n o pr ovis ion  in  Propos ed  Ru le F our  for  the cr oss-
exa mina t ion  of character witnesses as to specific insta nces of
bad conduct  of t he  pe r son  abou t  whom  th e cha ra cter  witn ess is
te st ifying. The  omiss ion is by de sign . If specific inst ances of
misconduct  qua lify for a dm issibilit y un der  eith er P roposed  Rule
One or Proposed Ru le T wo, t hen  ther e is  no rea son  not  to a llow
th eir  use in  cr oss-examination of a char acter witness called by
the accused pursua nt t o Proposed Rule Four .  However ,  if the
alleged sp ecifi c act s of m iscondu ct  by t he d efenda nt  do n ot
qu a lify for adm issibility u nde r  eit her  Propos ed  Ru le O ne or
Pr oposed Ru le T wo, the government sh ould not be permitt ed to
p res e nt  th e sa me in format ion  to the ju ry u nde r  the p ret ext  of
t es t ing th e weight t o be given to th e test imony of th e positive
characte r  wi tness .
There is a lso no pr ovision for pe rm itt ing t he  governmen t  t o
call a  character  wit nes s t o offer  a  nega t ive  opinion  or
r epu ta t ion  concerning the defendan t ’s  characte r  once  the
defenda n t  ha s pu t on  a p ositive cha ra cter  witn ess a s t her e is
un der t he curr ent la w.341
Fina lly, not hin g in P roposed  Rule F our  res tr icts t he a bility
of t he  de fendan t  (or  any othe r  pa r ty) to int roduce  op in ion  or
r epu ta t ion  t estimony for a pur pose other than  to establish the
cha ract e r of a person. Thu s, for exam ple, a defenda nt  char ged
with  a crime of violence who cla im s t o ha ve a cted  in  se lf-
defense wou ld  be fr ee t o pu t  on e vid en ce t ha t  he or  sh e (t he
defendan t ) was a w a r e of th e r ep uta t ion  for v iolence of t he
victim  of th e alleged crime, becau se su ch eviden ce would not be
offered an d r eceived t o prove t he  cha ra cter  of the  victim , bu t
ra th er  to prove the r easona bleness of the defend a n t ’s beh avior
un der  th e circumst an ces as he or sh e rea sonably perceived
th em t o be.
VII. CO N C L U S I O N
 The cha ract e r  evidence ru le cannot be just ified by any
sound policy. It  exist s because of an en tirely un justified
mistrust  of th e ju ry. The r u le a s w r it t en  a llow s for  many
complicated  exception s t ha t a re in consist ent  with  th e supp osed
reasons for th e ru le its elf, an d t he r ule in  practice is observed
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ M E L - F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1630 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
spor ad ically a t  b est. Th e presen t a ppr oach to the cha ra cter
evide nce pr oblem  is e nt ir ely u nfa ir  to ju ror s, as it r equires
them  to m as te r a nd  comply wit h obs cur e a nd  count er int uit ive
rules. A supe r ior , s t r eaml ined and more h onest a ppr oach can be
obtained  by su bst itu tin g four  sim ple, compr eh en sible, a nd
workable rules for the curr ent morass.
